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1  Canada, although not in Europe, was a contributing NATO member; New Zealand, although 
no longer a member of ANZUS, had been designated a non-NATO ally by the administration of Bill 
Clinton in 1997.
Global Allies in a Changing World
Michael Wesley
In October 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, US forces invaded Afghanistan, the country from which the attacks 
had been planned and coordinated. Operation Enduring Freedom, 
the invasion and subsequent stabilisation and state-building project in 
Afghanistan, saw the United States supported by the largest-ever coalition 
of its allies: 10 from Europe and two from Asia.1 Over the next 13 years, 
US allies from Asia and Europe planned, fought and worked side by 
side in unprecedented numbers and intensity, battling a  rising Taliban 
insurgency and supporting the consolidation of the Afghan Government 
and security forces. In the process, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in Europe and the San Francisco System in Asia became global 
allies, collaborating not only in Afghanistan but also in the stabilisation 
of Iraq, the setting up of the Proliferation Security Initiative to prevent 
transnational nuclear proliferation, and enforcing anti-piracy patrols in the 
Gulf of Aden. Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, 
New Zealand and Pakistan were designated ‘major non-NATO allies’ 




A decade after the invasion of Afghanistan, in a speech to a joint sitting 
of the Australian parliament, US President Barack Obama proclaimed 
that ‘the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of 
the Asia Pacific region … the United States will play a larger and long-
term role in shaping this region and its future’.2 By mid-2012, the 
administration’s resolve had been written into strategic policy: the United 
States would ‘rebalance’ its attention away from the Middle East towards 
the Asia-Pacific region, where 60 per cent of its naval, space and cyber 
assets would be positioned.3 The American rebalance caused more than 
a ripple of disquiet among US allies in Europe. Many responded to the 
understandable implication that a rebalance towards Asia would mean 
a diminution of America’s commitment to its security partnerships 
elsewhere. For many NATO members, the Chinese challenge to America’s 
Pacific primacy was remote, whereas Russia’s increasingly assertive and 
aggressive policies towards its near neighbours, Georgia, the Ukraine 
and NATO members in the Baltic states, represented the most profound 
challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War. Ironically 
at the same time in Asia, many security elites expressed scepticism about 
the seriousness of the rebalance. They questioned whether the United 
States would really be able to disentangle its forces and attention from 
the ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa and, even if 
it could, whether it would have the resolve to face down an increasingly 
confident and demanding China in the western Pacific. These concerns 
are likely to continue given the US air campaign against the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its recent recommitment of forces to Europe 
in the aftermath of Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Thus, in the first decade of the 21st century, US allies in Europe and Asia 
had traced the full arc of their new condition of interdependence, first 
tasting the benefits of collaboration and solidarity; and then the anxieties 
of competing for US commitment, attention and resources. Never before 
had NATO and the San Francisco system been so mutually significant. 
In 1949, the United States reversed 150 years of eschewing alliances 
by agreeing to a multilateral pact to shore up postwar Europe against 
an antagonistic and expansive Soviet Union. At the time, Washington 
had categorically ruled out a similar commitment in Asia, and rebuffed 
2  ‘Text of Obama’s Speech to Parliament’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 Nov. 2011, www.smh.com.
au/national/text-of-obamas-speech-to-parliament-20111117-1nkcw.html.
3  US Department of Defense, ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense’, p. 2.
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attempts by anxious wartime partners, such as Australia, to be allowed 
inside the NATO tent, at least at a consultative level. Gradually, however, 
whether as a condition for a peace deal with a rehabilitated Japan, or under 
the threat of communist expansion into the Pacific, it reneged, signing 
a series of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia and New Zealand from 1951. Unlike NATO, these 
would be bilateral (or trilateral, in the case of Australia, New Zealand, 
United States Security (ANZUS)), and their operative clauses in general 
much less compelling as security guarantees than NATO’s Article 5.
For the next half-century, the two alliance systems operated in isolation. 
While some NATO members joined the United Nations’ enforcement 
action in Korea in the 1950s, it was not a NATO operation. None of the 
San Francisco allies showed the slightest interest in supporting the Asian 
commitments of European powers, even though Britain contributed to 
the postcolonial stabilisation and defence of Malaya. The Vietnam War in 
the 1960s and 1970s mobilised the San Francisco allies minus Japan, but 
not a single NATO member. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 saw US 
allies from Europe and Asia come together to support a UN enforcement 
operation, as in Korea, but the experience was brief and had little effect on 
the different worlds of the two alliance systems. NATO became consumed 
by its post–Cold War expansion and the wars of the former Yugoslavia, 
while the San Francisco system seemed in decline, with Taiwan’s loss of its 
formal alliance with the United States in 1978, New Zealand’s expulsion 
from ANZUS in 1986, and the closure of US bases in the Philippines in 
1992. As the new century dawned, it was not an attack on any smaller ally, 
but on the superpower anchor of both alliance systems that brought about 
a new era of interdependence. Suddenly the rationale of both alliance 
systems had shifted from deterring and defeating state-based aggression to 
addressing state dysfunction and battling transnational violent extremism. 
The new reality in a unipolar world was that allies of the sole superpower 
had to anticipate, understand and integrate with their major ally’s new 
strategic imperatives. As a wounded America rose in fury, its long-time 
allies faced a choice of rising with it or being cast aside. For the first time, 
the thoughts and actions of remote US allies on the other side of the 
world became of abiding importance.
The Global Allies Project, on which this volume is based, brought 
together strategic scholars from eight countries allied to the United States 
to discuss challenges in alliance dynamics and management. The project is 
a response to a major lacuna in this new era of alliance interdependence. 
GLOBAL ALLIES
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While today America’s European and Asian allies are intimately aware 
of each other’s thinking on terrorism and counterinsurgency, counter-
proliferation, piracy and sea-lane security, cyber-threats and hybrid 
challenges, there has been remarkably little discussion of the challenges 
of alliance management among the allies of the United States. While 
there are large and inevitable differences between different alliances, there 
are also significant commonalities, including dilemmas of commitment, 
trust and risk management, the difficulties of managing American 
expectations and domestic political resistance, issues of defence spending 
and interoperability, and reconciling alliance commitments with other 
foreign policy interests. For 60 years, US allies have managed these 
issues in mutual isolation, and sometimes in competition with each 
other. The Global Allies Project seeks to add a crucial tile to the alliance 
interdependence puzzle, by systematically comparing the challenges and 
processes of alliance management across a range of long-standing US allies 
in Europe and Asia.
Rather than look backwards, however, the Global Allies Project looks 
toward the future of alliance management in Europe and Asia. While it 
is impossible to tell whether another 9/11 will happen to reinforce the 
interoperation of Asian and European allies of the United States, we believe 
there are structural forces at play that will reinforce the interdependence 
of the two alliance systems, and that make the case for comparing 
alliance management dynamics an enduring one. It is the purpose of this 
introductory chapter to explore what some of these structural forces are. 
In the sections ahead, I examine the imperatives of alliance policy in an 
era of relative US power decline, of regional and global order challenges 
by revanchist powers, and of the changing balance of costs and benefits in 
alliance commitments. Rather than establish a framework for the detailed 
alliance-specific case studies that follow, this chapter is intended to set the 
general scene against which those case studies can be read.
Declining Relatives
The perennial debates about the relative decline of American power serve 
to underline how central US primacy has been for the post–World War II 
global order. The unprecedented and probably never-to-be replicated 
post–World War II power lead that allowed the United States to craft 
a world order according to its preferences, convince a large number of 
other states of its legitimacy, and defend it against its opponents, has been 
5
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eroding steadily over the past 70 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union led 
to two decades of unipolarity but, unlike after World War II, the United 
States was not able to craft a stable or enduring ‘new world order’ as its 
first post–Cold War president promised. Indeed, the past two decades 
have demonstrated the complexity and intractability of threats to world 
order and the limits of American power to craft durable solutions to them.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to American primacy has been the pervasive 
uncertainty within its own policymaking system about what US power 
can achieve and how and when it should be wielded. As the dust of 
the Soviet collapse settled, Washington was nonplussed at the seeming 
puniness of those challengers that arose in defiance of George HW Bush’s 
new world order: a jumped-up Iraqi strongman; Serbian paramilitary 
thugs; an unhinged, jumpsuit-wearing North Korean dictator; and drug-
addled Somali gangs. But, despite not even approaching the seriousness 
of the Cold War’s crises, these new challenges would prove anything but 
routine matters for the sole superpower. American forces had little trouble 
in winning kinetic victories; what American power couldn’t achieve was 
enduring solutions that were acceptable to liberal consciences or the 
liberal order. What these frustratingly enduring challenges produced was 
a rising tide of criticism within the US of how those in charge of US 
foreign policy were handling the sword and shield of the Republic.
And so, American foreign policy lurched between extremes of aggression 
and restraint as the 21st century began. The George W Bush administration 
brought to power a critical mass of neoconservatives who believed that 
it was imperative to use the unipolar moment to reshape the world 
for another era of American dominance and liberal peace. American 
power could not only recast an infinitely pliable world, it could create 
new realities. Those who resisted would be crushed, those who objected 
would be cast aside; those who were onboard would benefit from the new 
reality. But the early swagger of the neoconservatives turned sour as global 
opinion turned against the projected invasion of Iraq, and as coalition 
troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq faced rising insurgencies. The 2008 
presidential election campaign saw both Republican and Democratic 
contenders criticise the Bush administration’s recklessness in its use 
of force, its rhetorical excesses, and its cavalier treatment of long-time 
allies and partners of the United States. Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, 
replaced confrontation with conciliation with those seen to be resisting 
the liberal global order—the Muslim world, China, Russia, Iran—and 
became as hesitant to use force as his predecessor had been  bellicose. 
GLOBAL ALLIES
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Yet Obama’s foreign policy registered few successes. Despite his search 
for a  series of ‘resets’, Russia, China and Iran became more assertive 
and defiant and a series of Muslim states in the Middle East and Africa 
succumbed to an even more brutal jihadist insurgency. The candidates 
in the 2016 presidential election have united in distancing themselves 
from the Obama approach to the use—and particularly the non-use—
of American power.
The backdrop to the oscillation of approaches to American power has 
been the slow vanishing of the unipolar era due to a combination of 
factors. One was the real demonstration of the limits of American power 
in Afghanistan and Iraq; unlike the Vietnam War, which was a proxy 
conflict against two Cold War opponents, these have been 21st-century 
insurgencies combining a millennial ideology, brittle structures of domestic 
order, deep sectarian divisions, and global support networks facilitated 
by new social media. The United States ran down its stocks of goodwill, 
public support, defence financing and tolerance for casualties, while 
the challenges of state dysfunction and Islamist insurgencies continue 
unabated. Meanwhile the global financial crisis mired the United States, 
Europe and Japan in debt, while dealing a major blow to the legitimacy 
of Western liberal dominance of the global economy. In the aftermath 
of the crisis, it became less and less controversial to observe the growing 
economic heft of emerging economies, particularly in Asia; on current 
trends, the United States will yield its century-long position as the world’s 
largest economy during this decade. China is already the world’s largest 
economy in purchasing power parity terms, the world’s largest importer 
of minerals and energy, the world’s largest exporter, the world’s largest 
manufacturer, the world’s largest trading nation, and the primary trading 
partner for 130 countries. In the meantime, its military spending has been 
increasing rapidly, leading some observers to argue that China represents 
a more profound threat to US primacy than the Soviet Union ever did.
At this time of relative decline, the United States faces some profound 
challenges to the liberal global order it founded. The Arab ‘Spring’ of 
2009–11 did not bring about a spread of representative democracy in 
the Middle East but, rather, the collapse of political order amid a virulent 
fanatical insurgency, deepening sectarian divisions and the growing 
assertiveness of regional powers. The global financial crisis bequeathed 
a chronically weak and unstable global economy, in which the status quo 
powers in the international economic order are faced with mounting 
debt and pervasive weaknesses in their currencies, and more and more 
7
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countries are looking to decidedly illiberal means of returning to stability 
and growth.4 Meanwhile, three powers have begun new forms of military 
adventurism across the Eurasian landmass. Using the pretext of protecting 
ethnic Russian minorities outside its borders, Russia launched attacks 
on Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, dismembering parts of both 
states’ territories. In the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Iran used the resulting chaos to extend its influence into Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon and Yemen. Iranian forces are currently at war in Iraq, Syria and 
Yemen. In eastern Asia, China asserted territorial claims in the East China 
Sea and the South China Sea and across the line of control with India. 
Taken together, these actions represent a challenge to the territorial order 
across Asia, agreed in 1991 in Europe, 1915 in the Middle East and 1945 
in East Asia. And each of these three revisionist powers, having closely 
watched US air and sea power in action since the end of the Cold War, 
has been patiently building up its anti-area access and denial (A2AD) 
capabilities—a development that has created an uncertainty of response 
in the United States and its allies. Finally, the world now faces new threats 
to the global information commons. The increasingly interconnected 
information and control systems of societies have proven extremely 
vulnerable to criminal and coercive attack; at the same time, the resort 
of major states to  authoritarian control over their information systems 
threatens a possible Balkanisation of the global information network.
The combination of falling US relative power and rising systemic threats 
to that power creates a paradox of rising indispensability and falling 
credibility for the United States among its allies. On the one hand, 
Washington is unsure whether a decisive show of resolve will only further 
illustrate the ineffectiveness of US power a la Iraq and Afghanistan; on the 
other, each case of perceived American hesitance is taken as more evidence 
of the recession of American primacy. Meanwhile, American allies face 
challenges to the liberal order with a growing sense that any effective 
response must involve the full complement of allied commitment and 
solidarity, but such are the expectations of allies in Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East that the American response will almost inevitably be found 
wanting in each theatre. While Stephen Walt is right to observe that 
4  The rise of statist economic models is the most prominent and worrying of these; see Ian 




hard balancing against the unipole is unlikely even under conditions 
of declining relative power, the dilemmas of alliance commitment and 
credibility are no less diminished.5
Shoring Up the Liberal Order
The frequency of US allies’ and partners’ recent exhortations on the need 
to defend the liberal order is a compelling sign that they are increasingly 
worried about its integrity. The states system seems to be under attack 
from above and below. In the Middle East and North Africa, jihadist 
insurgencies explicitly reject the borders drawn between Muslim societies. 
Their goal of a transnational caliphate, if successful, seeks to recast the 
postcolonial order across the Muslim world. In place of state territorial 
boundaries would be a single confessional divide between the society of 
believers and those of the unbelievers; across this divide would exist a state 
of perpetual war. 
Empire states exist in the Caucasus and the Western Pacific that are 
determined to expand their boundaries, either through formal annexations 
of territory or through the creation of spheres of influence. President 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia grieves the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
loss of territory, in Europe and Central Asia, but especially in the Caucasus. 
Both Georgia and Ukraine made the fatal mistake of seeking to align 
their countries more with the West and less with Russia; such a challenge 
to the Russian sphere of influence was met by direct aggression and the 
annexation of strategically crucial territory. In the Western Pacific, China 
increasingly views the ‘first island chain’, stretching from Japan through 
the Ryukyus and Taiwan to the Philippines as a scheme imposed on it by 
the Western postwar settlement, to hem China in through an archipelago 
controlled by states hostile to it and allied with the United States. Beijing 
is increasingly intent on overturning this postwar settlement, absorbing 
Taiwan, building sea control in the South China Sea, and nibbling away 
at the Ryukyus via its claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As in the 
Caucasus, it is a process of challenging the status quo through unilateral 
and unpredictable faits accompli.
5  Stephen M Walt, ‘Alliances in a Unipolar World’, World Politics, vol. 61, no. 1, Jan. 2009, 
pp. 86–120. doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000045.
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In both Europe and Asia, the United States and its allies face a real paradox 
of liberal order maintenance that makes their commitments to uphold the 
liberal order both conditional and unconditional. The conditionality of 
the liberal order arises from its commitment to certain values, such as 
democracy, the rule of law and free assembly and exchange, as well as its 
belief that the liberal order will not be complete until there is universal 
adherence to these claims. Real problems arise when the liberal order is 
dependent on illiberal regimes for its stability. In these cases, support for 
authoritarian allies is always conditional and unpredictable; the fate of 
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak showed that long-term US support 
can be suddenly withdrawn when one’s authoritarian nature is suddenly 
on stark display. The parallel unconditionality of the liberal order arises 
from its commitment to liberal values and their eventual universality. 
This  means that an attack on these values anywhere is taken to be an 
attack on them everywhere, creating mounting demands on the United 
States and its allies to ‘do something’ when these values are under assault. 
Whether or not actual strategic interests are at stake becomes secondary 
and, once committed to, the draining defence of liberal values becomes 
very hard to walk away from.
Both the conditionality and the unconditionality of liberal-order 
maintenance create real opportunities for those challenging the order. 
For a start, by definition these are states that do not identify with the 
order or its maintenance; they are able to free ride on those aspects they 
can benefit from, while avoiding, resisting or undermining elements they 
find threatening. The conditionality of US support for authoritarian 
or problematic allies creates opportunities for new partnerships, such 
as those developing between China and Saudi Arabia or between Russia 
and Pakistan. The unconditionality of US and allied commitments to 
defending liberal values generates a perpetual state of strategic chaos, 
as  the upholders of the liberal order perpetually disperse their forces 
and resources based on maps not of interests but of values. The fanatical 
jihadists in the Muslim world can dependably draw the ‘Great Satan’ and 
its allies into what they believe to be a millennial battle on their own turf 
simply through a growing catalogue of outrages.
GLOBAL ALLIES
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Alliance Costs and Benefits
The long history of regarding alliances in accounting terms, weighing 
up the costs and risks against the benefits and assurances they provide, 
is deeply embedded in political logics and the public mind. Arguably, 
one of the main reasons for the longevity of US alliances has been that 
their benefits have been seen to vastly outweigh their costs. For much of 
their history, US alliances have been relatively costless for both America 
and its allies. While it has become commonplace for American defence 
policymakers to complain of their allies’ underspending on defence, there 
is little to suggest that America’s alliance commitments contributed to 
higher US defence spending than would otherwise have been the case, 
while for much of their tenure, most US basing commitments in Asia 
and Europe have been financially supported by its smaller allies. For those 
smaller allies, there has rarely been any serious doubt that their alliances 
with the United States allowed them a level of security out of all proportion 
to their direct investments in the military and intelligence capabilities; or 
that an ending of their alliance with the United States would necessitate 
much greater defence expenditure to acquire the same level of protection.6 
Even when there were losses of blood and treasure in fighting alongside 
the United States in regional conflicts, smaller allies were aware that such 
exercises allowed their forces to maintain cutting-edge capabilities and 
their agencies access to inner realms of American intelligence and strategy.
An argument could be made that, for both America and its allies, there has 
been a convenient security–political trade-off to be made through their 
security relationships. Alliances in Asia and Europe provided the United 
States with political cover for its security commitments; the willingness 
of major powers to partner with US security commitments across the 
globe provided a sense of universal legitimacy to US strategic goals, both 
during the Cold War and after. For allies, the US guarantee provided 
security cover for their political alignments with the United States and 
the West; this meant that European states living under the shadow of the 
Iron Curtain and Asian states concerned about the spread of communist 
insurgencies could reassure themselves that they were safer as staunch 
members of the West than they would be if they tried to become neutral 
6  Of course, there have been arguments that US alliances have actually detracted from allies’ 
security by making them more prominent targets of attack.
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and avoid the confrontation. Nor has there been a strong sense, on the 
part of the United States or its smaller allies, that the alliance has acted 
as a significant constraint on their freedom of foreign policy initiative.7
The politics of alliance maintenance have been subtle and varied across 
the various allied states. The virtues of American strategic power tend 
to erode quickly among both American and allied publics soon after 
that power is deployed. Consequently, alliance maintenance has always 
been an exercise in ‘two-level games’ in which allied governments must 
try to maintain domestic political acceptance for a range of alliance 
commitments that are regarded as acceptable by US policymakers.8 
Repeatedly, the two-level logic of alliance maintenance, in combination 
with the alliance accounting (or  insurance) metaphor, has led to allies 
casting the alliance as the objective, rather than the means, of foreign 
and strategic policy. This meant that the United States was often joined 
in the exercise of coercion not because allies particularly subscribed to 
the objectives of coercion with the same intensity as the United States, 
but because they believed, and could argue to their publics, that ‘alliance 
maintenance’ required such a commitment to be shown.
There are three dangers in this approach. The first is that the alliance 
becomes heavily politicised. Controversial or costly actions taken in 
coalition with the intention of investing in alliance maintenance will end 
up increasing opposition to the alliance among both American and allied 
publics. The second cost is for the United States, because the imperative 
of alliance maintenance will mean that it finds itself paired with coalition 
partners who are less interested in the actual strategic objectives at hand 
than they are in keeping their major ally happy. This has been a problem in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, where US allies have made decisions to pull out 
of operations long before the situation has been regarded as stable enough 
to justify withdrawal. The third danger of this approach to alliances is 
a tendency for both the United States and its allies to turn situations into 
tests of alliance credibility. The best example of this was the response to the 
9/11 attacks, which the George W Bush administration clearly signalled 
was a test of how much allies were committed to American security and 
7  See, for example, Michael Beckley, ‘The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security 
Risks of US Defense Pacts’, International Security, vol. 39, no. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 7–48. doi.
org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197.
8  See Robert D Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 




American global-order preferences. The result was broad buy-in to the 
invasion of Afghanistan, a country in which no Asian or European ally 
had any strategic stake. A couple of years later, Bush raised the alliance 
commitment bar by setting his sights on an invasion of Iraq, based on 
highly tenuous connections to the 9/11 attacks and global security more 
broadly. In this case, the Bush administration was in effect asking its allies 
not only to place their alliance ties above their own non-existent interests 
in Iraq, but also above their commitments to the rule of international 
law and the substantial opposition of their own populations. In the 
end, two European allies (Britain and Spain) and one Asian (Australian) 
joined the invasion, all three using the demonstration of their solidarity 
with Washington to gain significant concessions from a grateful Bush 
administration. Ultimately, perhaps reflecting some realism on the part of 
the Bush administration, there were few negative consequences for allies 
that did not join the Iraq invasion or its subsequent stabilisation phase.
There are signs that the relatively costless nature of alliances is starting 
to be questioned in both Europe and Asia. In the face of direct Russian 
and Chinese challenges to the status quo and to American primacy, both 
the United States and its respective allies are aware of difficult choices.9 
During the 2016 US presidential election campaign, Republican 
candidate Donald Trump committed to requiring US allies in Europe 
and Asia to pay more of the shared cost of their own security or risk the 
attenuation of those alliances. It remains to be seen whether the president 
will deliver on these pledges. Victor Cha observes that, in Asia, an alliance 
security dilemma has developed: whereas US-alliance-initiated regional 
efforts are portrayed as latent strategies for containing China, region-
initiated attempts to engage China are seen as attempts to exclude the 
United States.10 A similar situation may be emerging in Europe, where 
US initiatives aimed at deterring further Russian adventurism are being 
seen by some as only increasing Russian hostility, while European efforts 
to engage with Russia are seen by others to be weakening NATO. Beyond 
this, the utility of alliances is starting to be questioned. In Asia, every 
Chinese provocation is now taken as a litmus test of American resolve 
9  See, for example, Stefanie V Hlatky & Jessica T Darden, ‘Cash or Combat? America’s Asian 
Alliances During the War in Afghanistan’, Asian Security, vol. 11, no. 1, Mar. 2015, pp. 31–51. 
doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2015.1006360; Tongfi Kim, ‘The Role of Leaders in Intra-Alliance 
Bargaining’, Asian Security, vol. 10, no. 1, Mar. 2014, pp. 47–69. doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.
874338.
10  Victor D Cha, ‘Complex Patchworks: US Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture’, 
Asia Policy, no. 11, Jan. 2011, pp. 27–50.
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and alliance commitment, a situation that bears heavily on American 
policymakers and cedes a great deal of initiative to Beijing. In Europe, 
there is a sense that NATO has been of little utility in dealing with three 
pressing challenges: the war in the Levant, Russian adventurism in the 
Caucasus, and the growing refugee crisis. It seems that alliances, so often 
seen as the ends of security policy, are now being found wanting as the 
means to greater security in more challenging security environments 
in both Europe and Asia.
Conclusion
Against this background, the comparison of alliance-management 
challenges faced by European and Asian allies of the United States unfolds 
as a rich exercise. While clearly acknowledging the differences between the 
two regions—the nature of treaty commitments, multilateralism versus 
bilateralism, strategic geography and levels of development—what has 
been truly fascinating has been the similarities between the two regions. 
Indeed, there have been more than a few points of convergence: the 
dilemmas of dealing with ‘grey zone’/hybrid threats, the challenges of 
interoperability and the tension between regional and global focus for 
alliance action. But perhaps the most intriguing convergence has been in 
relation to alliance structures: whereas in Asia a system of bilateral alliances 
is slowly plurilateralising as US allies develop security partnerships with 
each other; in Europe there has been an observable process of NATO 
allies quietly developing their own bilateral security relationships with the 
United States.
The chapters that follow have been developed by security specialists and 
consider their own country’s alliance with the United States. They constitute 
a rich collection of reflections on particular alliances, but arguably an even 
richer collective reflection on some of the generic challenges of managing 




1  J Thomas Schieffer, ‘Remarks Upon Arrival of the USS George Washington’, Yokosuka, 25 Sep. 
2008, viewed Aug. 2016, japan2.usembassy.gov/e/p/2008/tp-20080925-71.html.
2  Roger Buckley, US–Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
pp. 28–29; Michael J Green, ‘Balance of Power’, in Steven K Vogel (ed.), U.S.–Japan Relations in 
a Changing World, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, pp. 12–14; HDP Envall, 
‘Clashing Expectations: Strategic Thinking and Alliance Mismanagement in Japan’, in Yoichiro Sato 
& Tan See Seng (eds), United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: Perspectives from Asia, Amherst, 
NY: Cambria Press, 2015, pp. 66–67.
Japan: From Passive Partner 
to Active Ally
HDP Envall
Japan is America’s key ally in the Asia-Pacific, with the US–Japan alliance 
the foundation of America’s role as a ‘Pacific’ power. Indeed, the United 
States ‘has no better friend in the world than Japan’.1 This important 
alliance emerged from Japan’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent 
American-led occupation, but especially from America’s shifting global 
strategy in the early Cold War. Increasingly tense relations with the Soviet 
Union, the communist victory in China and the Korean War pushed 
the United States to secure Japan within the Western bloc. The resulting 
strategic bargain between the two countries was for the United States to 
provide security for Japan, with Japan offering bases for the US military 
in return. The arrangement established Japan for the United States as 
a dependent security partner; however, it also allowed Japan to focus on 
the important postwar task of economic redevelopment.2
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Despite facing some significant challenges, as well as considerable change 
in both countries, this structure has persisted largely intact over the 
subsequent 65 years. This continuity has, however, begun to give way over 
the past decade, especially in terms of how Japan envisages the alliance. 
During this period, and particularly since 2010, the emergence of a more 
contested order in the Asia-Pacific has prompted Japan to move away 
from its traditional acceptance of key asymmetries in the alliance. Japan 
is now seeking to distance itself from its role as a passive alliance partner 
and become a more active US ally. 
This shift has been driven by the country’s changing threat perceptions 
and  the resulting recalculation of alliance risks. Japan—as with many 
junior  allies—has always struggled to manage the dilemma between 
entrapment and abandonment, the ‘secondary alliance’ dilemma 
described by Glenn Snyder.3 On the one hand, to rely excessively on the 
United States would be to risk becoming entrapped in American security 
engagements. On the other hand, however, to seek greater autonomy 
would be to risk being abandoned by the United States.4 Over the past 
decade, Japan has come to perceive the risks of entrapment, even as they 
remain substantial and could potentially rise further, as less problematic 
than the risks presented by the changing balance of power (and threat) in 
the region and thus of abandonment.5 In turn, this has pushed Japanese 
policymakers into revising the country’s approach to international security 
and its role within the US alliance.
In order to explain Japan’s experience of changing strategic conditions 
and security perceptions, this chapter assesses two interrelated dimensions 
of Japan’s strategic calculations. It seeks primarily to understand how, in 
terms of domestic politics, Japan has approached its role in the alliance. 
But it also examines how Japan has managed its engagement of the wider 
regional context, especially in terms of the biggest change to the region—
the rise of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China).6 This chapter 
3  See Glenn H Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 
1984, pp. 466–68.
4  Green, ‘Balance of Power’, 2002, p. 14.
5  On increasing risks of abandonment and entrapment, see Nick Bisley, ‘Securing the “Anchor 
of Regional Stability”? The Transformation of the US‒Japan Alliance and East Asian Security’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 2008, pp. 86–87. doi.org/10.1355/CS30-1D.
6  On the role of perceptions of power transition on dispute escalation between Japan and 
China, see Ryoko Nakano, ‘The Sino–Japanese Territorial Dispute and Threat Perception in Power 




examines the evolution of these two dimensions across three periods—the 
Cold War, the post–Cold War until 2010, and the newly contested order 
since 2010 characterised by the rise of a more assertive China.
The Cold War, 1951–89
Defeat in World War II, the experience of postwar occupation, and the 
new threats of the Cold War fundamentally reshaped Japan’s security 
politics. The security role that Japan played in the emerging Cold War 
environment was influenced predominantly by the United States, its new 
ally. Accordingly, Japan adopted a pragmatic approach to its alliance with 
the United States and to its security policy more generally. As part of the 
grand bargain with the United States, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru 
Yoshida established a security strategy that trod a line in domestic politics 
between what conservatives (rearmament) and progressives (unarmed 
neutrality) expected. Relying on the United States for security protection 
in return for bases meant that Yoshida could deliver something to both 
camps—security for the conservatives and a restriction on Japan’s military 
capacity for the progressives. Yoshida’s deft politics eventually developed 
into the orthodox consensus of Japan’s Cold War security policy that came 
to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.7
This doctrine provided Japan with a number of advantages throughout 
the Cold War. It allowed the country to focus on economic development 
after the devastation wrought by World War II rather than expend scarce 
resources on a quick military build-up. In what was a turbulent period 
of politics following the war, it also pushed the potentially divisive issue 
of defence to the periphery of Japanese politics. The capacity of alliance 
politics to destabilise Japanese politics would be briefly demonstrated by 
the US‒Japan security treaty revision crisis of 1960. After this episode, 
however, Yoshida’s successors in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) were able to keep the politics of the US‒Japan alliance largely 
out of Japanese politics. Most significantly for Japan’s alliance policy, 
the Yoshida Doctrine made use of Article 9 of the Constitution, which 
prohibited Japan from maintaining a military for the purpose of making 
7  Richard J Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2007, pp. 29–37. On Yoshida’s approach to postwar security politics, 
see also HDP Envall, ‘Exceptions that Make the Rule? Koizumi Jun’ichirō and Political Leadership 
in Japan’, Japanese Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 232–33. doi.org/10.1080/10371390802249198.
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or threatening war. This was done as a way of resisting US pressure on 
Japan to contribute more as an ally. Entrapment in US security actions 
thus became less of a risk for Japan during the Cold War.8 
Yet the Yoshida Doctrine also had its disadvantages. The first was that 
it institutionalised a Japanese dependence on the United States for the 
provision of security and overall strategic direction. This, in turn, meant 
a lack of autonomy for Japan in devising an international role for itself. 
The problem was recognised by Yoshida himself, who noted that the 
country would remain in a ‘state of weakness’ so long as it depended too 
heavily on the United States for its security.9 It was also the target of key 
postwar prime ministers, such as Nobusuke Kishi and Yasuhiro Nakasone. 
They saw Japan’s abrogation of its security role to the United States as 
a ‘humiliation’ and argued for Japan to adopt a more autonomous defence 
posture, even as they came around to supporting the US alliance at the 
core of Japan’s national security policies.10 Yoshida’s approach also made 
Japan vulnerable to US accusations of ‘free riding’; that is, benefiting from 
the security that America’s engagement provided without contributing to 
the upkeep of this engagement. Criticism of this failing was especially 
pronounced from the 1970s. It forced Japan to respond by taking up 
a greater share of the cost of US bases in Japan and by redefining the idea 
of ‘security’ to include more of the non-traditional security activities that 
Japan was undertaking. Thus, the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ was 
adopted and entered into Japanese security practice.11 
The asymmetry in the US‒Japan alliance also shaped Japan’s engagement 
with China during the first half of the Cold War. America’s diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan (Republic of China) and not the mainland 
constrained Japan’s dealings with China by forcing it to follow suit. 
In order to circumscribe the constraints where possible, however, Japan 
made use of its seikei bunri policy (separating economics and politics), 
through which it opened indirect trade relations with China. As a result, 
8  Kenneth B Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2nd edn, Washington, 
DC: AEI Press, 1996, pp. 28–30.
9  Cited in Samuels, Securing Japan, 2007, p. 7.
10  Bhubhindar Singh, Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State, London: 
Routledge, 2013, p. 56.
11  Kenneth B Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2007, p. 258. On comprehensive security, see Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon no ‘Midoru Pawaa’ 
Gaiko: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Koso (Japan’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choices 
and Conceptions), Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005, pp. 153–54.
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trade was re-established between the two countries relatively soon after 
World War II, and indeed was only interrupted subsequently on rare 
occasions, such as during the outbreak of the Korean War.12 
When the United States began normalising its diplomatic relations with 
China in the 1970s, this also allowed Japan to engage China in a more 
cooperative manner, thereby opening up further trade opportunities for 
the two countries. From 1978, when it established an economic aid policy 
for China, Japan actively sought to promote economic development in 
China based on the reasoning that this was the best way to ensure that 
China would become a cooperative partner rather than a strategic rival. 
As Mike Mochizuki points out, ‘Japan was using commercial relations 
and economic aid to encourage a rising neighbour to be benign’.13 As part 
of this accommodation, Japan also accepted China’s view on the status of 
Taiwan and agreed to include the ‘anti-hegemony’ clause (directed at the 
Soviet Union) in the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978.
This is not to suggest, however, that bilateral relations during the period 
after 1978 were entirely smooth. A dispute over history textbooks in 
the 1980s led to tensions in Japan’s relations not only with China but 
also with South Korea.14 Still, as Tsuneo Watanabe points out, Japan’s 
engagement with China during this period was driven by a number of 
positive developments. These included China’s opening up under Deng 
Xiaoping; the positive nature of Sino-US relations; the complementarity 
of the growing economies of Japan, China and the United States; and, 
finally, the optimistic outlook of Japan’s political leaders, who sought 
to deepen economic cooperation through the region, including with 
China.15 Overall, Japan’s approach to China during this latter part of the 
Cold War kept within the framework of the US‒Japan alliance but was 
also based around accommodation and avoiding confrontation.
12  Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis, London: Routledge, 2005, 
pp. 78–79.
13  Mike M Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 30, nos 4–5, 2007, p. 747.
14  Claudia Schneider, ‘The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective’, 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 617, no. 1, 2008, pp. 109–10. 
doi.org/10.1177/0002716208314359.
15  Tsuneo Watanabe, ‘Japan’s Security Strategy toward the Rise of China: From a Friendship 





The end of the Cold War created tensions in both Japan’s alliance policies 
and its dealings with China. The drawbacks of the Yoshida Doctrine were 
already being exposed toward the end of the Cold War, and it was soon 
apparent that the doctrine was not well suited to the emerging post–
Cold War order. The Yoshida Doctrine did not offer much direction on 
how Japan might pursue a more active international role as an advanced 
economy. At the same time, Americans continued to allege free riding on 
Japan’s part, especially in relation to the 1991 Gulf War, where Japan was 
disparaged as only delivering ‘checkbook diplomacy’.16
These failings set off a new political debate in Japan about how the 
country should approach international politics and the US alliance in the 
post–Cold War era. This new ‘normalisation’ debate focused on the idea 
of becoming a ‘normal nation’ (futsū no kuni), within both the context 
of the US alliance and wider international relations. It was premised on 
the idea that Japan’s policies during the Cold War, and certainly during 
the Gulf War, had been abnormal and needed to be changed. Ichirō 
Ozawa, then in the LDP, argued that Japan had to take on more of the 
responsibilities of a normal nation and do more to cooperate with others 
in the international community. Ozawa argued for a strongly globalist 
vision that loosened the restrictions on Japan’s ability to do more on 
security matters (e.g. peacekeeping), but he also believed that in doing 
this Japan should be closely tied to international institutions such as the 
United Nations rather than just the US alliance.17 
This vision, however, was challenged by international developments in 
the 1990s and the early 2000s. It failed to provide convincing solutions 
to emerging instability and security threats in the Asia-Pacific, such as 
the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94. Instead, this threat, and 
the subsequent Taiwan Strait crisis, prompted the Japanese Government 
to work with Washington to restructure the alliance to better deal with 
the post–Cold War era. As Matake Kamiya explains, the alliance was 
16  Michael J Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 17.
17  Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Louisa Robinfien (trans.), 
Eric Gower (ed.), Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994, pp. 94–95. See also HDP Envall, Japanese 
Diplomacy: The Role of Leadership, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015, pp. 77–78.
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transformed from one intended to ‘counter a manifest, specific security 
threat’, such as that provided by the Soviet Union, to one able to address 
‘latent, unspecified sources of instability’.18 
It was also undermined by major events elsewhere in the world. 
In particular, the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 
exposed Japan’s lack of influence in global institutions, and especially the 
United Nations and, therefore, the assumptions about the utility of these 
institutions that underpinned the globalists’ arguments.19 Traditional 
security concerns, such as national defence and the alliance, then returned 
to the centre of the political agenda following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the United States in 2001. The Japanese security debates quickly shifted 
toward alliance cooperation and America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In place of Ozawa’s vision, conservative Japanese politicians, led by 
Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi between 2001 and 2006, began 
implementing a revisionist idea of Japan as a normal nation. This new 
vision was much more clearly focused on Japan’s role in the alliance. 
In what Richard Samuels describes as ‘de facto collective self-defense’, 
Koizumi was able to push Japan toward supporting US activities by passing 
an anti-terrorism special measures law and dispatching Japanese ships 
(Aegis destroyers) to the Indian Ocean to support US forces operating 
in Afghanistan. The Koizumi administration later passed the Iraq Special 
Measures Law and dispatched Self-Defense Forces to Iraq to undertake 
humanitarian missions.20 These actions were part of a wider revision of 
Japan’s security role, with the focus not only on increasing capabilities but 
also on reforming institutions and changing norms.21
Whereas the end of the Cold War brought about considerable change 
to Japan’s alliance policies, the country’s approach to China was initially 
characterised more by continuity, even after the Tiananmen Square 
18  Matake Kamiya, ‘Reforming the U.S.–Japan Alliance: What Should Be Done?’, in G John 
Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi (eds), Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.–Japan Security Partnership in an 
Era of Change, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 93.
19  Satu Limaye, ‘Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 22, no. 2, 2000, pp. 332–35. doi.org/10.1355/CS22-2E. See also 
HDP Envall, ‘Japan’s India Engagement: From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners’, in Ian Hall 
(ed.), The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2014, pp. 44–46.
20  Samuels, Securing Japan, 2007, pp. 94–99. See also Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: 
Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
2007, pp. 86–98, 113–32.
21  HDP Envall, ‘Transforming Security Politics: Koizumi Jun’ichiro and the Gaullist Tradition 
in Japan’, Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, art. 3, 2008.
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massacre of 1989. Although it imposed sanctions on China in response, 
the Japanese Government also moved more quickly to a policy of Chinese 
reintegration. Japan restored its yen loans program to China in 1990 and 
Emperor Akihito made an historic visit to that country in late 1992.22 
An important outcome of the Tiananmen Square massacre, however, 
was its effect on popular, as opposed to elite, perceptions of China in 
Japan. Positive impressions of China amongst the Japanese public fell 
substantially in this period, from nearly 70 per cent in 1988 to just over 
50 per cent following Tiananmen.23
Yet, as the 1990s progressed, Japan’s approach to China began to change. 
Japan remained broadly supportive of China’s integration into the 
regional economy, such as by backing its bid to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1999.24 Political relations, however, deteriorated 
throughout the decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which Japan 
saw as a major threat through the 1980s, altered the region’s basic order. 
Meanwhile, China’s more assertive conduct across Asia, and especially 
toward Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, began to affect 
Japanese perceptions of China. Beijing also became more economically 
and diplomatically active in East Asia, notably by contesting Japanese 
influence in the region’s multilateral institutions, such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and by developing closer bilateral 
trading relationships around the region.25 For Japan, the 1993–94 North 
Korean nuclear crisis created a new sense of insecurity, while China’s nuclear 
tests of 1995 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 heightened uncertainty 
regarding China’s strategic ambitions. In 1998, Japan was shocked first 
by a North Korean missile test in August and then by Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin’s strong criticism of Japan’s wartime conduct during a state 
visit in November.26 
Japan’s relations with China worsened through the 2000s, even as 
economic ties remained strong.27 That Japan was becoming less tolerant 
of Chinese criticism regarding its wartime conduct is well illustrated 
22  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, p. 749.
23  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, p. 749.
24  Björn Jerdén & Linus Hagström, ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator 
in the Rise of China, 1978–2011’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, p. 232.
25  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, pp. 756–57. 
26  Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to 
Bandwagoning?, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 17. 
27  Jerdén & Hagström, ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy’, 2011, p. 232.
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by Koizumi repeatedly visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine 
(where Japan’s war dead, including Class A war criminals, are enshrined). 
Japan also began to pursue a strategy that involved greater balancing vis-
à-vis China, especially by seeking out closer relations with other nations 
in the region, such as Australia and India.28 Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni, 
in turn, created hostility in Beijing (and also in Seoul) toward Japan, with 
popular anti-Japanese unrest becoming more prevalent throughout China. 
Tensions also increased as a result of the two sides’ ambitions over resource 
exploration in the East China Sea.29 Meanwhile, China continued to be 
more assertive in the region and especially toward Japan. Beijing increased 
its naval incursions into Japanese territorial waters, such as in 2004, 
when a Han-class Chinese nuclear submarine passed submerged through 
Japanese waters.30 
After Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, the two countries 
enjoyed a brief period of improving relations—a so-called ‘warm spring’.31 
The LDP, under leaders such as Shinzō Abe, sought to improve relations 
with China, including over history issues as well as earlier resource 
disputes.32 When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 
September 2009, it promised a further improvement in bilateral relations. 
It was especially keen to strengthen Japan’s relations in Asia through 
a proposal for an East Asian Community (EAC). Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama and Ozawa both favoured a closer relationship with China, 
although the Chinese did not support the EAC concept. Nevertheless, 
28  Derek McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising China” in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with 
Accommodation’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 21, no. 73, 2012, pp. 8–9.
29  On some of the problems over developing resources in the area, see James Manicom, 
Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014, pp. 145–47. Regarding the anti-Japanese protests, see 
‘Thousands Join Anti-Japan Protest’, BBC News, 16 Apr. 2005, viewed Aug. 2016, news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/4450975.stm.
30  Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 2014, p. 130.
31  Linus Hagström & Björn Jerdén, ‘Understanding Fluctuations in Sino–Japanese Relations: 
To Politicize or to De-politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 83, no. 4, 
2010, p. 721. doi.org/10.5509/2010834719.
32  Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 2014, pp. 122–65. On Abe’s approach to China, see HDP 
Envall, ‘Abe’s Fall: Leadership and Expectations in Japanese Politics’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, p. 155. doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.600164.
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Ozawa took a delegation of DPJ politicians and officials to Beijing in late 
2009 to discuss closer relations and to establish better links between the 
Chinese Communist Party and the DPJ.33 
The Newly Contested Order, 2009–16
When the revisionism of Koizumi and Abe lost momentum in the late 
2000s, the globalism of the 1990s made a comeback in the form of a 
new ‘Asianism’. This was adopted by the DPJ in 2009 and represented 
a major challenge to the hard-power worldview and US-centrality that 
revisionists had been attempting to consolidate. With this more Asian-
centric approach, the DPJ sought to return Japan to an institutionally 
focused, comprehensive-security agenda concentrated on integrating 
Japan more into the region. It also aimed to revise the US‒Japan alliance 
so that Japan would have greater autonomy from the United States—
viewed in the wake of the global financial crisis as in decline—and so 
that the relationship would become more ‘equal’. In particular, the DPJ 
sought to reduce what it saw as an ‘alliance burden’ on the Japanese public, 
especially that caused by the presence of US military bases in the country, 
such as those in the prefecture of Okinawa.34 
The DPJ’s agenda, however, collapsed under the weight of poor leadership, 
lack of government experience, and an increasingly contested new regional 
order. In terms of intra-alliance politics, the DPJ struggled to build 
a functioning relationship with the new US administration under Barack 
Obama. Hatoyama, in particular, lost the confidence of the United States 
as he switched between different policies and approaches to the alliance, 
especially over the Okinawan base issue.35 The unravelling of the DPJ’s 
alliance policies under Hatoyama caused the DPJ, initially under Naoto 
33  HDP Envall & Kiichi Fujiwara, ‘Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge: Discovering the Limits 
of Middle Power Internationalism and “Strategic Convergence”’, in William T Tow & Rikki 
Kersten (eds), Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 62–64.
34  Regarding the DPJ’s Asianism, see Daniel Sneider, ‘The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign 
Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan’, Asia Policy, no. 12, 2011, pp. 99–129. See also Envall, 
‘Clashing Expectations’, 2015, pp. 72–73. On the DPJ’s Okinawa policy, see HDP Envall & Kerri Ng, 
‘The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics’, Asian Security, vol. 11, no. 3, 2015, pp. 231–33. 
doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2015.1111339.
35  Tomohito Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. 168–79; Masahiro Matsumura, ‘Okinawa and the 




Kan and then under Yoshihiko Noda, to focus more on the alliance. 
In  late 2010, the government set out its plan to establish a Dynamic 
Defense Force emphasising greater mobility, versatility and flexibility in 
the Self-Defense Forces. The plan focused on increasing Japan’s capacity 
to respond effectively to ‘grey-zone’ conflicts (i.e. disputes that did not 
automatically constitute war). The DPJ also began engaging in a limited 
way with the US-backed proposal for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.36 
These changes did not constitute a transformational agenda in the vein 
of  Koizumi and Abe, but represented an incremental reorientation of 
Japan’s alliance policies. The DPJ refrained from more controversial steps, 
such as the formal adoption of the right to collective self-defence. Only 
when the LDP was returned to government in 2012—led once again 
by Abe—did Japan return to the revisionist agenda. The second Abe 
administration has subsequently replaced the dynamic defence force idea 
with the concept of making a ‘proactive contribution to peace’. Although 
euphemistic and vague, this concept is intended to achieve concrete and 
transformational aims. In its 2013 National Security Strategy, the Abe 
government envisaged the concept as helping to achieve key national 
objectives of strengthening the country’s deterrence capacity, deepening 
its alliance with the US, and broadening its regional diplomacy.37 
The accompanying policy changes have encompassed constitutional, 
institutional and capability adjustments. A National Security Council 
has been established, the government has ‘reinterpreted’ the constitution 
to allow collective self-defence, defence spending has been increased, 
and a new set of guidelines for US‒Japan security cooperation have 
been adopted.38 
The Abe administration’s strategy, therefore, has been focused on 
reinforcing the alliance with the United States to ensure that it remains 
at the centre of Japanese security policy. Japan has been consistently 
concerned about America’s commitment to Japanese security, pushing, for 
instance, for an explicit understanding that the disputed Senkaku Islands 
36  Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, 2013, pp. 197–201. See also Envall & Ng, ‘The Okinawa 
“Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics’, 2015, p. 229.
37  Government of Japan, ‘National Security Strategy’, 17 Dec. 2013, p. 5.
38  Christopher W Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism 
or New Dead End?, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 28–69; Jeffrey W Hornung & Mike 
M Mochizuki, ‘Japan: Still An Exceptional U.S. Ally’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 1, 2016, 
pp. 97–100. On the US‒Japan guidelines, see also Tomohiko Satake, ‘The New Guidelines for 
Japan‒U.S. Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role’, Asian Politics and Policy, 
vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 27–38. doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12239.
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come under the US‒Japan security treaty.39 Such concerns have also 
caused Japan to hedge against US abandonment by attempting to forge 
better relations elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. It is important, therefore, 
not to overlook the third of the above objectives: Tokyo’s ambition 
to strengthen the regional dimension of Japanese diplomacy. 
Where the DPJ’s approach to Asian regionalism was multilateral, the 
LDP under Abe has developed a minilateral approach.40 That is, Tokyo 
is now attempting to become a more active participant in ‘intra-spoke’ 
cooperation with US allies and partners in the region, most notably 
Australia but also India. This follows on from the approach adopted by 
Koizumi and Abe to relations with the United States, Australia and India 
in the early and mid-2000s. Japan is also now seeking to engage more 
with the nations of South-East Asia, especially the Philippines. In 2012, 
Abe argued that the United States, Japan, Australia and India should seek 
to establish a security ‘diamond’ stretching across the Pacific and Indian 
oceans to ‘safeguard the maritime commons’ in the region.41 Thus far, 
these types of partnership remain relatively low-key. They are also subject 
to uncertainty about their trajectory, as illustrated by the recent anxieties 
in the Japan‒Australia strategic partnership over a proposed (but failed) 
submarine deal.42 Nevertheless, Japan’s increased activity in this area 
points toward Japan adopting a hybrid approach to security combining 
alliance reassurance with new forms of regional engagement.43
Revival of the Abe agenda did not stem only from the DPJ’s poor 
alliance  management. China’s rise has stimulated the emergence of 
a new, more contested regional order that has played an important role 
39  Mizuho Aoki, ‘Obama Assures Abe on Senkakus’, Japan Times, 24 Apr. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/24/national/obama-tells-abe-security-treaty-covers-senkakus/.
40  HDP Envall, ‘Japan’s “Pivot” Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance’, 
Security Challenges, vol. 12, no. 3, 2016, pp. 17–18.
41  Shinzo Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Project Syndicate, 27 Dec. 2012, viewed Aug. 
2016, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.
42  On the Australia‒Japan strategic partnership, see Thomas S Wilkins, ‘From Strategic Partnership 
to Strategic Alliance? Australia‒Japan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific’, Asian Policy, no. 20, 2015, 
pp. 81–111. Also HDP Envall & Ian Hall, ‘Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional 
Security Governance’, Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 93–95. doi.org/10.1111/
aspp.12241. Regarding the failed Australia‒Japan submarine deal specifically, see Nick Bisley & 
HDP Envall, ‘The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the Submarine Deal that Wasn’t’, Asia Pacific 
Bulletin, East‒West Center, no. 346, 7 Jun. 2016, viewed Aug. 2016, www.eastwestcenter.org/
publications/the-morning-after-australia-japan-and-the-submarine-deal-wasn%E2%80%99t.
43  On minilateral engagement, see William T Tow & HDP Envall, ‘The U.S. and Implementing 
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: Can Convergent Security Work?’, IFANS Review, vol. 19, 
no. 1, 2011, pp. 59–60. 
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in sabotaging the idea of Japan acting ‘as a bridge between China and 
the US’.44 The ‘warm spring’ of Sino–Japanese relations that began under 
Abe, and which Hatoyama had so actively pursued, came to an end in 
2010. In  March that year, North Korea sank a South Korean corvette 
(the Cheonan); in September a Chinese fishing vessel rammed a Japanese 
Coast Guard ship near the disputed Senkaku Islands and set off a major 
diplomatic incident; and, in November, North Korea bombarded the 
South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. The incident near the Senkaku 
Islands was particularly damaging to Sino–Japanese relations. China 
responded to what Japan had initially viewed as a ‘policing’ issue by 
demanding compensation and an apology, delaying under mysterious 
circumstances the export of rare earths to Japan, arresting a number of 
Japanese in China and increasing its military activity in the East China 
Sea. This reaction comprehensively undermined the DPJ’s Asianist 
strategy, thereby contributing significantly to the party’s return, described 
earlier, to a more orthodox, alliance-based approach.45 
In fact, the 2010 incident not only brought about a dip in Sino–Japanese 
relations, but also led to a more long-term deterioration in mutual 
threat perceptions. It should be noted that the Japanese Government 
itself exacerbated matters when, in 2012, Tokyo Governor Shintarō 
Ishihara, a controversial nationalist, attempted to purchase islands in the 
Senkaku chain. The DPJ then decided to nationalise all the islands in 
order to prevent Ishihara from further damaging Sino–Japanese relations. 
Regardless, China reacted furiously. Violent protests broke out, normal 
diplomacy was disrupted, and China increased the rate of its naval 
incursions into the disputed area. Japan, in turn, dispatched coast guard 
vessels, creating a situation whereby a maritime confrontation between 
the two nations, although unlikely, was now conceivable.46 Subsequent 
incidents, including two in January 2013 where Chinese frigates locked 
their fire-control radar onto Japanese destroyers in the area, further 
heightened mutual threat perceptions.47 By 2014, the mutual disregard 
44  Takashi Yokota, ‘The Real Yukio Hatoyama; Japan’s New Prime Minister Could Be Asia’s First 
“Third Way” Leader’, Newsweek, 28 Sep. 2009. On the relationship between Hatoyama and Obama, 
see Tsuyoshi Sunohara, ‘The Anatomy of Japan’s Shifting Security Orientation’, Washington Quarterly, 
vol. 33, no. 4, 2010, pp. 39–57, 51–52.
45  Envall & Fujiwara, ‘Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge’, pp. 68–71.
46  Thomas U Berger, ‘Stormy Seas: Japan‒China Clash over Senkakus Hard to Avoid’, Oriental 
Economist, vol. 81, no. 1, 2013, pp. 14–16.




had grown to such an extent that Chinese and Japanese diplomats in the 
United Kingdom were describing each other as the Voldemort (chief villain 
of the Harry Potter books and films) of the Asia-Pacific. This pattern of 
antagonism, which has continued into 2017—albeit at a lower intensity 
and with some promising signs of improved communication—has not 
thus far done major harm to bilateral trade, but is now well established at 
the heart of the security relationship.48 
Conclusion: Japan’s New Alliance Approach
Japan remains America’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, as 
this chapter demonstrates, Tokyo’s view of the alliance, and its role within 
it, has changed significantly. Perhaps the central shift has been the way 
in which Japan balances the risks contained in the alliance framework 
and those presented by the reconfiguration of the regional security 
environment. This means that the interplay between how Japan sees 
China’s rise and how it seeks its ‘secondary alliance dilemma’ (the risks 
of the US‒Japan alliance) is reshaping Japan’s sense of the part it should 
play within the alliance.
In terms of regional reconfiguration, although East Asia presents a number 
of security threats to Japan, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, 
China’s rise is the dominant challenge. This is because China represents 
both a specific territorial threat and a broader systemic challenge for 
regional influence. Since the Cold War, as this chapter has outlined, 
China has increasingly contested Japan on territorial and systemic fronts. 
Japan’s perception of China as both a strategic rival and a direct security 
threat, therefore, has steadily risen, with Japan now viewing China not 
through the prism of the post–Cold War order but as the key dynamic 
in an entirely new, contested order where the regional balance of power 
is subject to a fresh struggle.
48  On the UK exchange, see Liu Xiaoming, ‘Liu Xiaoming: China and Britain Won the War 
Together’, Telegraph, 1 Jan. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/10546442/Liu-
Xiaoming-China-and-Britain-won-the-war-together.html; Keiichi Hayashi, ‘China Risks Becoming 
Asia’s Voldemort’, Telegraph, 5 Jan. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/japan/10552351/China-risks-becoming-Asias-Voldemort.html. For an example of the mutual 
antagonism from mid-2016, see ‘Japan Warned China as Naval Vessel Neared Senkakus, Sources Say’, 




In the post–Cold War era, Japan adopted a mixed strategy of engagement 
and soft balancing in an attempt to restrain China’s rapid rise while also 
seeking to integrate China into the established order. As this new, more 
contested order has emerged, Japan has modified its mixed strategy into 
one focused more on hard balancing.49 Since 2010, Tokyo’s policy has 
been to increase the country’s hard-power capabilities, strengthening 
its regional diplomacy, and integrating the country more into 
the US alliance. Tokyo’s experiments with Asian regionalism under the 
DPJ may, therefore,  constitute Japan’s last attempt to pursue a strategy 
based primarily on integrating China into the Asian regional security 
system. That the DPJ’s ambitions were severely damaged by the various 
incidents in bilateral relations that occurred from 2010 has meant that 
revisionists, and not globalists, have come to dominate Japan’s strategic 
decision-making. 
The revisionists’ success has, in turn, reshaped how Japan views its alliance 
dilemma. Although its perception of alliance risk fluctuated during the 
Cold War, Japan was chiefly concerned with the dangers of entrapment. 
In fact, this persisted long after the end of the Cold War. In a new, more 
contested order, however, abandonment can be expected to become the 
greater risk. China’s rapid rise not only makes it a systemic rival for Japan 
but also makes balancing Chinese power more challenging. Significantly, 
this applies not only to Japan but also to the United States, since the 
superpower now also faces higher potential costs in seeking to balance 
China. Consequently, Japan’s dependence on the United States is 
increased even as its confidence in the US security guarantee declines. 
The key question for Tokyo now is whether the US security guarantee, 
which has been at the heart of the alliance, remains reliable.
By becoming a more active ally, Japan is attempting both to buttress the 
US position in Asia and to deter China. But the approach has potential 
risks as well as benefits. On the one hand, Tokyo will likely have less 
bargaining power in future in terms of resisting pressure from Washington 
to ‘do more’ in conflict situations. Accordingly, when making the changes 
to collective self-defence, the Japanese Government included a number of 
important restrictions on this new right, not only for domestic political 
purposes but to retain some capacity to resist outside pressure on Japanese 
49  Soft balancing here refers to balancing focused on politics or diplomacy, as opposed to hard 
balancing, which emphasises a military response. See Derek McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising 
China”’, 2012, p. 3.
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decision-making. Whether this will prove effective, however, remains to 
be seen. On the other hand, a more active alliance role may serve a dual 
purpose for Japan in the coming years. Even as Tokyo’s policies are aimed 
at supporting the United States to stay engaged in the Asia-Pacific, they 
also create an insurance policy for Japan in case of a US withdrawal 
from the region. Within Japan’s new role as a more active ally, there is 




Germany: A Lynchpin Ally?
Markus Kaim
At first glance, a chapter on Germany’s alliance policy does not seem to 
call for a title suggesting that Berlin is playing more than a peripheral 
role in the international system. For most German observers, the notion 
of Germany as a ‘lynchpin ally’ is an unusual perspective. For decades 
the German political class has framed the Bonn and Berlin republics as 
a sometimes reluctant, sometimes reliable ally within NATO and the 
European Union, but has never intended to create the perception in 
other capitals that the future of the Euro–Atlantic security institutions 
is attached to Germany’s military capabilities and the political will to 
use them. Also, in terms of domestic politics, German politicians have 
traditionally avoided communicating to their constituency that Germany 
could or even should play a bigger, more responsible role in international 
affairs and in multilateral crisis management in particular.
But, due to a variety of factors, things have already changed and will 
continue to change for the years to come. First, under President Barack 
Obama, the United States has been prioritising domestic issues and 
carefully selecting those regional orders and crisis in which to play 
a more restrained role than previously, thereby leaving a vacuum in terms 
of sustaining the global international order. Second, the crisis of the 
European integration process continues with more and more EU regimes 
falling apart and traditional Europe-shaping powers, like France and the 
United Kingdom, following an introspective modus operandi. Therefore, 
in its current form, the European Union cannot fill the vacuum that 
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the United States has left behind. Third, with the annexation of Crimea 
and the continuing military destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, Russia 
not only put into question the political and territorial status quo in its 
neighbourhood, but challenged the norms and principles of the Euro–
Atlantic security architecture as laid down, for example, in the 1990 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe and following documents. This acquis, 
agreed upon by all member states of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has been the cornerstone of European 
(and German) security since the end of the Cold War. These determinants 
together have, since 2014, triggered a debate in Germany about the 
changed environment with which German foreign policy is confronted 
and the more active, more engaged role Berlin has to play within this 
environment. This debate has just started, but the first shifts, which are 
probably lasting, are clearly visible now. While this strategic reorientation 
might not represent Germany as a transatlantic lynchpin, it is established 
as such within the context of Europe and the European Union. This has 
implications for Germany’s foreign policy.
A Different Level of Ambition
A major strategic debate started among German foreign policy elites three 
years ago. Guided by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s foreign policy, this 
debate was opened by Federal President Joachim Gauck at the Munich 
Security Conference 2014. In his speech, Gauck pointed to the conflicts 
that confront Germany and its allies. He called for Germany to have 
a more active foreign policy:
For the key question is: has Germany already adequately recognised the 
new threats and the changes in the structure of the international order? 
Has it reacted commensurate with its weight? Has Germany shown enough 
initiative to ensure the future viability of the network of norms, friends 
and alliances which has brought us peace in freedom and democracy in 
prosperity? … And, in cases where we have found convincing reasons 
to join our allies in taking even military action, are we willing to bear our 
fair share of the risks? Are we doing what we should to attract new and 
reinvigorated major powers to the cause of creating a just world order 
for tomorrow? Do we even evince the interest in some parts of the world 
which is their due, given their importance? What role do we want to 
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play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? … In my opinion, 
Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should 
make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.1
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Minister of Defence 
Ursula von der Leyen made similar points in their speeches at the same 
conference.2 Taken together, these speeches mark a notable shift in 
Germany’s approach to its foreign policy since 2014. In many ways, 
Germany is the locus point of EU foreign policymaking. During a time 
plagued by wars and conflict, Merkel managed to show leadership while 
also integrating other EU countries into a specifically German approach. 
That was no mean feat for a country so often criticised for not taking 
on responsibility commensurate with its size and economic power. 
If  anything, the foreign policy ambition of Merkel’s third government 
is remarkable. It is definitely higher than that of her previous coalition, 
which wouldn’t be difficult given the government’s lacklustre approach 
in this field. It’s not that Germany didn’t use its weight under the first 
two Merkel governments. Ask anyone in Greece whether they think that 
Berlin was unaware of its power as it insisted on tough austerity measures 
for the single currency area. But Germany’s weight and influence were 
mainly geared toward just that—economic and structural reform in the 
Eurozone—rather than toward foreign policy issues.
This balance changed with the Ukraine crisis. When Russia began 
meddling  in Ukraine, Merkel proved her critics wrong. Those critics 
claimed that her interests in foreign affairs and international security 
policy were limited. Indeed, it is Merkel who has been engaged in crisis 
management efforts, and engaged with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, as delegated by Obama. At the same time, Merkel and Steinmeier 
coordinated the EU approach toward Moscow and, despite immense 
differences among the 28 member states over Russia, have maintained 
European unity on the sanctions imposed against Moscow.
1  Joachim Gauck, ‘Germany’s Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances’, 
speech at the opening of the Munich Security Conference, 31 Jan. 2014, www.bundespraesident.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile. See also Alison Smale, ‘Spurred by Global Crises, Germany Weighs a More 
Muscular Foreign Policy’, New York Times, 1 Feb. 2014.
2  ‘Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, on the Occasion of the 




But the concern for Germany goes further than Crimea or the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood Policy. More clearly than many other 
observers,  Merkel has understood that there is a linkage between the 
Ukraine crisis and the German ability to shape and influence the world. 
Since 1949, German policy has been based on the existence of effective 
international organisations and established norms and principles rather 
than on military capabilities. In this respect, German engagement in 
the Ukraine crisis is not only about helping others; the Russian-induced 
erosion of the Euro–Atlantic security order directly affects Berlin’s 
capability to shape and influence international affairs. The government’s 
decision to apply for the OSCE chairmanship in 2016 reflects these 
considerations and the increased will to shoulder more responsibility 
in the global arena.3 Another example is Berlin’s interest in running for 
a rotating seat in the UN Security Council in the years 2019/2020. 
It’s not only the Ukraine crisis that has preoccupied the Merkel 
government in recent years. One of Germany’s more strategic diplomatic 
endeavours has been its leading role in negotiations with Tehran on Iran’s 
nuclear program. This role should not be underestimated. Berlin initiated 
the talks together with Paris and London back in 2003 and was a driving 
force behind them until the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action in July 2015. This strong engagement is consistent with 
Germany’s commitment to the security of Israel, its general interest in 
furthering arms control, and its firm economic and political relationship 
with Tehran. Being a key trading partner of Iran certainly furthered 
Germany’s interest in finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute over 
Iran’s nuclear program.
More recently, the worsening situation in Syria has spurred the Merkel 
government to adopt a more active, multipronged approach to this 
part of the region. This includes the acceptance of more than 200,000 
Syrian refugees into Germany (not including the additional number of 
Syrian asylum seekers, whose applications have not been decided yet), 
support for trans-border humanitarian support into Syria, and increased 
efforts by the German security services to monitor and stem the flow of 
foreign fighters from Germany to Syria and Iraq. In an unexpected turn, 
3  Federal Foreign Office, ‘Renewing Dialogue, Rebuilding Trust, Restoring Security. The Priorities 
of the German OSCE Chairmanship in 2016’, www.osce.org/cio/215791?download=true. See also 
Hanns W. Maull, ‘What German Responsibility Means’, Security and Human Rights, vol. 26, no. 1, 
2015, pp. 11–24. doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02601012.
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Berlin also decided in the summer of 2014 to provide arms and training 
to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to help contain the expansion of the 
so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In December 2015, a large 
majority of the German Bundestag voted in favour of the deployment 
of up to 1,200 troops (according to the mandate—the actual number is 
268 as of 8 May 2017) to reinforce the international alliance against ISIS, 
following the 13 November Paris terrorist attacks. This led Germany to 
provide support in the form of reconnaissance and logistics as well as 
protection components. In addition to satellite reconnaissance, Tornado 
jets have been deployed to help obtain a precise picture of the situation 
on the ground. Over and above this, Germany has provided an aerial 
refuelling plane, a frigate to escort a French aircraft carrier and staff unit 
and headquarters staff. While these decisions reflect Germany building its 
influence in a regional conflict, there is still continued reluctance from the 
German Government to engage German armed forces in any large-scale 
combat operation. And, even more importantly, this support lacks the 
necessary strategic underpinning: the military as well as the political goal 
remain undefined and rather unclear.
This more ambitious, more engaged German foreign and security policy 
approach of the last two years has gone hand in hand with a parallel 
intellectual effort to provide a sober analysis of Germany’s changed security 
environment, and the role Germany should play in it, as encouraged and 
requested by Gauck in Munich three years ago. Importantly it should come 
as no surprise that the decision to draft two major strategic documents 
date back to 2014, because the recent crises revealed an ongoing lack of 
a durable and coherent strategic orientation for German foreign policy.4
In February 2014, the German Foreign Office launched a public discussion 
process by introducing the project Review 2014: A Fresh Look at Foreign 
Policy, which posed two deliberately provocative questions to experts in 
Germany and abroad: What, if anything, is wrong with German foreign 
policy? What needs to be changed? The overarching aim of the review 
was to conduct a process of reflection on German foreign policy’s future 
prospects by way of dialogue between the federal Foreign Office and the 
most important foreign and security policy stakeholders, including civil 
society. In February 2015, Steinmeier presented the final report Crisis – 
4  Adrian GV Hyde-Price, ‘The “Sleep-Walking Giant” Awakes: Resetting German Foreign and 
Security Policy’, European Security, vol. 24, no. 4, 2015, p. 605.
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Order – Europe to the German Bundestag and the public.5 It encapsulated 
the three phases of the review process, including discussion with experts 
from Germany and abroad, and talks with federal Foreign Office staff. 
The conclusion was that, as the world changes, so should German foreign 
policy. Germany’s medium-term foreign policy challenges included 
crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crisis support; shaping the 
elements of a new global order; and embedding German foreign policy 
even more firmly in Europe.
Germany’s need for strategic reflection and orientation is also illustrated 
by von der Leyen’s decision to define the country’s security policy priorities 
in a new defence white paper, White Paper on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr.6 In the previous white paper—published in 
2006—Germany’s security policies were mostly attuned to Afghanistan. 
Russia was defined as a partner, and the Arab Spring and the emergence 
of ISIS terrorist militia were still in the distant future. Now German 
politicians are facing a different environment: war rages in Ukraine, 
Russia and NATO members eye one another like they did when the Iron 
Curtain still stood, and Germany is actively participating in the fight 
against ISIS. Two guidelines seem to be certain: first, it has emphasised 
Germany’s self-perception as a middle power in international affairs with 
aspirations to shape the world together with European and transatlantic 
partners, thereby striking a different tone compared to the widespread 
isolationist, anti-integrationist and anti-globalist mood in France and the 
United Kingdom. Second, the white paper prioritises Germany’s level 
of ambition. Although the country is highly globalised and affected by 
global events like only a few others, its foreign policy ambition is not 
global. Instead, German security policy will focus for the years to come on 
crisis management in the neighbourhood of the European Union.
The Political–Societal Background
Germany’s foreign policy does not reflect the mood of the constituency. 
In  spring 2014, Germany’s leading electoral and political research 
institute, TNS Infratest, conducted a survey to gauge the public’s general 
5  For the final report, see Review 2014: A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy, Berlin: Federal Foreign 
Office, 2014.
6  See White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 2016, Berlin: Federal 
Ministry of Defence, 2016.
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approach to foreign and security policy. While there was widespread 
interest in foreign policy issues, there is only lukewarm support for 
greater international involvement: 60 per cent believe that Germany 
should continue to exercise restraint in the area of foreign policy, whereas 
37 per cent are in favour of greater German involvement. The positions 
have changed dramatically compared to attitudes in 1994: 37 per cent 
were in favour of German restraint, whereas 62 per cent were in favour 
of  assuming greater responsibility.7 Asked about the reasons for their 
opinion, 73 per cent of the respondents state that the main reason why 
they are in favour of greater restraint is that Germany has enough problems 
of its own, and that it should try to resolve them before dealing with other 
issues. And 50 per cent justified their reticence by referring to German 
history, a stance that tends to be taken in particular by respondents over 
60 years of age; 37 per cent believe that Germany’s influence in the world 
is too small to make much of a difference. Taken together, public opinion 
in Germany shows the same ‘introspective mode’, which can be observed 
in the United States and a lot of European countries.
The 37 per cent who are in favour of greater involvement adduce the 
following arguments in support of their views: Germany owes its 
economic  prosperity to international trade and should thus make 
a  contribution to world peace and global security (93 per cent); 
Germany’s greater political and economic significance should be reflected 
in the assumption of more international responsibility (89 per cent); and 
Germany is globally respected as a mediator (85 per cent).
When asked more specifically about the use of military force, public 
opinion gives a rather traditional response: 82 per cent of respondents 
were in favour of cutting back on German military missions. This attitude 
was reflected in all age groups, and was particularly noticeable for those 
over the age of 60 (90 per cent). A small majority rejected support for other 
countries in armed conflicts without direct German military participation, 
and a clear majority were even against arms deliveries to allied countries. 
Respondents would support intervention by German armed forces only if 
peace and security in Europe were directly threatened, for humanitarian 
purposes, in the case of a direct threat to Germany’s allies, in the context 
of peacekeeping measures based on international agreements, and in 
order to prevent genocide and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
7  Involvement or Restraint? Findings of a Representative Survey Conducted by TNS Infratest Policy 
Research on German Attitudes to Foreign Policy, Hamburg: Körber Foundation, May 2014, p. 2.
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Although  the protection of human rights is considered to be the most 
important task of German foreign policy, and genocide an important 
reason for military intervention, a majority of Germans (66 per cent) are 
not prepared to give their blessing to a military mission for humanitarian 
reasons without the requisite UN mandate. Only 33 per  cent would 
support intervention for humanitarian reasons in the absence of an 
appropriate mandate from the UN Security Council. Regardless of the 
multilateral framework in which German expeditionary missions might 
take place (United Nations, NATO, European Union), the decision 
to deploy German armed forces or even to use military force remains 
a contentious issue in Berlin, to address which requires a lot of political 
capital to be invested by the political class.
Multilateral Crisis Management
Since the normalisation of German foreign policy in the post–Cold 
War era, one narrative has guided all German governments regardless of 
political orientation: although the prime purpose of NATO traditionally 
has been collective defence, the changed security environment after 1990, 
with its plethora of diverse security challenges, has made this task largely 
irrelevant. Due to several rounds of NATO and EU enlargement and 
the lack of a serious threat to Euro–Atlantic security, Germany would be 
encircled by a ring of friends and the ongoing success of the European 
integration process would perpetuate Germany’s stability and security. 
Smaller armed forces and a decreasing defence budget could not only 
be possible, but also a strategic choice as a welcome peace dividend and 
contribution to a more peaceful world.
The only remaining circumstances in which the use of military force 
could  be legitimised has been the deployment of the German armed 
forces for collective defence, mandated by the UN Security Council and 
conducted within a multilateral framework. And, in this case, Germany 
has come a long way. Berlin has contributed to an array of military 
operations over a wide geographical area since the beginning of the 1990s 
including UN peacekeeping in Cambodia and Somalia, peace support 
operations in the Balkans, humanitarian military intervention in Kosovo, 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Common 
Security and Defence Policy missions in Africa and maritime security 
operations in the Mediterranean and off the Horn of Africa.
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Until the crisis years, and even today, Germany’s military engagement has 
focused on collective security. It is the driver behind the largest and longest 
engagements of the German armed forces. By January 2017, 880 German 
soldiers were participating in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission 
(RSM), the follow-up to the International Security Assistance Force mission, 
which brought the first German soldiers to Afghanistan in 2001 and ended 
on 31 December 2014. They continue to help train, advise and assist the 
Afghan security forces without participating in combat. In Kosovo, more 
than 500 soldiers are still deployed as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the 
NATO-led international peacekeeping force that has been responsible for 
establishing a secure environment in Kosovo since 1999. After the end of 
the immediate hostilities between Serb and Kosovo Albanians, KFOR today 
focuses on contributing to a safe and secure environment, coordinating 
the international humanitarian efforts, facilitating the development of 
a stable, democratic, multiethnic and peaceful Kosovo, and supporting the 
development of the Kosovo Security Force. More than 150 German soldiers 
participate in the two EU-led maritime missions: 120 have been deployed 
within the framework of the European Union Naval Force—Mediterranean, 
which aims to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose 
of vessels to fight human smugglers and traffickers due to the human 
emergency in the Mediterranean Sea. Roughly 30 of them continue to 
contribute to the  European Union Naval Force—Operation Atalanta. 
As a reaction to the expansion of Somali-based piracy and armed robbery at 
sea off the Horn of Africa and in the western Indian Ocean, and its impact 
on international trade and maritime security and on the economic activities 
and security of countries in the region, the European Union protects vessels 
of the UN World Food Programme, the African Union Mission in Somalia 
and other vulnerable shipping since December 2008. At the same time, 
it deters and disrupts piracy as well as armed robbery at sea and monitors 
fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.
The most recent decisions of the German Bundestag to deploy up 
to 1,200 soldiers to Syria and, in January 2017, 1,000 soldiers to the 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
operation follow exactly the same paradigm: that Germany can and 
should strengthen the UN system of collective security regardless of the 
multilateral organisation through which these operations are conducted.8




From Security Provider to Security 
Consultant
Given the widespread disillusionment in the political class as well as 
the broader public about what has been accomplished with German 
military engagements in the past, for example, in Afghanistan, the Merkel 
government has made it clear that Germany wants to take on more 
responsibility in foreign policy but is keen, as far as possible, to  avoid 
direct military involvement in the future. Confronted with a  rising 
number of crises in Europe, Merkel has advocated a subsidiary policy to 
support other countries and regional organisations in providing security 
and stability in their respective environments. Providing training and 
equipment for governments and regional organisations in crisis areas 
enables them to create and maintain peace and security by their own 
efforts, Hence, Germany was one of the driving forces of the December 
2013 European Council meeting of EU leaders, which emphasised the 
importance of empowering global partners to take more responsibility 
for regional security. 
The concept of capacity-building—providing advice, training and 
equipment to strengthen partners’ own capabilities—has featured on 
Germany’s foreign policy agenda for some years now, albeit mostly in the 
context of broader crisis prevention and management efforts. One priority 
in this regard has been Germany’s engagement in Mali. The restoration of 
security and lasting peace in Mali is a major issue for the stability of the 
Sahel region, as well as Africa and Europe more broadly. In February 
2013, at the request of the Malian authorities, the European Union 
launched EU Training Mission Mali, a training mission for Malian armed 
forces. For this purpose, roughly 130 German soldiers have been deployed 
to the West African country. The aim of the mission is to support the 
rebuilding of the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs 
by providing expertise and advice, in particular as regards operational 
and organic command, logistic support, human resources, operational 
preparation and intelligence. The mission is not involved in combat 
operations. The EU Training Mission Somalia (with 10 German soldiers) 
follows more or less the same approach.
While a controversial mission, since the beginning of 2015 more than 
150 Bundeswehr soldiers have participated in a training mission for 
Iraqi armed forces and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq. 
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The context for this mission is the developments since summer 2014, 
when ISIS started its military advances in Iraq and Syria. Many people 
were killed and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes. 
Germany has also responded to an earlier request from the Iraqi side and 
Kurdish–Iraqi forces and gave its approval for the Peshmerga fighters to 
be supported through the provision of military equipment and weapons. 
Germany is providing this help within the framework of the international 
alliance against terror, which comprises more than 60 countries and 
provides military and humanitarian aid in the fight against ISIS. 
Together with a handful of smaller contingents, the German armed forces 
have currently (2,500 as of 8 May 2017) deployed 2,900 soldiers for 
different kinds of out-of-area operations.
The Return of Collective Defence
Even before the Ukraine/Russia crisis, the focus of NATO was shifting 
away from large-scale stabilising operations. One explanation for this is 
that decision-makers have been realistic about the political constraints 
they face, realising that stabilisation operations cannot be the core tasks 
of NATO. Instead, the focus has been on a gradual reduction of global 
military engagements and on preserving interoperability activities, as 
seen in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. This policy has been illustrated 
by the efforts of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) of 2012, an 
attempt designed to increase allied interoperability. Through three lines of 
effort—training and education, exercises and better use of technology—
the CFI was designed to help the alliance maintain the tremendous 
level of operational and tactical interoperability it has developed in the 
years before.9
In this respect, the Ukraine crisis has only accelerated an already existing 
development. Collective defence as NATO’s prime purpose has, however, 
been ‘rediscovered’ by the German political class and the wider public due 
to the revisionist Russian foreign policy under Putin, and the growing fear 
among Central and Eastern European NATO countries that they could 
also be confronted with growing political pressure, territorial ambitions 
9  Stephen J Maranian, NATO Interoperability, Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the Alliance, 
Research Paper no. 115, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015.
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and forms of hybrid warfare.10 That does not mean that Russia is perceived 
as a permanent threat to Germany’s security. On the contrary, Russian 
foreign policy enjoys an understanding in Germany like in no other 
Western country. But the decision to contribute to reassurance measures 
for Eastern neighbours is driven by two strategic considerations. First, 
their security concerns will not be alleviated by vague rhetorical assurance 
of alliance solidarity, but only by a credible NATO military posture (with 
a clear German footprint). Otherwise the alliance’s credibility would be 
weakened, its commitments hollow and, at the end of the day, the Central 
Eastern European NATO members might look somewhere else to protect 
their political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second, an unequivocal 
German commitment to the protection of those countries gives Berlin the 
necessary leverage to influence their foreign policy behaviour and to avoid 
any unwanted escalation in the relationship between NATO and Russia. 
In this respect, military reassurance and the de-escalation of the conflict 
as well as the exploration of all diplomatic avenues for a political solution 
are, in the eyes of the Merkel government, two sides of the same coin.
In response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO allies decided at the September 
2014 summit in Wales on the most fundamental military evolution of 
the alliance since the end of the Cold War. The objective was a large-
scale reinforcement and reorganisation of defence capabilities, requiring 
considerable political, military and financial input from all allies. 
Additional measures were adopted at the 2016 Warsaw summit that are 
intended to ensure credible deterrence. These include establishment, on 
a rotational basis, battalion-sized force contingents in each of the three 
Baltic states, as well as in Poland. 
Berlin played a considerable part in shaping the Wales decisions and 
the partners continue to expect Germany to bear a substantial military 
and financial burden because of its economic strength. With regard 
to assurance measures, Germany has, for instance, increased its naval 
participation in the Baltic Sea and is sending significantly more soldiers 
on NATO exercises. As for the agreed adaptation measures, Germany 
has been the first state to take on the command of the new Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2015.11 The Multinational Corps 
10  Heidi Reisinger & Aleksandr Golts, Russia’s Hybrid Warfare. Waging War below the Radar 
of Traditional Collective Defence, Research Paper no. 105, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2014.
11  Jan Abts, NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. Can the VJTF Give New Elan to the NATO 
Response Force?, Research Paper no. 109, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015.
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North-East, which Germany, Poland and Denmark are jointly running 
in Stettin, Poland, will increase its readiness, take on more tasks and will 
become a hub for regional cooperation. Most strikingly, Berlin recently 
announced its willingness to serve as a ‘framework nation’ on the Eastern 
flank of the alliance, promising to lead a multinational battalion in 
Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.12 In overview 
it turns out that, among the European NATO members, Germany is 
providing the backbone for the successful implementation of the Wales 
and Warsaw decisions. Without Berlin’s participation, they would be 
hardly feasible.13
Conclusion
With regard to political will, it has been become evident that the Merkel 
government since 2014 has had a higher level of ambition in foreign 
and security policy than in the years before. This can be explained to 
a certain degree by different personnel in key ministries, but also—
and even more importantly—by the changed power structure of the 
international system and higher expectations of Germany from its 
traditional allies within the European Union and NATO. As long as the 
United States and major powers within the European Union continue 
to be preoccupied with domestic priorities, Germany cannot escape 
the role of a Führungsmacht (leading power). In the German context, 
leading always means ‘in a European context’ and ‘together with others’—
however, German foreign and security officials do not deny any more that 
the Merkel government has the political will to influence European and 
international security.14 At least two caveats come into play, however. First, 
Berlin does not pretend to be a global power. Instead priority will be given 
to crisis management in the European periphery to the east (the ongoing 
Russia–Ukraine crisis), to the south-east (the advancement of ISIS in 
12  Diego A Ruiz Palmer, The Framework Nations’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New 
Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?, Research Paper no. 132, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016.
13  Rainer L Glatz & Martin Zapfe, NATO Defence Planning between Wales and Warsaw. Politico-
military Challenges of a Credible Assurance against Russia, SWP Comments no. 5/16, Berlin 2016.
14  Here the author disagrees with Sten Rynning’s assessment that ‘[t]he sum total is a Germany 
which seeks to inspire confidence abroad, which invites cooperation, but which is ill prepared to 
take a leading role. Germany is peaceful but insular in this sense’ (Germany is More Than Europe Can 
Handle: Or, Why NATO Remains a Pacifier, Research Paper no. 96, Rome: NATO Defense College, 
2013, p. 5). See also Franz-Josef Meiers, ‘The Stress Test of German Leadership’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 
2, 2015, pp. 47–55. doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1026061.
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Syria and Iraq) and the south (the fragile situation in North Africa after 
the revolutionary wave of 2011). Second, the current German strength 
has a lot to do with the temporary weakness of others. A more ambitious 
and engaged French president might change the power equation. In this 
respect, Berlin’s central political role will be temporary. But, as long as 
things stand as they are, Germany is a lynchpin ally, maybe less within 
a transatlantic context, but definitely for and among Europeans.
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Continuity Amidst Change: 
The Korea – United States Alliance
Youngshik Bong
The Republic of Korea (RoK) – United States alliance dates from the 
signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty on 1 October 1953. Its signing—
just two months after the conclusion of an armistice agreement—brought 
the Korean War to a halt, and its provisions—allowing the permanent 
stationing of foreign troops in an intensely nationalistic country that had 
endured decades of colonial occupation—underpins the central role the 
United States had come to play in South Korean security. The southern 
part of the Korean Peninsula was administered by an American military 
government from the end of World War II, and it was in the months 
following the withdrawal of US forces in 1949 that North Korea chose to 
make its devastating attack on the South. Seventy years later, with almost 
every other factor in North-East Asia having been transformed, it is South 
Korea’s pervasive sense of insecurity that maintains the strength of the 
alliance, despite a range of complicating factors.
As a security commitment, the RoK–US alliance is much less equivocal 
than other US alliances in Asia. The operative clause of the RoK–US 
Mutual Defence Treaty states that if either party is attacked by a third 
country, the other will act to meet the common danger. The United 
States maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea and these, along with the 
650,000-strong RoK armed forces, are closely integrated in command and 
communications, and both Korean and American forces will be under 
US command in wartime. Despite the alliance’s main focus on the Korean 
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Peninsula, it has long had an extra-regional dimension. South Korea 
committed over 300,000 troops to the Vietnam War, the second-largest 
expeditionary contingent after the United States; and, more recently, 
Seoul sent 3,000 non-combat troops to Iraq and 300 non-combat troops 
to Afghanistan.
Despite these elements of integration, there is a range of complicating 
factors in the alliance, and it is the management of these complicating 
factors that shapes the central alliance dynamics. This chapter will review 
four key complicating factors in the alliance—North Korea, the rise of 
China, alliance asymmetries, and changing role conceptions—in order 
to illustrate some of the key challenges and responses in managing the 
RoK–US alliance.
Handling North Korea
North Korea’s aggression and unpredictability have consistently provided 
the basis for the alignment of strategic interests that has underpinned the 
RoK–US alliance but, at the same time, they have created some of the 
most damaging friction between Washington and Seoul. By one count, 
between 1953 and 2003, North Korea was responsible for 1,439 major 
security ‘provocations’ and for the deaths of 390 RoK and 90 US soldiers.1 
Since the early 1990s, the threat from North Korea has become even 
greater due to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons technology, 
its willingness to engage in direct aggression against the South, and the 
advent of a third-generation Kim dynasty leader who is younger and 
seemingly more ruthless than his father and grandfather. North Korea 
is believed to have around 40 kilograms of plutonium, enough to build 
around 12 nuclear devices, although there are differing views about how 
capable it is of miniaturising these for installation on ballistic missiles. 
Since 2008, Pyongyang has tested nuclear devices in October 2006, May 
2009, February 2013, January 2016 and September 2016; tested ballistic 
missiles in April 2009, April 2012, December 2012, February 2016, 
October 2016 and February–June 2017; attacked and sunk the RoK 
naval vessel Cheonan in March 2010; shelled the South Korean island 
Yeonpyeong-do in November 2010; and detonated a landmine on the 
southern side of the demilitarised zone in August 2015.
1  Leon Whyte, ‘The Evolution of the US–South Korea Alliance’, The Diplomat, 13 Jun. 2015.
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During the Cold War, Seoul and Washington had a closely coordinated 
approach to the North Korean issue. The problem of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was seen as an extension of the 
strategy of containment, with US forces in South Korea playing much 
the same ‘tripwire’ role as they were in continental Europe. The end of 
the Cold  War  brought real differences between Seoul and Washington 
over North Korea to the surface. While in Washington there was an 
expectation that the Cold War’s end would bring about a relatively 
unproblematic unification of the two Koreas, much as had happened 
between the two Germanys, South Korean hopes were tinged with more 
than a little apprehension. The first real test of the alliance over North 
Korea came during the 1993–94 first North Korean nuclear crisis, during 
which Washington and Seoul coordinated their actions well. Real cracks 
opened up, however, during the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 
2002, which, according to David Kang, ‘showed how far the two countries 
had drifted apart in their foreign policies and perceptions’.2
The 2002 North Korean nuclear crisis showed that a decade of 
perseverance rather than collapse by the DPRK had opened up divisions 
between South Korea and the United States about how best to handle 
North Korea. Seoul had become concerned more about the DPRK’s 
chaotic collapse than about its nuclear or conventional aggression, and 
had embarked on a policy of transformation of North Korea through 
engagement. Successive RoK presidents pursued dialogue with the North 
and supported the development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
which saw the location of South Korean industry in a North Korean 
industrial zone, as a path towards economic and hopefully political 
transformation. The United States, however, continued to view North 
Korea through the lenses of military aggression, authoritarianism and 
nuclear proliferation, and became wedded to a program of regime 
transformation. Most  concerning to many South Korean policymakers 
was that many of their counterparts in Washington, particularly in the 
administration of President George W Bush, seemed unconcerned about 
whether North Korea underwent a ‘hard’ or a ‘soft’ collapse.
2  David C Kang, ‘Rising Powers, Offshore Balancers, and Why the US–Korea Alliance 
is Undergoing Strain’, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, 2005, p. 116.
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During this period, and particularly in the context of the Six-Party 
Talks, China emerged as an alternative significant actor in relation to the 
problem of North Korea.3 As Pyongyang became ever more unpredictable, 
it became clear that Beijing was the only player able to wield carrots 
and sticks to try to influence North Korea’s behaviour. Furthermore, 
it became ever more obvious to Seoul that Beijing’s interests in relation 
to North Korea were much closer to its own than Washington’s were. 
Whereas Beijing prioritised stability and behavioural change, Washington 
prioritised confrontation, isolation and coercion. There was a growing 
sentiment among South Korean policymakers that China was a stabilising 
and influential player on the Korean Peninsula, while Washington was 
destabilising, decreasingly influential and liable to undo years of Seoul’s 
compromise and hard work in engaging and socialising North Korea.4
A new round of North Korean unpredictability and aggression unleashed 
dynamics that moderated these tensions. Perhaps alarmed by the growing 
closeness of Sino-RoK relations, North Korea’s torpedoing of the Cheonan 
and shelling of Yeonpyeong-do opened up a rift between Seoul and Beijing. 
South Koreans were angered by China’s ambivalence over attributing the 
sinking of the Cheonan, at the cost of 40 South Korean lives, to North 
Korea—despite the unequivocal judgement from an international panel of 
experts that North Korea was responsible. Later that year, South Koreans’ 
anger towards China deepened when Beijing was also ambivalent about 
condemning Pyongyang over the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do. Subsequent 
toughness from Beijing towards North Korea over its nuclear and ballistic 
missile tests has failed to mollify many in South Korea, particularly among 
conservatives, who now doubt China’s trustworthiness on North Korea. 
The conservative administration of President Park Geun-hye gradually 
abandoned the conciliatory aspects of its ‘trustpolitik’ approach to the 
North, in favour of increasing pressure on Pyongyang through measures 
such as closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex after the North’s fourth 
nuclear test in 2016.
The new phase of North Korean aggressiveness coincided with a new 
president in the White House, who has shown a real willingness for 
the United States to follow Seoul’s lead on dealing with North Korea. 
3  Leszek Buszynski, Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue, 
London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 78–110.
4  Ted Galen Carpenter & Douglas Bandow, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations 
with North and South Korea, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
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Pyongyang’s aggression, and the new US approach has ushered in 
essentially a joint approach to dealing with North Korea, which has 
four main aspects: keeping the door open to restarting six-party talks 
on the condition that Pyongyang takes ‘irreversible steps’ towards 
denuclearisation, insisting that any six-party or US–DPRK talks must 
be preceded by North–South Korea talks and improvements in relations, 
trying to gradually alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea, and 
responding strongly to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions 
and conducting beefed-up military exercises.5 The closeness of the RoK 
and American positions has also been reflected in a pragmatic revision of 
the Korean forces’ rules of engagement in the advent of another North 
Korean conventional attack—a revision that was seen to be necessary after 
RoK forces were constrained by the terms of the alliance from responding 
more forcefully after the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong-do.
The oscillation in RoK–US alliance relations with respect to North Korea 
reflects some key underlying realities in the alliance. The key independent 
variables affecting the allies’ closeness on this issue appear to have been 
the political alignment of the South Korean administration and its 
policy approach to North Korea, the level of provocation undertaken by 
Pyongyang, and the prevailing global approach in US foreign policy at 
the time. All of these issues are of course highly changeable, and there is 
little within the alliance that suggests that, should each of these factors 
change—and importantly align, a new period of estrangement within the 
alliance could develop.
The Rise of China
As David Kang notes, South Korea appears to be the only US ally or 
partner in Asia not to have engaged in either external or internal balancing 
behaviour against the rise of China.6 Unlike most other countries in the 
region, South Korea has not significantly upgraded its security cooperation 
with the United States or other regional states since the mid-1990s, and its 
arms spending has been falling even as China’s has been growing strongly. 
Despite China’s geographic proximity and increasingly assertive behaviour 
5  Mark E Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth D Nikitin, Ian E Rinehart & Brock 
R Williams, US–South Korean Relations, Congressional Research Service Report 7–5700, 26 Apr. 
2016, p. 13.
6  Kang, ‘Rising Powers, Offshore Balancers’, 2005, p. 30.
GLOBAL ALLIES
50
in the East and South China Seas, there is no evidence that South Koreans 
consider it to be a rising threat—in clear contrast to a significant number 
of publics in other regional countries.
Part of the explanation lies in the remarkable growth of economic relations 
between South Korea and China over the past quarter-century. Currently, 
over one-fifth of South Korea’s total trade is with China, larger than South 
Korea’s trade with both Japan and the United States combined. South 
Korean industry has eagerly invested in China as well, making China the 
number one location for Korean FDI, and becoming the largest single 
source of foreign investment in China. These trade and investment 
linkages have only accelerated since the signing of the China–RoK Free 
Trade Agreement in 2015. As in the security realm, there is no clear 
evidence that South Koreans see China as an economic threat—although 
Seoul has been signing FTAs with a range of outside countries and has 
indicated a strong interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Another element bringing greater closeness between Seoul and Beijing 
has been a shared concern about Japan’s security ‘normalisation’. South 
Korea and China are the two countries in the region most sensitive about 
Japan’s past war crimes, and Tokyo’s perceived unwillingness to adequately 
acknowledge and atone for its past behaviours. Both countries are most 
prone to outbreaks of anti-Japanese nationalism when issues of Japan’s past 
come to prominence. Added to this, both countries have outstanding and 
emotionally charged territorial disputes with Japan. As discussed above, 
there are many South Koreans who have favoured China’s approach to 
dealing with the North Korean issue over that of the United States.
American strategists have worried for over a decade about the growing 
warmth of Sino-RoK ties, which has prompted them to ask whether 
South Korea will be the first ally to leave the US alliance system and 
gravitate towards bandwagoning with a rising China.7 These feelings were 
particularly stirred during the administration of President Roh Moo-
hyun but somewhat quietened during the conservative administration 
of President Lee Myung-bak. President Park began her term in office 
developing a strong rapport with the Chinese leadership, holding six 
summit meetings with Chinese president Xi Jinping during her first three 
years in office.
7  Victor D Cha, ‘Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux’, in Ashley J Tellis & Michael Wills (eds), 
Strategic Asia 2004–5: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, Seattle: NBR, 2004.
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There have not, however, been uniformly positive developments in South 
Korean–Chinese relations. In 2004, South Koreans were shocked and 
angered when Chinese media and government statements claimed the 
ancient Koguryo kingdom (73 BCE – 688 CE) to have been Chinese. 
Koguryo is central to the modern Korean sense of identity and, when 
Beijing refused to back down on the claim, opinion polls found that 
the number of South Koreans believing China to be the RoK’s most 
important diplomatic partner in Asia plummeted from 63 per cent to 6 
per cent.8 South Koreans have also been concerned that the dynamism 
and growth of China’s economy are pulling the North Korean economy, 
particularly in its northern provinces, into China’s orbit and away from 
South Korea’s. Many are also angered by China’s forcible repatriation of 
North Korean refugees back to North Korea. In recent years, gaps have 
begun to open up between China’s and South Korea’s views of North 
Korea. As noted above, there was considerable anger over China’s refusal 
to blame or sanction North Korea over the sinking of the Cheonan and 
the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do and, in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing 
nuclear belligerence, there is growing annoyance at Beijing’s opposition 
to South Korean deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, particularly 
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile 
defence system. More broadly, conservative South Koreans have been 
nonplussed at Beijing’s unwillingness to discuss joint approaches to 
dealing with uncertainties regarding North Korea. Park herself expressed 
disappointment about the Xi government in China when Beijing did not 
return the hotline calls from the RoK President’s office and the Ministry of 
National Defence immediately after the fourth nuclear test by Pyongyang. 
Such non-action by the Xi government indicated that Beijing’s position 
toward the two Koreas had not changed in any fundamental ways and this 
was especially disappointing, even humiliating, to the Park administration, 
which made the controversial decision, despite its diplomatic and security 
ties with the ‘West’, to attend the celebration in Beijing in commemoration 
of the 70th anniversary of victory of the Chinese people over the Japanese 
and fascism. 
The impact of the rise of China on the RoK–US alliance provides some 
important insights into the dynamics of the alliance. It shows how tightly 
focused South Korean security perceptions are on North Korea, as well 
8  Terence Roehrig, ‘History as a Strategic Weapon: The Korean and Chinese Struggle 




as how pragmatically South Korean calculations about their security and 
economic interest shift in relation to changing power dynamics in their 
region.9 In recent years, as both Seoul and Beijing have begun to engage 
with Japan on trilateral economic cooperation, South Korea’s existential 
but pragmatic interest in the evolving shape of North-East Asia has 
become manifest. Despite years of courtship of China and frustration 
with the United States, the bedrock of the alliance remains undisturbed, 
showing Seoul to be interested in simultaneously bandwagoning with 
a rising China, but not at the cost of its balancing alliance with the United 
States, while the strategic balance in North-East Asia evolves into a new 
status quo.
Alliance Asymmetries
By definition, every alliance with the world’s sole superpower is an 
asymmetric relationship. And yet, a major source of tension in the RoK–
US alliance has been the combination of stable and evolving asymmetries. 
In a situation of stable asymmetries, an alliance is able to develop 
mechanisms for their management or, in the case that they are not resolved 
or managed—such as the decades-old dispute between the United States 
and its NATO allies over military spending—they become progressively 
uncontroversial and effectively quarantined from disturbing the broader 
alliance. In an alliance with evolving asymmetries—for example, between 
the United States and the United Kingdom in light of London’s changing 
capabilities in nuclear and conventional weapons—the alliance becomes 
a shock-absorbing mechanism, facilitating an integrated response to 
the changing capabilities of each partner. However, the combination of 
stability and evolution in the RoK–US alliance’s asymmetries has been 
a very difficult combination for the alliance to manage.
The most pronounced stable asymmetry in the RoK–US alliance has been 
the sovereign status of each of the parties. South Korea’s sovereignty has 
been truncated and compromised by the continued presence of US troops 
for more than six decades, and there is a strong sense in South Korea that 
the bedrock of the alliance lies in this continuing abnormality. This is 
only heightened by growing discussion of Japan’s security ‘normalisation’ 
in both Tokyo and Washington, giving rise to an acute awareness in 
9  Hyon Joo Yoo, ‘The Korea–US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension: A Korean Perspective’, 
Asian Perspective, vol. 36, no. 2, Apr.–Jun. 2012, pp. 331–51.
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South Korea that Japan’s sovereign abnormality is being resolved while 
the prospects of a similar resolution for South Korea are slight. In the 
context of this sensitivity to sovereignty in North-East Asia, the stability 
of the regional order is hostage to the ‘tyranny of small issues’, where 
disputes over islands, for example, are able to highjack progressive trust- 
and order-building. There is a counterpart ‘tyranny of small voices’ in 
which US allies are increasing their demands on their alliance partner, 
thereby hindering Washington’s capacity to develop a coherent strategic 
vision for the region. In the absence of this vision, US policy appears 
increasingly Manichean—bent on classifying allies according to whether, 
in America’s judgement, they are with the United States or with China 
(and by implication against the United States). Another stable asymmetry 
lies in the strategic outlook of the two parties: while South Korea’s interests 
are regional and political-economic, those of the United States are global 
and political-military.10
The evolving asymmetries relate to the changing balance of material 
capabilities between the two allies. At the time of the signing of the 
Mutual Defence Treaty, the South Korean economy was 0.1 per cent the 
size of the American economy and, in per capita terms, South Koreans 
were just 10  per cent as wealthy as Americans. By 2015, the South 
Korean economy  was 10 per cent the size of the American economy, 
and South Koreans were 70 per cent as wealthy as Americans on a per 
capita basis. No other US alliance has seen such a dramatic shift in the 
material asymmetry between two allies. The dramatic change in the 
material asymmetry of the alliance has had several implications. While 
the United States has been gratified by South Korea’s success, and 
certainly prefers a stable, capable and wealthy ally, South Korea’s rise has 
created expectations in Washington that it should play a more assertive 
role in regional security, particularly against what Washington believes 
is the challenge of a revanchist China to the stable order in the region. 
On the South Korean side, the success of its economy in high-technology 
innovation and production has created expectations that Seoul should 
no longer be the passive purchaser of advanced US military technology, 
but rather should increasingly invest in developing its own defence 
technologies. This tension has underpinned some of the delays and 
disagreements concerning the integration of South Korean and American 
missile defence deployments in the region. Another change on the South 
10  Kang, ‘Rising Powers, Offshore Balancers’, 2005, p. 32.
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Korean side has been democratisation and the emergence of a dynamic 
and influential civil society, greatly restricting the freedom of manoeuvre 
within the alliance that democratic South Korean governments can enjoy 
in comparison to their authoritarian predecessors.
The change in material asymmetry has led to a questioning within the 
South Korean security elite of just how closely the RoK’s security interests 
align with those of the United States. An ally that has for decades gratefully 
accepted a place under the American nuclear extended-deterrence umbrella 
has begun to consider how it might look to its own resources to defend 
itself. A 2014 national survey by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies 
found that 52.8 per cent of respondents say that they believe the United 
States will intervene for South Korea in case of a war, that 54.4 per cent 
believe that North Korea will use nuclear weapons in case of another 
Korean War, and that 52.2 per cent believe that the United States will use 
its nuclear weapons if North Korea launches nuclear attacks on the South. 
Tellingly, 61.3 per cent of respondents agreed that South Korea needs to 
develop its own nuclear weapons.11 Interestingly, the fewest respondents 
who believed South Korea should develop nuclear weapons thought it 
should do so to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat (32.2  per  cent), 
more advocated nuclear weapons in order to increase South Korea’s 
international influence (33.5 per cent), and to possess nuclear sovereignty 
as an independent country (33.4 per cent).
This combination of stable and evolving asymmetries has led to a potent 
mixture in terms of managing the alliance relationship. The growing sense 
of South Korean capacity and national pride rubs up repeatedly against 
its sense of compromised sovereignty in ways that affect the alliance’s 
dynamics. To date, the allies have managed these issues, but this is no 
guarantee for the future. Since 2009, the alliance has been upgraded from 
a specific undertaking against a North Korean attack to a regional and 
even a global partnership. Seoul has embarked on a new phase of middle-
power activism, engaging enthusiastically in regional forums and global 
bodies, such as the G20, in ways that have enhanced rather than detracted 
from the alliance. The two sides are edging closer on ballistic missile 
defence, deciding on a policy of interoperability rather than integration. 
A process of relocation of US forces from the area of the Korean 
demilitarised zone to other parts of South Korea is progressing, and a new 
11  South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification, Asan Institute Report, Feb. 2014.
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cost-sharing arrangement for the financial support of US forces in Korea 
has been pragmatically negotiated. The only sticking point has been in the 
transition from the operational control of US and South Korean forces in 
wartime by a US commander; a 2007 agreement to split the United States 
Forces Korea Combined Forces Command into separate US and RoK 
commands has been delayed in the face of North Korea’s aggression and 
concerns about the readiness of RoK forces for independent response to 
an attack. The postponement of the wartime operational control transfer 
without any set date for its enactment has created anxiety in South Korean 
society that the RoK military lacks resolve and a sense of responsibility for 
achieving self-defence.
Changing Role Conceptions
Of course, military alliances are not just about pragmatic security 
interests. A military alliance is a good barometer to measure the strength 
of mutual trust between countries based upon common values and world 
views. Forging a military alliance is not only determined by the purpose 
of deterring the projected military threat from a common adversary. 
A  military alliance is also an institution that nations create to protect 
political ideology and key principles that they deem indispensable for 
maintaining civilised orders. For instance, as political scientist Tony 
Smith concludes in his book America’s Mission, World War II marked 
the defeat—one immediate, and the other after four decades—of fascism 
and communism, the two totalitarian rivals of liberal democracy as viable 
forms of political organisation, not just a military victory by the allied 
powers.12
Enhancing a bilateral security partnership as a value-based military alliance 
is an ambitious goal for both sides. Under international anarchy, where 
there is no central authority above sovereign states to enforce promises 
between states, it might be regarded as a rarity that states tie their national 
security to pursuit of shared values. To realists, it is a futile and dangerous 
practice. Justifying your security alliance with values and principles is only 
useful as nice diplomatic rhetoric or a code word. And yet, in rhetoric if 
not always in action, this has been a distinguishing feature of US military 
alliances across the globe.
12  Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, 
Princeton University Press, 1995.
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South Korea has a keen interest in this issue from the alliance perspective. 
Broadly speaking, it assesses the status of the RoK–US military alliance by 
two standards: functional and comparative. As for functional aspects, the 
South Korean Government and public assess the value of the alliance in 
terms of its contribution to national security, especially for maintaining 
sufficient and reliable deterrence and defence capability against military 
threats from North Korea. At the same time, South Koreans tend to use 
the US–Japan alliance as a measuring stick for US ‘fairness’ toward South 
Korea as its ally. The way the United States and Japan define the core 
missions and nature of their bilateral security alliance affects the way 
South Koreans expect the United States to define those of the RoK–US 
security alliance.
To many South Koreans, the RoK–US security partnership must be 
as qualified as the US–Japan security alliance is to become a global 
partnership based upon common values and historical views. Like Japan 
and the United States, South Korea and the United States have taken 
steady steps to elevate the status of their alliance to a value-based alliance. 
The ‘Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the 
Republic of Korea’, which was announced on 16 June 2009, stipulated 
the commitment of both governments to ‘build a comprehensive strategic 
alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values 
and mutual trust’. The statement even tied the mission of the alliance 
to Korea’s unification based upon shared values between the allies. 
It defines the purpose of the alliance as ‘establishing a durable peace on 
the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of 
free democracy and a market economy’. Such strategic vision is reiterated 
and articulated in the 2013 ‘Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 
60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States of America’, in which the two declared that the alliance: 
has evolved into a comprehensive strategic alliance with deep cooperation 
extending beyond security to also encompass the political, economic, 
cultural, and people-to-people realms. The freedom, friendship, and 
shared prosperity we enjoy today rest upon our shared values of liberty, 
democracy, and a market economy. 
The 2013 declaration also affirmed that it is the basis of the joint vision 
that Korean unification should be achieved peacefully, and ‘based upon 
the principles of denuclearization, democracy and a free market economy’.
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Some may suggest that finding out whether the RoK–US alliance 
can be a genuine value-based security partnership in fulfilment of the 
official strategic visions is impossible until North Korea’s military threat 
disappears. Only then will we be able to find out that the alliance was 
based upon mutual identity and common values, as in the case of NATO 
remaining robust even after the disappearance of the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
The RoK–US alliance presents some of the most confounding puzzles 
and practical dilemmas of any of America’s alliances. It has confronted 
a  constant and unpredictable threat for its entire existence and, more 
recently, is at the forefront of a rapidly shifting relative-power configuration 
in the Asia Pacific. It has embodied both stable and evolving asymmetries 
and a shift towards aspirations for a more values-based alliance partnership. 
And yet, through all of these challenges, the alliance has remained solid 
and relatively adaptable. Perhaps the key to thinking about the future of 
the alliance lies in the question of values. For a Manichean-minded United 
States, a values-based alliance will set natural limits on Seoul’s willingness 
to bandwagon with a rising China. For a pragmatically minded South 
Korea, the evolution of the values question—probably involving Japan 
and yes, Taiwan also—will be key to the arrival of North-East Asia at 
a new stable status quo. For these reasons, perhaps we are right to view the 
RoK–US alliance as a bellwether for the evolution of other US alliances 




1  As was the case, for instance, with UK newspaper the Guardian in which the selfie was ‘portrayed 
as a mark of disrespect’. See Judith Soal, ‘Barack Obama and David Cameron Pose for Selfie with 
Danish PM’, Guardian, 11 Dec. 2013.
Denmark’s Fight Against 
Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics 
of ‘Punching Above Your Weight’
Kristian Søby Kristensen & Kristian Knus Larsen
At the official memorial service for Nelson Mandela on 13 December 
2013, Roberto Schmidt, a photographer from Agence France-Presse 
(AFP), caught US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron flanking Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt while 
all three smiled and posed for a selfie. The picture immediately went viral 
and sparked global media debates ranging from how heads of state and 
government should behave at official events to whether Michelle Obama 
looked angry, jealous or just more interested in following the memorial 
service than in group selfies.1 
In the context of Danish alliance politics, however, the symbolism of the 
picture carries more significant messages. In international relations, being 
positioned squarely and securely between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and getting positive attention from both, to a large 
extent defines both the means and the ends of Danish security policy. 
Increasingly, and for the last decade or more, the core goals of Danish 
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alliance politics have been to associate Denmark closely with and get the 
maximum amount of positive attention from the United States first and 
foremost. 
This policy has, surprisingly to many, been consistent across governments 
and incurred tangible costs in both Danish blood and treasure while 
providing only more intangible Danish political gains. It has further 
positioned Denmark rather high on the US calling list as Denmark 
has shown itself to be a dependable and willing source of support for 
US military initiatives, as was the case, for instance, in the intervention in 
Libya in 2011. This policy concurrently sets Denmark apart from many 
other European small states, which have not to the same degree been 
willing or able to associate themselves so closely with the United States 
in international politics.
Andreas Løvold argues that, in today’s international relations, small 
states—like Denmark—do not face threats to their survival. On the 
contrary, they face the threat of being left without influence, the threat of 
being irrelevant in international relations.2 In many ways, Danish alliance 
politics seem to have taken Løvold’s argument to heart. Consequently, 
Danish alliance politics can be seen as a continuous fight against 
irrelevance. In  the Danish political version of this argument, that has 
meant constantly seeking closeness with the United States and status as 
a relevant actor. It has also meant being a country that, in the eyes of 
American decision-makers, ‘punches above its weight’ in international 
affairs.3 
While not only setting Denmark apart from many other European small 
states, this unambiguously close relationship and almost unconditional 
support for US international policies marks also a historical departure from 
a radically different historical past, where Danish foreign policy was, if not 
in direct opposition to, then at least hesitant in its support of American 
policies and ambiguous in regards to the Danish political commitment 
to NATO and the transatlantic system of alliance. Consequently, this 
chapter does three things. First, this fundamental historical change 
is unpacked. That leads, secondly, to a characterisation of the relation 
2  Andreas Løvold, ‘Småstatsproblematikken i Internasjonal Politkk’, Internajsonal Politikk, vol. 62, 
no. 1, 2004, pp. 7–31.
3  ‘Remarks by President Obama, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen’, IIP Digital, United States 
of America Embassy, 14 Mar. 2011, viewed Aug. 2016, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100173/
pdf/DCPD-201100173.pdf.
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between a current militarised Danish foreign policy and core assumptions 
of Danish alliance politics. Third, the chapter explains this radical and 
seemingly continuous change of politics through the convergence of 
different political rationales in Danish alliance politics, in Danish–US 
relations and in the view of the US role in the world. In conclusion, the 
paper argues that this shift in politics is, on the one hand, relatively solid 
and is increasingly being taken for granted. On the other hand, however, 
the chapter identifies a  number of challenges that may contribute to 
change in Danish alliance politics.
Danish Alliance Politics: A Brief History 
With the end of the Cold War, Denmark’s geopolitical position changed 
radically. Instead of being a frontline state in a global confrontation, 
Denmark could see, not the end of history, but world history move away 
from Denmark. This is equally reflected in subsequent Danish defence 
and security white papers noting a continuously more secure regional 
environment, culminating in a 2008 white paper that was unable to 
identify any territorial threat to Denmark in the foreseeable future 
and characterised the Danish security environment as benign ‘without 
historical precedent’.4 
Danish politicians were not slow to recognise that this fundamental 
change in European geopolitics would also change both the conditions 
and the opportunities for Danish foreign and security policy. Danish 
foreign policy had been perceived as reactive and pragmatic during 
the last decades of the Cold War, and the end of the Cold War meant 
that a new line of policy was both possible and necessary. Supported 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the conservative–liberal government 
formulated a more active and value-based Danish foreign policy. From 
the beginning, this policy focused on positioning Denmark as actively 
contributing to building and maintaining international institutional 
architecture in Europe, thereby ensuring simultaneously the new pan-
European peace, anchoring a reunited Germany institutionally in what 
was then the European Economic Community and, through NATO, 
keeping the United States as the ultimate underwriter of European 
4  Danish Government, Dansk Forsvar, Globalt Engagement: Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen 




security.5 In 1993 the conservative-liberal government was replaced by 
a social democratic government. This entailed few changes in the line 
of policy re-emphasising the importance of liberal ideas and multilateral 
institutions.6 But, simultaneously, this more active policy acquired 
a military dimension as Denmark, for the first time since World War II, 
deployed military force in the form of a navy ship in support of the US-led 
coalition in the Gulf War of 1991. 
While only symbolic in nature and far away from any combat operations, 
the decision to employ Danish military assets marked a fundamental shift 
in Danish decision-makers’ view on the role of Danish military force in 
foreign policy and alliance politics. Whereas a US request for Danish 
military assistance in 1952 for the war effort in Korea was met with the 
counteroffer of a hospital ship, in the Gulf War and in post–Cold War 
geopolitics, it seems legitimate in the milieu of the new activist Danish 
foreign policy to use military force—far away from Danish territory and 
to maintain international order. Subsequently, the Danish armed forces 
engaged in the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s in an attempt to 
end the bloodshed of the Balkan Wars. Denmark’s engagements in the 
former Yugoslavia showed a country that was prepared to participate in 
potentially dangerous peacekeeping operations and Danish participation 
in the Kosovo campaign in 1999 showed that a UN Security Council 
authorisation was not a precondition for Danish use of force. Instead, 
NATO was increasingly seen as the most important international 
institution and American leadership as the most important factor for 
peace and security in Europe.
When NATO invoked Article 5 the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the United States in 2001, it was a decision wholeheartedly supported 
by Denmark. Danish politicians expected that a military response would 
be organised through the UN or NATO.7 Instead, the United States opted 
for a more unilateral response in Afghanistan in 2001–02 and, even more 
contentiously, in 2003 in the Iraq War. The liberal-conservative Danish 
Government that took office in November 2001 unequivocally followed 
its American allies into war. Denmark’s choice between Europe and the 
5  Rasmus Brus Pedersen, ‘Danish Foreign Policy Activism: Differences in Kind or Degree’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 47, no. 3, 2012, pp. 331–49. doi.org/10.1177/0010836712444863.
6  Rasmus Brus Pedersen, ‘Fra Aktiv Internationalisme til International Aktivisme: Udvikling 
og Tendenser i Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Aktivisme’, Politica, vol. 44, no. 1, 2012, pp. 111–30.
7  Pedersen, ‘Fra Aktiv Internationalisme til International Aktivisme’, 2012.
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United States, or the United States and the United Nations, often falls 
with the United States, leading Hans Mouritzen to coin Danish alliance 
politics as ‘super atlanticist’.8 
Denmark has been a persistent ally to the United States throughout the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and unquestionably supported US policies 
in both countries as well as in the wider Middle East. Instead of being 
a reluctant ally, Denmark has worked hard to become and remain an 
‘impeccable’9 US ally. This has established Denmark as a core NATO 
member, a dependable US diplomatic ally and a consistent contributor to 
US-led military coalitions. This consistent political support, combined with 
a willingness to stay the course, take risks and participate with no official 
caveats in military operations has not gone unnoticed in Washington. 
Peter Viggo Jakobsen recounts a British delegation to Washington in 2013 
being told by a top official of the Obama administration that the United 
Kingdom ought to be more like Denmark, ‘a model to follow’.10 If Danish 
alliance politics are about fighting for relevance and attention from the 
United States, then being set up as a model for the United Kingdom 
is indeed a mark of success.
The development of this increasingly close alliance relationship between 
Denmark and the United States is to a wide extent based on a specific 
Danish view on the use of armed force that sets Denmark apart from many 
comparable European small states. The continuously closer US–Danish 
relationship goes hand in hand with the militarisation of Danish foreign 
policy, where use of Danish armed force has become an increasingly 
legitimate and pivotal foreign and alliance policy tool.
The Militarisation of Danish Foreign Policy
On 29 April 1994, Serbian forces ambushed a squadron of Danish Leopard 
1 main battle tanks that was in Bosnia as part of UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). In the firefight taking place over the next two hours, 
the Danish forces manage to destroy the Serbian attackers and return to 
8  Hans Mouritzen, ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 
2007, pp. 155–67. doi.org/10.1080/14794019908656861.
9  Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning, ‘The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO and the Uncertain 
Future of Top-Tier Membership’, in Nanna Hvidt & Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy 
Yearbook 2008, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008, pp. 55–84.
10  Peter Viggo Jakobsen & Jens Ringsmose, ‘Size and Reputation – Why the USA Has Valued its 
“Special Relationship” with Denmark and the UK differently since 9/11’, Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies, vol. 13. no. 2, pp. 135–53.
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base without casualties, thus proving possible a more muscular approach 
to peacekeeping.11 Later, Michael Rose, UNPROFOR commander, stated 
that ‘the Danish tanks changed the way to solve wider peacekeeping tasks 
forever’.12 They did more than that, however. They equally changed the 
view on the use of force by Danish foreign policy elites, making ‘peace 
operations … the flagship in the new activist foreign policy pursued 
by Denmark in the 1990s’.13
Successive Danish governments have used the term activism to describe 
a basic component of their foreign policy, denoting a more (supposedly 
more than before) active Danish profile in the international sphere and 
that  Denmark would pursue its values and interests actively around 
the world. Both centre-right (liberal-conservative) and centre-left 
(social democratic) governments have increasingly used the Danish armed 
forces as a key component or tool of this active foreign policy. This use 
of armed force abroad as a central instrument of Danish foreign policy 
makes it possible even to label Danish foreign policy as military activism.14
Jakobsen defines military activism as the use of armed force in international 
engagements for purposes that exceed Denmark’s narrow national 
defence.15 Thus, military activism is more than self-defence. It is about the 
use of armed force to influence international developments, but it is also 
about increasing Danish status and visibility among key Danish partners 
and allies. In a comparative perspective, and dating back to the tank 
engagement in Bosnia, Denmark has been unusually willing to deploy 
military force. Denmark’s so-called military activism has led Danish 
decision-makers to adopt a remarkable risk-prone profile. Risk-taking and 
few national restrictions (caveats) have been notable features of Denmark’s 
military activism.16 Consequently, the Danish Government supported the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and a comfortable parliamentary majority 
decided to deploy Danish land forces to help stabilise Iraq after combat 
11  Ole Kjeld Hansen, ‘Operation “Bøllebank”’, Dansk Militaerhistorie, 28 Oct. 2013, viewed Aug. 
2016, milhist.dk/slaget/operation-bollebank/.
12  Quoted in Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the 
Making, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 83.
13  Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations, 2006, p. 109.
14  Kristian Søby Kristensen, Danmark i Krig: Demokrati, Politik og Strategi i den Militære Aktivisme, 
Copenhagen: DJØF Forlag, 2013.
15  Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Danmarks Militære Aktivisme Fortsætter Med Eller Uden USA’, Politik, 
vol. 18, no. 4, 2015, pp. 5–13.
16  Karsten Jakob Møller & Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Good News: Libya and the Danish Way of War’, 
in Nanna Hvidt & Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012, Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for International Studies, 2012, pp. 106–30.
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operations were deemed to be over. Working with the British in Basra 
region, the Danish forces quickly found themselves engaged in what 
ended up being the losing side of a counterinsurgency operation costing 
eight Danish lives. 
It is, however, the 2006 decision to deploy—again with the British—
to the Helmand Province in Afghanistan that symbolically, and in terms 
of both human and economic costs, stands out as the most significant 
example of Danish military activism. In Helmand’s ‘green zone’ a Danish 
battalion battle group conducted frequent and intense combat operations 
fighting the Taliban, and the number of casualties increased dramatically, 
especially in the years 2007–11.
That the operation could lead to heavy fighting was not lost on the 
Danish Defence Command. In addition to the risks associated with the 
deployment to Helmand, however, the top echelon of the Danish armed 
forces equally saw this as, first, an opportunity to provide a distinct Danish 
military contribution to the development of Helmand. Second, to show 
Danish politicians that their armed forces could function in a militarily 
activist foreign policy. And third, by combining both of the above, prove 
their own ‘military metier’, as stated by then Chief of Defence General 
Hans Jesper Helsø.17 Consequently, both the Danish armed forces and 
Danish political decision-makers went to Helmand with their eyes 
relatively open, knowing the risk involved. In Afghanistan, by 2013 the 
Danish forces had suffered 43 casualties and more than 200 seriously 
wounded,18 making Denmark the country with the highest number of 
fatalities relative to the size of its population of all those contributing 
troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The government’s decision to deploy troops to Helmand was supported by 
a broad majority of the Danish parliament and, perhaps surprising to the 
government itself and despite rising casualties, public support remained 
relatively constant with between 40–50 per cent of Danes supporting the 
mission. This leaves Denmark changing places with the United States as 
the two ISAF countries with the highest public support for the operations 
in Afghanistan (between 2006 and 2011).19 
17  Quoted in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Den Gode Krig, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2011.
18  ‘Combat Mission in Afghanistan is over’, CPH Post Online, 22 Jul. 2013.
19  Peter Viggo Jakobsen & Jens Ringsmose, ‘In Denmark, Afghanistan is Worth Dying for: How 
Public Support for the War was Maintained in the Face of Mounting Casualties and Elusive Success’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 50, no. 2, 2014, pp. 211–27. doi.org/10.1177/0010836714545688.
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Looking at the apparent appetite for warfare that had developed in 
Denmark, it should come as no surprise that the Danish Government did 
not hesitate to offer a Danish military contribution when NATO started 
preparing Operation Unified Protector as a response to the conflict in 
Libya. Indeed, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs called it ‘good news’ 
when the government had gotten parliamentary backing to deploy Danish 
F-16s to the effort against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s forces.20 
All parties in parliament, including the radical socialist left wing, 
supported  the decision and no critical questions were asked by the 
media when the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced the deployment. 
Six F-16s took off for Sicily at such a pace that only French, American and 
British aircrafts were in place before them.21 Denmark put no national 
restrictions on the use of its aircraft. The Danish F-16s took a central 
role in the operations and the Joint Force Air Component Commander, 
Major-General Margaret H Woodward, of the US Operation Odyssey 
Dawn called the Danish F-16s the ‘rock stars of the campaign’ due to 
their versatility.22 The flexible character of the Danish contribution 
was supplemented with a large amount of precision-guided munitions. 
According to the RAND Corporation, ‘[the Norwegian and Danish] 
air forces proved critical to maintain pressure on Muammar Qaddafi’s 
regime’.23 Thus, RAND concludes that the Danish air force ‘made 
a  contribution to Libya operations out of proportion to its size, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively’.24 Equally, when US Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates in 2011 lambasted European allies in general for their lack 
of political will and military capability, the efforts of the Danish air force 
in Libya was noted as a positive exception to both things lacking in wider 
Europe. Libya thus becomes a perfect example of the use of force in 
Danish alliance politics. It positions Denmark as a relevant and noticed 
ally, contributing more than expected. 
In sum, when looking at the above examples of Danish use of force under 
the foreign policy heading of military activism, a number of characteristics 
are worth noting. First, political as well as military risk-taking have been 
prevalent and, in comparative perspective, a significant feature of Danish 
20  Annelise Hartmann Eskesen, ‘Lene Espersen: Jeg Har to Gode Nyheder’, Politiken, 18 Mar. 2011.
21  Møller & Jakobsen, ‘Good News’, 2012.
22  Møller & Jakobsen, ‘Good News’, 2012.
23  Karl P Mueller, Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, Washington DC: Rand 
Corporation, 2015.
24  Mueller, Precision and Purpose, 2015.
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use of military force. By agreeing to operate in dangerous or difficult areas 
without many national restrictions or caveats, Danish politicians have 
accepted an increased risk of casualties. But more risks follow. Danish 
politicians have additionally accepted the political risks of potentially 
causing civilian casualties, of taking political responsibility for potentially 
unpopular—and sometimes unwinnable—military operations and, 
finally, accepted the political risk incurred by delegating control of Danish 
armed forces, without caveats, to allied or coalition command.
Second, the colour of government has had limited influence on Danish 
use of force, and both centre-right and centre-left governments have 
enjoyed wide parliamentary support as well as positive public opinion 
in response to their decisions to use force abroad. This has meant that 
shifting governments have been able not only to use force abroad, but to 
prioritise the speed of the decision-making process with which Denmark 
decides to use military force—as was the case in Libya. This in itself is an 
indication of the degree to which military activism and the use of force 
has become a constant feature of Danish foreign policy, setting Denmark 
apart as a special case compared to other Nordic or European countries.25 
The active use of force has been a consistent feature of Danish foreign 
policy, the continuity of which has surprised many engaged with the 
analysis of Danish foreign policy.26 
In the following we ask why this is so, and why this feature has been 
so  consistent and prevalent. Our answer is that the special Danish 
willingness to use force needs to be understood as a specific conflation 
of three distinct political rationalities guiding Danish foreign policy. 
This has, in turn, made possible the ever closer alliance with the United 
States. Denmark has—because of this conflation—been able to maintain 
the political and public support required to incur the costs necessary 
to constantly be relevant to and noticed by American decision-makers. 
Just  as Gates noted, the Danish contribution to the Libya campaign 
showed Denmark to be punching above its weight. 
25  See Hakon Lunde Saxi, ‘Defending Small States: Norwegian and Danish Defense Policies in the 
Post-Cold War Era’, Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 26, no. 4, 2010, pp. 415–30. doi.org/10.1080
/14751798.2010.534649.
26  See Ringsmose & Rynning, ‘The Impeccable Ally?’, 2008, pp. 55–84.
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Why? Convergence of Three Rationales 
in Danish Alliance Politics 
On 26 September 2014, then Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-
Schmidt announced that Denmark would contribute F-16s in the 
fight against Islamic State. At the press conference, the Prime Minister 
reminded the journalists present that ‘Denmark is one of those countries 
that have already taken responsibility’, and then informed them that 
‘Denmark last night received a formal request from the US … for, among 
others, Danish F-16s’.27 The Prime Minister had already in the morning 
informally contacted key parliament leaders to make sure the deployment 
could be voted through parliament the following week. The first question 
from the press addressed not the risks, mission parameters or the strategy 
of the operation, but the pace of the decision-making process: ‘You hope 
that it will be possible to summon the Parliament and pass the bill already 
next week. What will that mean in terms of getting the planes in the air?’ 
The Prime Minister replied that ‘the planes can be in the air as soon as the 
bill is passed by Parliament. Luckily, we can deliver quickly.’28
The bill was passed by approximately 90 per cent of the votes in the 
parliament, and the F-16s took off a week after the request was received. 
In the public debate about use of force, the question is not if, but how 
fast. The almost automatic reaction to the American request was not 
surprising, however. A year before, the Prime Minister participated in 
a dinner hosted by Fredrik Reinfeldt—then Swedish Prime Minister—
on the occasion of President Obama visiting Sweden. Also present were 
the heads of state and government of Finland, Iceland and Norway. Prior 
to the meeting, Sweden, Norway and Finland had refused to participate 
in any intervention punishing the Syrian regime for its use of chemical 
weapons against its own civilian population. Denmark, on the other hand, 
had announced that it, without any indications of US intentions or plans, 
would support the United States against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. 
Thorning-Schmidt emphasised that it was important to ‘signal to the 
Americans that they have a very close ally here that they can count on’.29
27  Helle Thorning-Schmidt, ‘Prime Minister’s Press Conference September 26 2014’, 
Statsministeriet, viewed Aug. 2016, www.stm.dk/_p_14084.html.
28  Thorning-Schmidt, ‘Prime Minister’s Press Conference September 26 2014’.
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The unequivocal support for any potential US military action against 
Assad, as well as the pace of the decision-making process and the political 
unity in the parliament in the case of a US request for military support 
against ISIS show how established the use of force has become in Danish 
foreign policy and how this is linked to Denmark’s special relationship 
with the United States. 
Traditional foreign policy analysis would emphasise that these decisions 
are based on a calculation of Danish interests and values in relation to 
a  particular political interpretation of the international environment. 
Møller and Jakobsen thus identify three primary objectives: to protect 
Danish territorial integrity, promote and protect Danish values and to 
‘do our part’ as a trustworthy partner.30 While all these objectives are 
significant, it is difficult to see how these objectives should set Denmark 
radically apart from its Nordic neighbours, following often very different 
policies. Similarly, explaining Denmark’s particular military activism on 
particular domestic policies of shifting governing parties, on the other 
hand, fails to explain the significant continuity across governments.31
To make sense of this almost instinctive and unconditional military and 
political support to American military operations as well as the continued 
willingness by large parts of the Danish public and political establishment 
to take risks and use military force, we argue that three long-standing 
rationalities in Danish foreign policy converge, reinforcing simultaneously 
the use of force and the US–Danish relationship. Building on Mikkel 
Vedby Rasmussen—who debates Danish strategic culture as a reflection 
of changes in the relation between two discourses on the utility of force in 
international relations32—we show the value of analysing Danish alliance 
politics, as being a consequence of long-term historical convergences of 
a cosmopolitan, a strategic and a moral rationale for Danish use of force.
The cosmopolitan rationale is based on the idea that Western use of force 
can be a universal force for good. The air campaign against Serbia in the 
spring of 1999 was aimed at stopping human rights violations occurring 
in Kosovo. The bill that was presented to the Danish parliament read: 
‘Folketinget [the Danish Parliament] hereby declares its consent to send 
30  Møller & Jakobsen, ‘Good News’, 2012.
31  See Pedersen, ‘Danish Foreign Policy Activism’, 2012, pp. 331–49.
32  Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘“What’s the Use of It?”: Danish Strategic Culture and the 




a Danish contribution to the NATO efforts in the Western Balkans to 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo’.33 As the air campaign 
unfolded in April 1999, Danish Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup 
expressed the cosmopolitan view: ‘Kosovo can become the example of how 
it is necessary to go in and apply the necessary pressure to solve things out 
… NATO will not draw any geographical boundaries describing where 
the Alliance can act’.34 The engagement in Kosovo showed how military 
force could safeguard human rights. The words of Hækkerup, who 
describes NATO acting without boundaries, today seems like a succinct 
prophecy for the following decade. The cosmopolitan rationale was 
upheld through the 2000s, as humanitarian concerns have been central to 
political arguments for why Denmark deployed or maintained a military 
presence in, for instance, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan or Mali.
Cosmopolitan concerns were thus repeatedly emphasised during the 
Danish engagement in Afghanistan. While 9/11 and the terrorist threat 
were accentuated, so was the need to focus on humanitarian development. 
In 2008, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller and Minister 
for International Development Ulla Tørnæs explained Denmark’s strategy 
in Afghanistan: 
The goal is to stabilise Afghanistan, to ensure that the democratic elected 
government is the only master of the house and to ensure higher standards 
of living, human rights and democracy for the Afghan population … 
Human rights are now ensured in the constitution, and a human rights 
commission has been established with Danish support.35 
Parallel arguments can be found in relation to more recent deployments 
of Danish armed forces. In Denmark the intervention in Libya was seen as 
the international community coming together acting to prevent genocide. 
Thus it made sense for conservative Minister of Foreign Affairs Lene 
Espersen, as noted above, to declare it a ‘good thing’ that Danish military 
action was forthcoming. Equally, in deciding to deploy F-16s to fight ISIS 
33  Danish Parliament, ‘Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om et Dansk Militært Bidrag til en NATO-
Indsats på det Vestlige Balkan’, Motion no. B4, Copenhagen, 1998.
34  Morten Jastrup, ‘NATO er Uden Begrænsninger’, Information, 21 Apr. 1999, viewed Aug. 2016, 
www.information.dk/29859.
35  P S Møller & U Tørnæs, ‘Derfor er vi i Afghanistan’, Politiken, 16 Jan. 2008, viewed Aug. 2016, 
politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/ECE458081/derfor-er-vi-i-afghanistan/.
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in Iraq, the bill authorising Danish use of force repeatedly emphasises 
humanitarian concerns, human rights violations and an international 
responsibility to help Iraqi authorities protect its civilian population.36 
The strategic rationale, also associated with the use of force, is in Danish 
alliance politics about being closely aligned with the United States and 
providing political and military support when requested by the US 
Government. Thorning-Schmidt was open about this in 2013 when she 
declared that Denmark would support American actions in Syria even 
before the US Government had declared that it would take action, and 
what that action would entail. As British support foundered in the House 
of Commons, Denmark found itself—together with France—as the 
only European country openly supporting American-led military action 
in Syria. This made Denmark stand out in Europe, in what seemed like 
a peculiar position for a Scandinavian small state. But, if the strategic goal 
is closeness, attention and relevance vis-à-vis the United States, it is an 
almost perfect position.
This reflects the strategic rationale in Danish politics. Maintaining a close 
relationship with the United States is not a new element in Danish 
alliance politics—indeed, this rationale was emphasised throughout the 
2000s. With liberal Anders Fogh Rasmussen as Prime Minister, building 
ties with the United States was a core concern and, consequently, 
Denmark developed a close bilateral—and personal—relationship with 
the administration of George W Bush in the years after 9/11.
In September 2003, Rasmussen established the main lines in his 
government’s alliance politics, and why that, for instance, entailed Danish 
support for the American invasion of Iraq: 
We are in the middle of a  showdown with the policy of adaptation, 
which has dominated Danish foreign policy since the defeat [to Prussia] 
in 1864 … Cooperation with the US is not adaptation. It is equal 
cooperation with a friend, a  partner, an ally, who honour the same 
principles and values  as we do: democracy, freedom of speech, market 
economy, and human rights.37 
36  Danish Parliament, ‘Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution for Additional Danish Military 
Contribution to Support the Fight Against ISIL’, Motion no. B123, Copenhagen, 30 Sep. 2014, 
viewed Aug. 2016, www.ft.dk/samling/20131/beslutningsforslag/b123/bilag/1/1403349.pdf.
37  Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussens tale på Københavns 




In order to safeguard these principles and values, close cooperation with 
the United  States is, for Rasmussen, self-evident. Per Stig Møller, as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rasmussen’s government, later elaborated: 
‘The USA is incredibly important to us. If we find ourselves in a crisis 
it will be the US that can help us. No one else can help us.’38 The quid 
pro quo of this strategic calculation is that if Denmark needs to be able 
to count on the United States in a crisis, the best way to ensure that is to 
make sure the United States can count on Denmark. Rasmussen’s liberal-
conservative government continuously emphasised this strategic rationale 
through the 2000s and so did Thorning-Schmidt’s social-democratic 
government, as shown above.
While Møller emphasises that the strategically motivated partnership with 
the United States is about a reinforced security guarantee, it is also about 
privileged access and influence. As stated by Rasmussen:
At present I will say that Denmark has a unique strong position in 
international and European politics. Internationally we have direct access 
to the top political leadership in the US, the world’s only superpower, 
and the only state that has global reach. Of course that does not mean 
that we can control such a state’s foreign and security policy … But all 
things being equal, it makes Denmark a more interesting partner for 
negotiations and conversations.39 
During his time in office, Rasmussen visited President Bush seven times, 
and Danish diplomats enjoyed increased access to Washington. Thorning-
Schmidt’s selfie with Cameron and Obama symbolises the strategic 
rationale of close alignment with the United States.
Lastly, Danish alliance politics has been formed by a moral rationale that 
rests on a distinct moral historiographic understanding of Danish foreign 
and alliance politics during World War II and the Cold War, making it, 
as noted by Karsten Møller and Jakobsen, morally necessary for Danish 
decision-makers today to ‘do our part’. In his book on Denmark’s war 
effort in Afghanistan, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen highlights that one of the 
core principles of Danish military activism has been that Denmark should 
fight shoulder to shoulder with the United States and the United Kingdom 
38  PS Møller, ‘Danmark skal være en allieret, som USA altid kan regne med’, Information, 20 Jul. 
2015, viewed Aug. 2016, www.information.dk/539896.
39  Anders Fogh Rasmussen, quoted in A Henriksen & J Ringsmose, ‘Hvad fik Danmark ud af 
det? Iraq, Afghanistan og forholdet til Washington’, DIIS Rapport 2011:14, Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute for International Studies, 2011, p. 8.
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because that is the right thing to do.40 The importance of this principle 
was highlighted by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in repeated statements in the 
early 2000s. At the brink of the Iraqi invasion in March 2003 the Prime 
Minister thus argued that ‘world history is filled with such dilemmas [of 
going to war]. And we would not be where we are today, if we or others 
had chosen to do nothing. There are situations where it is necessary to 
choose the uncomfortable option to ensure freedom and peace’.41 In other 
words, had it not been for the United States and United Kingdom 
fighting in World War II, Denmark would not have been liberated from 
German occupation. Consequently, to pay that historical debt, Denmark 
cannot now do nothing, but is morally obligated to actively choose to do 
something.
In August 2003, Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government continued this 
line of reasoning and launched an attack on the Danish cooperative policy 
during most of the German occupation between 1940 and 1945. The 
Prime Minister stated: ‘It has been of vital importance to Denmark’s 
international reputation that we had a showdown with the policy of 
cooperation [during the German occupation]. Also for the way we see 
ourselves.’42 In an op-ed, the Prime Minister further emphasised: ‘Even 
judged on the premises of that time the Danish policy was naïve, and it 
is highly objectionable that the Danish political elite so strongly followed 
a policy of not only neutrality but active adaptation.’43 In this way, current 
military activist policy is put forth as the morally right thing to do, 
as opposed to previous small state adaptation.
Denmark’s historical debt was, according to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, now 
due, and Denmark’s hesitant membership of the NATO alliance during 
the last decades of the Cold War further reinforced the need for Denmark 
to start down payments on its moral debt. That underlines the importance 
of the transatlantic alliance and entails supporting US policies, making 
hard but active choices, and bearing the costs and risks associated with 
using military force abroad. It is the right thing to do. 
40  Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘Den gode krig’, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2011.
41  ‘Anders Fogh Rasmussens Tale Vedrørende Irak’, 18 Mar. 2003, viewed Aug. 2016, 
danmarkshistorien.dk/leksikon-og-kilder/vis/materiale/anders-foghs-tale-vedroerende-irak-180303/ 
?no_cache=1.
42  Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Opgøret med samarbejdspolitikken’, Statsministeriet, 26 Aug. 2003, 
viewed Aug. 2016, www.stm.dk/_p_6393.html.




Taken together, these three rationales emphasise different reasons and 
objectives for the active use of military force and the significance of 
the transatlantic alliance. Combined with early lessons learned in the 
Balkans in the 1990s, they converge through a variety of arguments that 
have enabled broad political consensus in the Danish parliament and 
substantial and sustained public support for the use of force. Military 
deployments and political decisions have been mandated on the basis 
of bills and political debates that have drawn upon all three. Thus, the 
deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Iraq (again) were all 
founded on combinations of these rationales. Further, the military activist 
policy that is thus made possible and rational has enabled changing 
Danish governments to develop and maintain a position as a key NATO 
member and a close and dependable US ally. ‘Punching above one’s 
weight’ to seek close relations with the United States makes sense from 
cosmopolitan, strategic and moral grounds. The United States is often 
the precondition for Danish force being a cosmopolitan force for good. 
Supporting US military actions is sound strategic realpolitik for a small 
state like Denmark. Finally, penance for past Danish foreign policy sins 
can be paid by standing by the United States.
Conclusions and Consequences
In July 2015, Danish servicemen warned against continued air operations 
in Iraq. Ground crews were exhausted and aircraft were increasingly in 
need of maintenance. The shop stewards in the Royal Danish Air Force, 
unusually and very publicly, asked Danish politicians ‘to step up to 
their responsibility and withdraw the Danish contribution so the planes 
and mechanics can get a break’.44 The aircraft returned to Denmark on 
1 October only to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kristian Jensen, 
responding to the November 2015 Paris terrorist attack by suggesting 
a redeployment of F-16s to Iraq.45 The use of military force has become 
not only a key component in Danish foreign policy but also an accustomed 
practice.
44  H Jensen & JA Bjørnager, ‘F-16 Mekanikere: Stop fly-aktionen mod Islamisk Stat’, Berlingske 
Tidenden, 27 Jul. 2015, viewed Aug. 2016, www.b.dk/nationalt/f16-mekanikere-stop-fly-aktionen-
mod-islamisk-stat.
45  Søren Ploug Lilmoes, ‘Kristian Jensen: Regeringen er Klar til at Bombe i Syrien’, Politiko, 15 Nov. 
2015, viewed Aug. 2016, www.politiko.dk/nyheder/kristian-jensen-regeringen-er-klar-til-at-bombe-i-
syrien.
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The convergence of the cosmopolitan, the strategic and the moral 
rationale has entailed a sedimentation of the active use and political 
utility of military force in Danish alliance politics. Military force is what 
Denmark contributes within alliance settings and, due to consistent high 
public and broad political support for both NATO membership and 
participation in international military operations, the Danish politicians 
are not challenged to explain why military force is the right contribution. 
Instead of being just a label that describes current Danish alliance politics, 
military activism has become a foreign policy custom. The Danish public 
and politicians have become accustomed to sending Danish military forces 
to armed conflicts and, even though casualties have resulted in political 
discussions, it has not deterred the Danish parliament from repeatedly 
deploying military forces. Consequently, the current view on the use of 
force as a key component of Danish alliance-politics structure and lock-
in-place Danish politics. Continuity is easy, whereas a new political 
course of action inevitably ends up in a difficult confrontation with some 
combination of the three rationales mentioned above. 
Still, what may account for change if it is unlikely that an internally and 
politically driven break takes place? We highlight two potential sources 
of  change. First, the current and future force structure of the Danish 
armed forces may increasingly be a deciding factor for how force can be 
used in Danish alliance politics. Second, perhaps military activism is not 
suited to the alliance politics of the future. The challenges that arose in 
Iraq with regard to the flight mechanics and aircraft can be seen in other 
areas of the Danish armed forces. A considerable number of capabilities 
are worn down, limited in numbers and need to be recapitalised. Thus, 
Denmark can still deploy fighter jets, tactical air lift, navy vessels, special 
operations forces and a battalion-sized task force, but the force structure 
is challenged in terms of sustainability. 
Denmark has in the last decades—along with most Western European 
states—consistently spent less on defence and is currently spending 
1.17 per cent of GDP, substantially off NATO’s 2 per cent target. During 
the war in Afghanistan, Danish politicians and diplomats could argue 
that Denmark made a considerable contribution to the alliance through 
risk-taking. This has given rise to a notable discussion on whether 
member states should be assessed based on input, output or outcome 
measures. In other words, should alliance status be assessed on defence 
spending, deployable forces and capabilities, or deployed forces and 
capabilities? By always being willing to heed the call, and deploy forces, 
GLOBAL ALLIES
76
military activism has enabled Denmark to provide an outsized NATO 
contribution while keeping defence spending low. The cost has not been 
financial but increased risk to service personnel and a narrowing down of 
Danish capabilities.
With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its involvement in Eastern 
Ukraine, NATO’s debate about defence spending has been re-emphasised, 
lessening the value of Danish risk-taking. So while Denmark’s military 
activism proved a politically beneficial alliance policy in a world formed 
by the American ‘war against terrorism’ and subsequent counterinsurgency 
operations, it seems less likely to thrive in a world that is returning to 
geopolitics, with NATO increasingly focused on Russia, and the United 
States increasingly focused on China.
Military activism has—for a while—produced an equilibrium in Danish 
politics due to its ability to encompass cosmopolitan, strategic and moral 
rationales in Danish foreign policy, and simultaneously strengthening 
relations to the United States. Due to both internal and external factors, 
however, this could be changing. Denmark will in the coming years be 
challenged in balancing global, regional and Arctic demands. Denmark 
will need to refocus on the Nordic region and further develop policies 
and capabilities for the Arctic. Simultaneously, Denmark will be asked to 
contribute to collective defence in NATO. Doing that, while still being 
both able and willing to deploy military force out of area will be difficult 
for the very slim and not well-funded Danish force structure. Defence 
policy, for Denmark, immediately transforms into foreign and alliance 
politics. 
In sum, military activism turned out to be a solid basis for consistent 
Danish alliance politics. The days of military activism might, however, be 
coming to an end. Not because of a critical and causality intolerant public 
or a war-weary parliament, but because of the slimming Danish force 
structure and because the key Danish ally—the United States—is now 
increasingly asking for defence spending rather than risk-taking.
77
6
1  See, for example, Brad Glosserman, ‘The Australian Canary’, PacNet, no. 67, Pacific Forum 
CSIS, 21 Nov. 2011.
Crusaders and Pragmatists: 
Australia Debates the 
American Alliance
Brendan Taylor & William T Tow
The most evident management challenge facing the US–Australia alliance 
going forward is how Canberra positions itself between its leading trading 
partner (a rising China) and its long-standing strategic ally (the United 
States). For more than half a decade now—ever since the former senior 
defence official turned professor Hugh White sparked a public discussion 
on the subject—this has been the dominant foreign policy debate in 
Australia. It is a debate that has attracted international attention including, 
most significantly, in Washington.1
This chapter begins with the observation, however, that this debate is but 
the latest manifestation of a long-standing tension in Australian foreign 
policy that reflects Canberra’s cultural and historical ties to the Western 
world, juxtaposed against its geographic location on Asia’s periphery. 
The  chapter goes on to assess the arguments put forward by the two 
dominant camps in this debate. The first of those camps it characterises 
as the ‘Crusaders’, a collection of scholars and policy analysts who argue 
that Canberra needs to ‘double down’ on the American alliance going 
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forward with a view to seeing off the Chinese challenge to the US-led 
security order in Asia that has served Australia so well during the postwar 
period. The second it dubs the ‘Pragmatists’, a relatively diverse group who 
contend that Canberra needs to establish a greater degree of autonomy 
from Washington in a manner carefully calibrated to align with Asia’s 
changing power dynamics. While successive Australian governments have 
essentially sought to have the best of both worlds by actively seeking and, 
by and large, achieving a remarkable degree of foreign policy autonomy 
within the bounds of the American alliance, the chapter concludes that 
this course is likely to become more challenging to maintain in the future 
as US expectations of Australia intensify in an increasingly contested Asia.
Torn Country
The most extensive reiteration of the debate regarding how Australia 
should position itself between China and America was initiated by the 
publication of Hugh White’s 2010 Quarterly Essay ‘Power Shift’.2 White’s 
work started out with the proposition that the US-led security order in 
Asia that had been in place since the end of World War II was coming 
under challenge in the face of China’s rise. Whichever order replaced 
it, in White’s view, would be an inherently more contested one. Given 
that such an outcome would not be in Australia’s interests, White urged 
Australian policymakers to undertake a concerted effort to convince both 
Beijing and Washington to enter into a power-sharing arrangement—akin 
to that which operated reasonably effectively in Europe during the 19th 
century—rather than drifting into a dangerous strategic competition with 
considerable potential for war.3 White also saw the need for India and 
Japan to be included in this arrangement, given that they are the region’s 
other two major powers. At the heart of the power-sharing arrangement, 
however, was the fundamental need for Beijing and Washington to see 
one another as equals and to ‘share power’ in Asia on this basis. Should 
that outcome not eventuate, according to White, then Canberra would 
almost certainly be faced with an unenviable choice between its leading 
2  Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay, 
no. 39, Collingwood, Vic.: Black Inc, 2010.
3  For further reading on the Concert of Europe, see Carston Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: 
A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815–1914, London: Longman, 1970.
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trading partner and its long-standing strategic ally, most dramatically in 
the case of conflict between these two heavyweights. In White’s view, this 
was a choice best avoided.
The debate that White’s work prompted is one with relatively deep 
historical roots. Indeed, Canberra has faced challenges regarding how 
to position itself between Beijing and Washington ever since the US–
Australia alliance was conceived in the early 1950s. As Michael Wesley 
has observed, ‘more than any other country, China has always symbolised 
for Australia the immanent evolution of the Asian regional order. This 
has been a nagging caveat in this country’s deep commitment to, and 
investment in, the American-guaranteed global and regional orders’.4 
This observation is consistent with the late Samuel Huntington’s famous 
characterisation of Australia as a ‘torn country’—a people who, in his 
words, are ‘divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization 
or another’.5 Huntington here was referring to an Australia ‘torn’ between 
its cultural and historical ties with the Western world and its geographic 
proximity to Asia.
Washington very clearly required Canberra to make a choice between its 
history and its geography when it agreed to enter into a formal strategic 
alliance with Australia in the early 1950s. At the time, the Australian 
Foreign Minister, RG Casey, was actively considering an alternative 
multilateral organisation that would include not only his country’s major 
power allies—Great Britain and the United States—but also the newly 
independent states of Asia. Even prior to that, the government under Ben 
Chifley was in 1949 seriously contemplating the possibility of following 
Britain’s lead and formally recognising the newly established People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) under Communist rule. After toying with 
and ultimately rejecting a prospective multilateral framework—akin to 
that which it had established in Europe following the ending of World 
War II6—Washington made clear to Canberra that in order to secure 
the alliance it sought so as to ease its anxieties regarding the prospect 
4  Michael Wesley, ‘Australia–China’, in Brendan Taylor (ed.), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional 
Power: Friendships in Flux?, London & New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 60.
5  Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 151–54.
6  For further reading, see Victor Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in 




of a remilitarised Japan, Australia needed to unequivocally support US 
policy in Asia. This included non-recognition of Communist China and 
forswearing any alternative Pan-Asian regional structures.7
Almost as soon as the ANZUS8 Treaty had been signed, however, Canberra 
was testing Washington’s limits in terms of how much leeway it would 
afford Australia as far as its China policies were concerned. Somewhat 
ironically, even as Australian troops were fighting against Chinese and 
Chinese-supported troops in the Korean War, Australia was already 
engaging in a burgeoning trading relationship with Communist China. 
By the early 1960s Australia had become China’s leading supplier of wheat 
while, by the end of that decade, it was China’s third-largest supplier of 
goods—second only to Japan and the then West Germany. Moreover, this 
was during a period when a US-led trade embargo was in place against 
Communist China—an instrument of economic statecraft that Canberra 
supported in relatively minimalist terms by adhering to the requirement 
it not supply Beijing with ‘strategic materials’.9
By the early 1970s, daylight was again opening up between Canberra 
and Washington in their respective China policies, with Australia moving 
more quickly towards the formal normalisation of relations with Beijing 
than even the revolutionary diplomacy of the Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger years. Gough Whitlam, leader of the opposition Australian 
Labor Party, for instance, led a delegation to Beijing in July 1971 only 
a matter of days before Kissinger famously visited there as US national 
security adviser. Whitlam was elected prime minister in the following year 
and one of his first acts was to formally recognise China in December 
1972. He  subsequently became the first Australian prime minister to 
visit the PRC in October 1973, during which time he was able to secure 
separate trade and technology agreements, coupled with the establishment 
of a joint trade committee. Most significantly in the context of the current 
chapter, however, all of this occurred in advance of the normalisation 
7  Wesley, ‘Australia–China’, 2007, p. 62.
8  New Zealand was originally a member of the alliance, but its participation was suspended in 
1986 following a dispute with the United States over the visits of nuclear ships. For further reading 
see Gerald Hensley, Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, Auckland University 
Press, 2013.
9  Wesley, ‘Australia–China’, 2007, p. 64.
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of  China–US relations in 1979. As Shannon Tow has thus observed, 
‘these milestones were hallmarks of an emerging Australia China policy 
that was less calibrated with Washington’.10
In perhaps the most direct antecedent to White’s work, however, the former 
secretary of the Australian Department of Trade, Stuart Harris, published a 
monograph in the late 1990s titled simply Will China Divide Australia and 
the US?11 While acknowledging that the China policies of Canberra and 
Washington had generally been fairly well aligned, Harris also pointed out 
that there had on occasion been quite public differences between them, 
particularly in relation to human rights issues. Moreover, Harris was also 
of the view that such differences were likely to become sharper and more 
pronounced in the future ‘as the two countries accommodate, in their 
own responses to a changing regional environment, rising China’.12 While 
predicting that Australia and America would continue to have common 
interests vis-à-vis China, Harris was also of the view that differences would 
open up due to their differing geography, geopolitical objectives, national 
interests and foreign policymaking processes. He suggested that these 
differences would grow in importance and that they had the potential to 
ultimately divide Canberra and Washington. His monograph was thus 
not only an attempt to identify these differences in advance, but also 
to develop effective strategies for managing them.
In some respects, the story of the US–Australia alliance during the period 
since Harris produced this monograph has been the antithesis of what he 
predicted. Writing recently in Foreign Affairs, for instance, Bates Gill and 
Tom Switzer argued that ‘Australia now figures more prominently in US 
foreign policy than at any time since 1942–45, when Australian combat 
troops served under General Douglas MacArthur and scores of US air and 
naval bases and army camps were stationed Down Under’.13 The alliance has 
unquestionably gone from strength to strength in recent years, deepening 
institutionally and broadening into new areas of cooperation such as cyber 
security, ballistic missile defence, space cooperation and new measures 
10  Shannon Tow, ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance: Reconciling Sino–Australian Relations 
with ANZUS, 1971–2007’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 12, no. 1, 2012, p. 81. doi.
org/10.1093/irap/lcr021.
11  Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, Sydney: The Australian Centre for 
American Studies, 1998.
12  Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?, 1998, p. 1.
13  Bates Gill & Tom Switzer, ‘The New Special Relationship: The US–Australia Alliance Deepens’, 
Foreign Affairs, 19 Feb. 2015.
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to combat terrorism. Of particular significance, during his first visit to 
Australia as president in November 2011, Barack Obama announced 
the establishment of the US Marine Corps Rotational Force, Darwin—
this force will grow to 2,500 personnel in coming years and operate as 
a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Even more significantly, the 2014 Force 
Posture Agreement between the United States and Australia enabled not 
only the expansion of the US Marine Force, but also the rotation of a US 
Air Force presence in northern Australia including B-52 (and potentially 
B-1B) bombers, fighter jets and air-to-air refuelling aircraft.14 Consistent 
with this, the Australian Government’s 2016 defence white paper placed 
particular emphasis upon the acquisition of military capabilities that 
will enable Australian forces to operate in close cooperation with their 
American counterparts, particularly in South-East Asia.15
All of that said, however, differences between Canberra and Washington 
over China policy have also become more pronounced and more visible 
in recent years, precisely along the lines that Harris predicted. Perhaps the 
starkest example occurred in April 2015 when Australia opted to apply 
for membership of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). Canberra’s decision was especially significant because it occurred 
in the face of strong and rather public opposition from the Obama 
administration. In October of the same year, further tensions were 
generated by the Australian Government’s decision to grant a 99-year 
lease to Landbridge, a Chinese company with alleged links to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). While the Australian Department of Defence 
had reportedly given the ‘all clear’ for this deal to go ahead, the Obama 
administration was reportedly disgruntled that it had not been consulted. 
Andrew Krepenivich summarised the mood in Washington at the time 
by suggesting that the Landbridge lease ‘threaten[ed] to undermine 
Australia’s relations with its closest security partner, the United States’.16 
As a consequence of this episode, coupled with Canberra’s reluctance to 
adopt a stronger position in response to China’s growing assertiveness 
in  the South China Sea, reports soon emerged that Australian and 
American officials were engaged in ‘emergency talks’.17
14  Greg Sheridan, ‘B-1 Supersonic Bombers Coming to the North After All’, Australian, 22 May 
2015.
15  For further reading, see Peter Jennings, ‘The 2016 Defence White Paper and the ANZUS 
Alliance’, Security Challenges, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, pp. 53–63.
16  Andrew Krepenivich, ‘Darwin Port Deal with China’s Landbridge Group an Unforced Error’, 
Australian, 17 Nov. 2015.
17  Lisa Murray, ‘US in Talks on Darwin Port’, Australian Financial Review, 4 Dec. 2015.
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The fact that such episodes were taking place against the backdrop of 
the debate sparked by White back in 2010 is by no means insignificant. 
It is a debate that has not gone unnoticed in Washington. Indeed, as two 
well-placed American commentators, Michael Green and Zack Cooper, 
observed in July 2015:
for much of Australia’s history, its leaders have been nervous about 
abandonment by its primary ally … In the midst of Asia’s ascent today, 
however, it is Australians who worry about entrapment by Washington 
and Americans that worry about abandonment by Canberra.18 
It is to the debate sparked by White in 2010 that this chapter now turns.
Crusaders
It is possible to characterise the various participants in the debate in 
a  number of different ways. As will become apparent throughout the 
course of this chapter, there are also subtle variations within, as well as 
these clear differences between, the Crusader and Pragmatist camps.
Before proceeding to outline some of the primary contributions on either 
side of this debate, it is worth emphasising that the question at its centre is 
how much strategic autonomy Australia should exercise from the United 
States. To be sure, over the years a handful of scholars and analysts have 
suggested abandoning the American alliance altogether. The most recent 
example of this is a controversial book authored by former Australian 
prime minister, the late Malcolm Fraser.19 In this book, Fraser characterises 
the alliance as a ‘dangerous’ strategic tie and one that critically inhibits 
Canberra’s capacity to engage with its Asian neighbours. By and large, 
however, the vast majority of debate around the American alliance has not 
seriously considered the abandonment option. As Tow has observed, for 
instance, even the revolutionary Whitlam government of the 1970s was 
cognisant of this. In her terms:
18  Michael J Green, Peter J Dean, Brendan Taylor & Zack Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an 
Ascending Asia’, Centre of Gravity Series, no. 23, Jul. 2015, p. 8.
19  Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 
2014. For an earlier example of work calling for the complete abandonment of the American alliance, 
see David Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Blackburn, Vic.: Dove Communications, 1984.
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Whitlam was acutely conscious that Sino–Australian relations should 
not develop at the expense of Australia’s core strategic relationship with 
the United States. Although Whitlam is popularly represented as the 
harbinger of a more independent Australian foreign policy, he was acutely 
aware of Australia’s strategic dependence on the American alliance.20
Those falling within the Crusader camp argue that, in a more contested 
Asia, Australia will not have the same luxury that those such as Whitlam 
have enjoyed in years gone by in terms of how much autonomy Canberra 
is able to exercise within the alliance. Instead, they argue that the very 
survival of the US-led security order in Asia, which has served Australia so 
well in the period since the end of World War II, is being fundamentally 
challenged as a direct result of China’s growing power, influence and 
strategic ambition. In response to this challenge, Crusaders argue that 
Canberra needs to join American efforts to balance against China’s rise. 
As Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI) and a prominent member of the Crusader camp, puts it: 
the strategic choice Australia faces is not the pulp fiction one of picking 
between the US and China. It’s a choice about us: do we crouch or do we 
stand? Stand, that is, with a strong defence capability, a powerful alliance 
and a global network of friends. No choice at all, really.21
As Jennings’ quote implies, these balancing efforts involve not only siding 
with the United States, but also coordinating much more closely with 
other American allies and partners to add further weight to Washington’s 
position in Asia. There is a strong values-based logic underpinning such 
arguments, with Crusaders advocating closer collaboration between 
Canberra and other democratic partners and allies of America to preserve 
what Condoleezza Rice once famously characterised as a ‘balance of power 
that favours freedom’22 in the Asia-Pacific region. Andrew Shearer, another 
prominent member of the Crusader camp who served as a senior adviser 
to former prime minister Tony Abbott and who is now affiliated with the 
highly regarded Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington DC, embraces this logic by encouraging ‘the development of 
a network of like-minded partners who have both the political will and 
the capacity to contribute materially to maintaining a favourable balance 
20  Tow, ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance’, 2012, pp. 81–82.
21  Peter Jennings, ‘Australia Must Choose to Stand Tall in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Australian 
Financial Review, 17 Feb. 2014.
22  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Dr Condoleezza Rice Discusses President’s 
National Security Strategy’, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 1 Oct. 2002.
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of power in a rapidly changing region’.23 Such arguments are consistently 
made by those in the Crusader camp to advocate closer strategic relations 
bilaterally between Australia and Japan, trilaterally to include Australia, 
Japan and the United States, and quadrilaterally by adding India into 
that mix.24
Unlike in the past, when Canberra has had little reluctance when it comes to 
issuing statements reflecting its strong rhetorical support for the American 
alliance, Crusaders also argue that Australia needs to undertake much more 
in the way of concrete action to actively support a strong US presence in a 
contested Asia. In recent months, such arguments have increasingly been 
made with reference to the South China Sea. This has been especially so 
since the United States began demonstrating its commitment to military 
overflight and freedom of navigation with respect to this body of water, 
as first evidenced by the October 2015 transit of the USS Lassen within 
12 nautical miles of five features in the disputed Spratly Islands. As Ben 
Schreer and Tim Huxley, two prominent voices from the Crusader camp 
argued in the aftermath of this operation, ‘words alone are not sufficient 
to stop China’s maritime assertiveness. Expecting the US will somehow 
stand up to China on its own is a tall order. The cherished assumption 
that Australia can sail easily between China and the US is a flawed one’.25 
In a similar vein, following Beijing’s February 2016 deployment of anti-
aircraft missiles to Woody Island, Jennings argued that ‘urging restraint 
and calm as prime ministers Malcolm Turnbull and New Zealand’s [John] 
Key did last Friday is sensible enough, but realistically, the South China 
Sea issue is morphing from a dispute into a crisis. More is needed than 
soothing talking points’. Jennings then went on to propose:
a better approach would be to strengthen and coordinate American 
and regional responses to China. This must include a shared, stronger, 
diplomatic response to Beijing and for a number of countries—not 
just the United States—to exercise military overflight and freedom of 
navigation manoeuvres.26
23  Andrew Shearer, ‘Uncharted Waters: The US Alliance and Australia’s New Era of Strategic 
Uncertainty’, Perspectives, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Aug. 2011, p. 16.
24  See, for example, Andrew Shearer, ‘Australia–Japan–US Maritime Cooperation: Creating 
Federated Capabilities for the Asia-Pacific’, A Report for the CSIS Asia Program, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Washington DC, Apr. 2016.
25  Ben Schreer & Tim Huxley, ‘Standing up To China is Essential, Even if Costly’, Australian, 
21 Dec. 2015.
26  Peter Jennings, ‘South China Sea: We Should Push Back against New Drive’, Australian Financial 




Juxtaposed against the Crusader camp, another school of thinking argues 
that Canberra should instead be seeking to distance itself somewhat 
from the alliance as Asia becomes more contested. There are a number 
of different variants of this argument. A particularly interesting feature of 
this line of thinking, however, is the significant number of former senior 
Australian politicians and officials who have associated themselves with 
the Pragmatist camp.
One notable example is former foreign minister Bob Carr, who argues that, 
by aligning itself too closely with the American alliance, Canberra risks 
entrapment within a conflict in which it has only peripheral interest. Carr 
has made this argument recently and publicly in relation to rising tensions 
around the East and the South China Seas disputes. To substantiate his 
arguments on the East China Sea, the Australia–China Relations Institute 
(ACRI), of which Carr is head, has undertaken polling of the Australian 
public showing that 71 per cent of Australians were against Australia 
taking sides in a conflict between China and Japan over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, whilst 68 per cent were of the view that the 
Australian Prime Minister should refuse any request from his American 
counterpart to provide military support in the event the United States 
were to become involved in any such contingency.27 On the South China 
Sea, Carr contends that it would be a mistake for Canberra to follow the 
course suggested by the Crusaders with respect to so-called freedom-of-
navigation operations given that few, if any, other Asian capitals would 
be willing to engage in these. In Carr’s terms, ‘do we want to be the only 
American friend, partner or ally to be donning a deputy sheriff’s badge, 
glinting in the sunlight and running these sorts of patrols?’28
A second strand of the Pragmatist line of thinking argues that any 
decisive tilt towards the American alliance would be premature given the 
uncertain trajectory of the Sino–American relationship. According to 
this line of reasoning, while there will be competitive elements to this 
relationship in the foreseeable future, it is important not to underestimate 
the potential for Beijing and Washington to manage their differences and 
27  Rowan Callick, ‘Don’t Take Sides in China–Japan Islands Conflict, Says Survey’, Australian, 
6 Jan. 2015.
28  ‘Australia Should Not Conduct “Missions” with US in South China Sea: Former FM’, Xinhua, 
4 Mar. 2016.
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for the cooperative dimensions of the relationship to prevail. The classic 
statement from Canberra reflecting this logic can be found in the 2013 
defence white paper, which stated:
the Government does not believe that Australia must choose between 
its longstanding alliance with the United States and its expanding 
relationship with China; nor do the United States and China believe we 
must make such a choice.29 
More recently, the recently retired Australian Secretary of Defence, 
Dennis Richardson, has continued to famously run a similar line. 
In Richardson’s terms, ‘our relationship with China and the United States 
can be summarised by one simple phrase: friends with both, allies with 
one’. Lest this be mistaken for a softer version of the Crusader line of 
argument, however, Richardson also places himself firmly within the 
Pragmatist camp by going on to observe that ‘as close as we are to the 
United States, we do have our own interests and set our own course. 
Our relationship and interests in China are sometimes different to those 
of the United States’.30
A third strand of the Pragmatist school argues that, by distancing itself 
from Washington, Canberra stands the best chance of contributing—to 
the extent that a middle-sized power such as Australia possibly can—
toward ameliorating deepening strategic competition between China and 
America. White’s argument that Canberra should be urging Washington 
and Beijing to ‘share power’ in Asia places him squarely within this camp.31 
With specific reference to the South China Sea disputes, Wesley takes 
a similar line to White, arguing that Canberra needs to take a less timid 
approach in relation to these disputes and to draw inspiration from some 
of Australia’s most activist diplomatic initiatives of days gone by—such as 
its promotion of a creative solution to the Cambodian conflict during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s—particularly given the considerable interests 
it currently has at stake in Asia. In Wesley’s words:
29  Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra: Department of Defence, 
2013, p. 11.
30  Dennis Richardson, ‘The 2015 Blamey Oration: The Strategic Outlook for the Indo-Pacific 
Region’, 3rd International Defence and Security Dialogue, 27 May 2015, viewed 16 Jun. 2016, 
www.rusinsw.org.au/Papers/20150527B.pdf.
31  In addition to Hugh White’s 2010 Quarterly Essay, see also Hugh White, The China Choice: Why 
America Should Share Power, Collingwood, Vic.: Black Inc, 2012.
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were Washington to become embroiled in a conflict in the South China 
Sea, it is highly likely that Australia would be expected to fulfil its alliance 
obligations alongside US forces. Australia’s acceptance as part of the Asia-
Pacific region might also be challenged, a status that has been contested 
in the past and could be again in the future. An Australia that stands aloof 
from one of the region’s key flashpoints could well be an Australia whose 
commitment to  regional issues is questioned in future international 
relations.32
Trouble Ahead?
The voluminous scholarship on alliance politics has engaged surprisingly 
little with the issues surrounding the management of alliances. Instead, 
the focus of this work has been predominantly upon questions relating 
to the formation, persistence and collapse of these arrangements.33 This is 
especially true of scholarship addressing Australia’s alliance with America. 
In one of the few works to specifically address alliance management 
issues, however, the doyen of alliance politics Glenn Snyder points out 
that central to the task of managing any alliance, ‘the parties will want to 
shape and control it so that it maximizes their net benefits’.34 The analysis 
presented in this chapter suggests that, historically, Australia has certainly 
endeavoured to do so in its alliance with America, willingly accepting 
its characterisation as a ‘Dependent’ and ‘Dependable’ junior ally to the 
United States, but in practice actively seeking and successfully exercising 
a remarkable degree of independence within the bounds of this alliance 
relationship.
One could argue that Canberra has been able to exercise this degree of 
independence precisely because Washington has ultimately afforded it 
the luxury of doing so. Indeed, as detailed earlier in this chapter, after 
initially requiring Canberra to commit to US policy in the Asia-Pacific 
as a non-negotiable requirement for first entering into a formal alliance 
with America, Washington has generally during the period since afforded 
Canberra considerable latitude—especially so in its China policies—and 
has opted not to impose significant costs upon it, even in instances when 
32  Michael Wesley, ‘Timid Diplomacy Leaves Us in a Sea of Disputes’, Age (Melbourne), 25 Sep. 
2015.
33  See, for example, Stephan M Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1987.
34  Glenn H Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 165.
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Australia has clearly gone against the wishes of its senior ally, such as in 
April 2015 when Canberra applied for membership of the Chinese-led 
AIIB. Do outcomes such as these suggest that the Pragmatists are 
ultimately likely to prevail over the Crusaders in their ongoing debate 
as outlined in this chapter? Not necessarily. 
Indeed, a case can be made that the future management of the 
American alliance may become more rather than less challenging and 
that history may not serve as a reliable guide for Canberra, particularly 
in an increasingly contested Asia. The noticeable degree of interest that 
Washington has paid to the Australian debate between the Crusaders and 
Pragmatists, for instance, points towards the possibility of an impending 
sea change in American attitudes towards the alliance. As Michael Green 
and Zack Cooper note, ‘these public debates by the United States’ closest 
ally in the Pacific have some senior US officials quietly questioning 
whether Japan may in future replace Australia as the most trustworthy 
ally should US and regional tensions continue mounting with Beijing’.35 
In the final analysis, therefore, while Australia’s alliance with America is 
today in seemingly very good shape, as this relationship continues to both 
broaden and deepen and should Canberra expect to exercise the same 
degree of independence within the alliance that it has done historically, 
the task of managing its relations with Washington could well become 
more challenging and the potential costs associated with exercising such 
independence considerably greater.
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The Challenges and Dynamics 
of Alliance Policies: Norway, 
NATO and the High North
Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger
This chapter sets out to discuss two major framework conditions for 
Norwegian foreign, security and defence policy: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the High North.1 Having to address increasingly 
heterogeneous security concerns and agendas, how do alliances shape their 
members’ foreign, security and defence policies? And how do the specific 
challenges related to the High North, such as Russia and other states’ 
policy agendas, form Norwegian responses and policies? In answering these 
questions, we aim to explore the framework conditions in a contemporary 
and historical context. Apart from contributing to the literature on Norway 
and NATO, we endeavour to add value to the general understanding of 
small states’ foreign and security policy enablers and constraints.2
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As a small state located at NATO’s northern flank, Norway has a keen 
interest in keeping the High North peaceful. Norway seeks predictability 
and stability in its relationship with its neighbours. Its sovereignty 
ultimately depends, however, on the maintenance of international law and 
order embedded in two elements. One is the international community and 
particularly the United Nations, which ‘is Norway’s first line of defence, 
literally speaking’.3 The other is the alliance system and especially NATO’s 
Article 5, and Norway’s close bilateral relationship with the United States. 
A complicating factor is, however, that Russia–West/Russia–NATO 
relations often are reflected in and affect Norway’s bilateral relationship 
with Russia in the High North—for instance, the bilateral relationship 
soured following Russia’s intervention in Georgia. 
In discussing the challenges and dynamics of Norway’s alliance policy, 
this chapter focuses on three points in particular: first, what Norway as 
a country does to manage its security challenges and status as a small state, 
both through procurement policies and multilateral security cooperation; 
second, how Norway manages its relationship with its High North 
neighbour Russia; and, finally, to what degree Norway’s 2014 Arctic 
policy and 2006 High North strategy have been adequate responses to the 
challenges above. The first two points mainly concern security, notably 
Norway’s alliance policy (NATO membership), and bilateral relations 
with Russia. The final point, however, seeks to outline the room Norway 
has for pursuing a more independent yet inclusive foreign policy in the 
region to promote cooperation and competence sharing.
Russia has been a returning concern in both Norwegian and Western 
security discourses. From being an actor of limited resources that 
generated nominal interest in the 15 years after the Cold War ended, 
Russia has clearly re-emerged as an actor on the global scene. This has 
been felt both in the north, where the level of Russian military activity 
has increased considerably, but also in the south and the east, with the 
Russian interventions in Georgia (2008) and especially Ukraine (2014). 
The  current threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 
violent extremism, however, has ostensibly created the opportunity 
for a  rapprochement between Russia and the West in the fight 
3  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interesser, ansvar og muligheter: Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk 
(Interests, Responsibility and Possibilities: Approaches in Norwegian Foreign Policy), St. meld. 15 
(2008–09), 13 Mar. 2009.
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against terrorism. This recent move revisits questions about how to engage 
with Russia not only for NATO, but also in a local context, namely in the 
High North. 
Overall, the bulk of existing literature on challenges in this region has 
been policy-specific, covering areas such as environmental policies, 
minority policies, fisheries, legal issues and energy extraction, including 
the role of big powers such as Russia, the United States and, potentially, 
China. Regarding Norwegian security, the literature has focused primarily 
on the challenges related to military developments in Russia and Russian 
intentions, as well as Norway’s response in the form of military presence, 
exercises and surveillance of the seas. This essay contributes to the debate 
a discussion about how Norwegian policy has developed in light of an 
alliance that has to deal with increasingly diversifying—and at times 
diverging—security concerns and agendas, while at the same time having 
to deal bilaterally with Russia as a great power. To do so, we hone in on 
Norway’s changing role in the alliance, as well as the alliance’s role in and 
influence on Norway’s defence policy. The handling of two intertwined 
priority areas of Norwegian foreign and security policy—Russia and the 
High North—is studied to demonstrate Norwegian approaches towards 
the challenges within the respective bilateral and multilateral contexts. 
The chapter begins by contextualising Norway’s current global position 
with a brief historical account of the country’s foreign and security policy. 
Then we give an overview of Norway’s historical alliance with the United 
States and NATO before embarking on a discussion of Norway as a notable 
defence spender and contributor to international security, challenging the 
view that Norway is a small state. The chapter proceeds with a discussion 
of how Norway manages its relationship with Russia bilaterally, but with 
a view to global security concerns. Finally, we analyse Norway’s foreign 
policy options in the High North, a region that encompasses Norway’s 
number one security policy focus area. 
Norwegian Security and Defence Policy
Compared to its Nordic counterparts, Norway was a latecomer in 
developing its armed forces and independent foreign policy. This  is 
largely due to the fact that Norway did not gain full independence 
until 1905. The  country was under Danish rule for nearly 400 years 
before it was turned over to Sweden in 1814, after Denmark’s loss in 
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the Napoleonic wars. Norway declared itself neutral during World War I 
and maintained its neutrality until it was invaded by Nazi Germany in 
1940. World War II was an instigator for change in Norway’s defence and 
security policy. In the aftermath of the war, Norway developed its armed 
forces in line with its place in NATO’s security strategy and with national 
defence concerns.4 
Norway’s NATO membership since 1949, with the concomitant binding 
guarantee of mutual security in Article 5 of the treaty, reinforced the 
promise of support in times of crisis. The Norwegian forces were 
dimensioned to deny an attacker the possibility of invading Norwegian 
territory or, if invaded, of putting up resistance (for 48 hours) until allies 
could come to Norway’s assistance. Back then, as today, it was understood 
that ‘assistance would have to come from the West, and it would have to 
be prepared in peacetime in order to be effective in times of war’.5 Norway 
joined the alliance a year after turning down Sweden’s 1948 proposition 
of a Scandinavian alliance and continues to hold that NATO defence 
cooperation is supreme over any other Nordic defence cooperation.6 
As we shall see, however, Norway does take part in security and defence 
cooperation with its Nordic neighbours (Nordic Defence Cooperation, 
NORDEFCO). 
Norway’s defence policy came to be based on the understanding that 
external support and reinforcement were an absolute necessity.7 As an 
Atlantic coastal state with strong historical ties to the West, Norway has 
sought protection from Western great powers, in previous times particularly 
from the United Kingdom and, later, from the United States.8 Having 
a close bilateral relationship with the United States was widely recognised 
in Norway as providing extra reassurance of the guarantee under NATO’s 
Article 5. In addition to NATO membership, Norwegian defence against 
4  Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie, Bind 6, Oljealder 1965–1995, Oslo: University 
Publisher, 1997; Kjetil Skogrand, ‘Allierte i Krig og Fred 1940–1970’ (Allied in War and Peace 1940–
1970), vol. 4, Norwegian Defence History, Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004.
5  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, Report of Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and 
Defence Policy, Norwegian Government, Jun. 2015, p. 14.
6  Ståle Ulriksen, ‘Balancing Act – Norwegian Security Policy, Strategy and Military Posture’, 
Frivärld: Stockholm Free World Forum, 2013, p. 5, viewed Aug. 2016, frivarld.se/rapporter/balancing-
act-norwegian-security-policy-strategy-military-posture/.
7  Nina Græger, Norsk Forsvarspolitikk: Fra invasjonsforsvar til internasjonal innsats 1990–2015 
(Norwegian Defence Policy: From Invasion Defence to International Projection 1990–2015), Oslo: 
Spartacus forlag/Scandinavian Academic Press, 2016.
8  Nina Græger & Kristin M Haugevik, ‘The Revival of Atlanticism in NATO? Changing Security 
Identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark’, NUPI report, Oslo, 2009.
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invasion was based on universal male conscription, mobilisation and total 
defence, where the whole society could be activated in case of an armed 
attack. Throughout the Cold War period, national defence was the main 
objective, with any international involvement a secondary task.9 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the realisation that 
the Russians were not about to invade only gradually changed Norway’s 
security and defence policy. Change in the structuring of the armed forces 
took time but Norway did manage to transition to a post-national flexible 
defence.10 This did not change the importance of NATO and Norway’s 
close security relationship with the United States. But, in addition, the 
armed forces were transformed to meet the new international security 
environment and now participated in international peace operations, 
including peace enforcement operations. Around the year 2000, 
international operations were on par with national defence in Norwegian 
security concepts and strategies.
Preparing for an invasion over land became the main priority in post–
World War II Norwegian security and defence policy. Consequently, the 
army was the lead service for Norway throughout the Cold War. Regarding 
international deployments, the Norwegian contributions to UN missions 
up until 1995—especially on the Korean peninsula, in the Gaza Strip 
and in Lebanon—were also mainly from the army. The air force played 
an important role in the air missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan 
(Operation Enduring Freedom) and Libya, and the navy participated in 
international missions in the first Gulf War, the Gulf of Aden and the 
Mediterranean. The army, however, has dominated Norway’s long-term 
international engagements, as in Lebanon, the Balkans and Afghanistan 
(International Security Assistance Force, ISAF). Regarding territorial 
defence, however, the air force and the navy have arguably become lead 
services. Increased Russian military activity in the High North in more 
recent years has made both air surveillance and maritime security a higher 
priority on the Norwegian security agenda, as noted by the Defence 
Minister in 2014: ‘Our vast ocean areas, and the resources that exist 
9  Nina Græger, ‘Home and Away? Internationalism and Territory in the Post-1990 
Norwegian Defence Discourse’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 44, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1–18. doi.
org/10.1177/0010836710396347.
10  Ministry of Defence, ‘Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets Virksomhet og Utvikling i Tiden 1999–
2002’ (Main Guidelines for the Armed Forces’ Activity and Development in 1999–2002), White Paper 
no. 22, Oslo: Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Government, 1998; Ministry of Defence, Kosovo-Krisen 
– Nasjonal rapport (Kosovo Crisis – National Report), Norwegian Government, 24 Jan. 2001.
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there, demand continuous presence and a robust capacity for surveillance, 
to maintain sovereignty and to exert authority.’11 And, although the army 
remains important for territorial defence, a Russian invasion is unlikely 
in the foreseeable future.
Norway: A Standout Defence Spender 
and Participator
Many are puzzled by Norway’s willingness to spend fortunes on defence 
material and capability contributions—in periods when most European 
NATO countries were and still are cutting defence budgets and 
investments, and despite its location in a part of the world experiencing 
relatively low tension.12 Norway is a big spender within defence, spending 
more on defence per capita than any other European country. Over 
the years, Norway has maintained a relatively large defence budget and 
number of bases and installations across the country. In view of the 
post–Cold War security situation and with a large, expensive defence 
organisation, however, Norwegian political and military decision-makers 
were gradually convinced of the need to reform and downsize. More 
importantly, Norway needed to ensure interoperability with allied forces, 
as international operations in practice became the main task of the armed 
forces in the 1990s. With the global power shift and, especially, with 
Russia’s more forward and aggressive foreign policy, defence budgets again 
became a cause for concern. Norway’s defence budget has been stable 
and predictable and now amounts to some 43 billion Norwegian kroner, 
a 3.4 per cent increase compared with the core military budget for 2014.13
11  Ministry of Defence, ‘Sikrer Ekstra Midler i år Til Kystvakten’ (Secures Extra Funds to the Coast 
Guard this Year), Norwegian Government, 1 Feb. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.regjeringen.no/no/
aktuelt/kv-andenes-skal-repareres--sikrer-ekstra/id750283/.
12  Nina Græger, ‘From “Forces for Good” to “Forces for Status”?: Small State Military Status-
Seeking’, in Benjamin de Carvalho & Iver B Neumann (eds), Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s 
Quest for International Standing, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2015, p. 101.
13  The costs of international deployments as well as procurement investments (e.g. the F-35s) 
are kept outside of the annual defence budget. See Ministry of Defence, ‘Government Proposes 
3.4% Defense Budget increase in 2015’, Norwegian Government, 13 Oct. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, 
www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/Proposing-34-Defence-Budget-Increase-in-2015/id2005697/.
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In 2015, the country ranked sixth worldwide on defence spending 
per capita, ahead of the United Kingdom and France.14 The country’s 
core defence budget is almost twice that of Denmark and Finland, 
and considerably bigger than Sweden’s budget. Despite the NATO target 
that member states should each spend a minimum of 2 per cent of their 
national income or GDP on defence, few countries have been able to 
meet the target. At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, the 
ambitious target was replaced with the expectation that countries would 
halt any decline in defence expenditure.15 Norway currently spends some 
1.58 per cent of GDP and, although it will not meet the 2 per  cent 
spending target, the proposed defence plan for the period 2017–20 
suggests a substantial increase in total defence expenditure.16 Given the 
drop in defence budgets in Europe, excluding the Baltics, Norway has 
put emphasis on the importance of greater self-reliance and it is expected 
that the defence budget will continue to be at the same level or increase.17 
Recent notable procurements in the defence sector have made estimates 
for a growing budget more likely. As pointed out by the Chief of Defence, 
however, ‘to further today’s economic framework implies that the Armed 
Forces will have to be further downsized’.18 A returning issue has been 
Norway’s propensity to spend large parts of the budget on operating 
expenses (e.g. maintenance), at the cost of investments in defence 
materials and installations or training, which strengthens the operational 
capability of the armed forces. Added to this is the fact that procurement 
costs have increased by some 4 per cent every year, which aggravates the 
situation.19 This challenge is not unique for Norway and also holds for 
several NATO countries. 
14  SIPRI, ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
2015.
15  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, 5 Sep. 2014, viewed Aug. 
2016, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm; Denitsa Raynova & Ian Kearns, 
‘The Wales Pledge Revisited: A Preliminary Analysis of 2015 Budget Decisions in NATO Member 
States’, European Leadership Network, Feb. 2015.
16  Ministry of Defence, ‘Kampkraft og bærekraft. Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren’ (Combat 
power and sustainability. Long term plan for the defence sector), Government Proposition 151 S 
(2015–16), Oslo: Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Government, 17 Jun. 2016.
17  SIPRI, ‘Media Backgrounder: Military Spending in Europe in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis’, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13 Apr. 2015. 
18  The Armed Forces, Et Forsvar i Endring (A Defence Undergoing Change), Chief of Defence, 
5 Oct. 2015.
19  Nils Holme, ‘Forsvarspolitikken Ved et Veiskille’ (Defence Policy at a Crossroad), Report, Oslo: 
Civita, 2013; see also, The Armed Forces, Et Forsvar i Endring, 2015.
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Norway’s relatively large defence expenses compared to most of its 
European allies have been reasonably distributed across the three branches 
of its defence: navy, air force and army. Starting with Norway’s sea forces, 
being able to surveil the vast sea areas in the High North is central in 
the Norwegian defence concept and thinking.20 A frigate procurement 
program was approved by the Norwegian Parliament in 1999 and 
completed over a decade later in 2011. The purchase of five Spanish-
manufactured frigates was the biggest procurement expense in the 
history of the Norwegian navy.21 Although the navy and the coast guard 
have made notable advances in capabilities and acquisitions over the 
past 10 years, training to develop the skills for using the new, advanced 
technologies has been under-financed. In the Cold War era, the navy was 
focused largely in the coastal areas to defend the littoral areas and sea lines 
of communication between northern and southern Norway and was in 
a constant state of high readiness. While the navy remains a coastal force 
today, it has increased seagoing capability and is especially working to 
reverse the drop in capabilities experienced during the Norwegian armed 
forces general ‘low point’ from 2008–12.22 Most notably, in a series of 
acquisitions, a new logistics and support vessel is being made by South 
Korea.23 This new acquisition will allow Norway to contribute on a higher 
level than it has in the past as the fleet is able to provide fuel, food, fresh 
water, ammunition and other supplies to other vessels around the world.24 
Regarding special capacities, Norway is one of the few European states 
with a minesweeping capacity and a leader in European mine-warfare 
technology. In addition to the Royal Norwegian Navy’s Oksoy- and Alta-
class mine warfare vessels, the fleet has HUGIN Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicles provided by the Norwegian defence industry (Kongsberg 
Maritime). Further, Norway is in the process of upgrading its submarines 
after it was decided that the current Ula class would likely have life 
20  Ministry of Defence, ‘White Paper No. 1 (2012–2013) (2013 Budget)’, presented to the 
Norwegian Parliament, 14 Sep. 2012.
21  Ministry of Defence, ‘Future Acquisitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces 2014–2022’, 
Norwegian Government, Mar. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/
temadokumenter/acquisitions-2014-2022_mars-2014.pdf.
22  Ulriksen, ‘Balancing Act – Norwegian Security Policy, Strategy and Military Posture’, 2013.
23  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Largest Ship of the Norwegian Navy Under Construction in South 




24  Interview with employee in the Norwegian Navy, May 2015.
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extensions until 2020 and then be replaced.25 These submarines are viewed 
as a strategic deterrent by the Ministry of Defence26 and are esteemed 
by experts to be Norway’s strongest deterrent against military threats at 
sea.27 The ongoing planning of the procurement of new submarines has 
reportedly involved discussion of possible joint scenarios with NATO 
partners Poland and the Netherlands, who are also in the process of 
planning their future procurements,28 thus illustrating the international 
dimension of Norwegian procurement policy. 
In addition to easing national concerns, these capacities enable Norway 
to participate actively in a multilateral context, also beyond NATO. 
Maritime surveillance and anti-piracy activities are two areas of particular 
Norwegian interest and involvement. Norway has participated in the 
European Union Naval Force—Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR), and 
in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield with vessels in the Gulf of Aden since 
2008. Norway was also the first nation outside of Asia to join ReCAAP—
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia, which works to fight pirates and other 
armed attacks against shipping in the Asian region, an important arena 
for Norwegian trade. It is also the only non-EU member of the Maritime 
Surveillance project (MARSUR), which was launched by the European 
Defence Agency in 2005 to create a network using existing naval and 
maritime information exchange systems. 
Significant upgrades are also taking place in the Norwegian air force. 
The role of the Norwegian fighter plane fleet in the surveillance of the vast 
sea areas around Norway as well as responding to increased Russian air 
activity in the High North is essential.29 The principle decision to replace 
the country’s 52 F-16 fighter planes with 57 F-35 aircraft was approved by 
parliament in 2008, with the first training planes expected to be ready in 
2017 and the remaining planes by 2020. As with the F-16s, the Norwegian 
Government opted for the US planes, to be manufactured by Lockheed 
Martin. In justifying the purchase, the government emphasised the 
excellence of the F-35s—as with the frigates before that—in surveillance 
25  Ministry of Defence, ‘Future Acquisitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces, 2014–2022’, 2016.
26  Ministry of Defence, ‘A Defence for Our Time’, Government Proposition no. 73 (2011–12), 
presented to the Norwegian Parliament, 23 Mar. 2012.
27  Interview with employee in the Norwegian Navy, May 2015.
28  ‘Norway May Go Dutch with Poland on Subs’, Defence Industry Daily, 10 Sep. 2015, viewed 
Aug. 2016, www.defenceindustrydaily.com/ula-tech-norways-next-submarine-fleet-07609.
29  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 21.
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and demonstration of sovereignty in the High North, as well as in combat 
(e.g. stealth capabilities) in international operations.30 Apart from these 
qualities and the political prestige attached to the acquisition itself, 
these purchases signal to allies and partners that Norway is a country that 
takes responsibility for its own security, both nationally and globally.31 
Buying from American manufacturers also contributes to maintaining 
the close political bilateral relationship. In the 2017–2020 Long Term 
Defence Plan, the Chief of Defence emphasised national defence concerns 
and capacities aimed at protecting sovereignty, with the air force playing 
a central role.32 
As a lead service during the Cold War, the Norwegian army was a priority in 
defence budgets. The army took the main cuts when the defence structure 
was downsized in the late 1990s and early 2000s and its main activity 
became, to a large extent, to be a provider of personnel to international 
operations. During 2003–14, the ISAF mission was its primary focus, as 
well as some other smaller operations. Defence spending related to the 
Norwegian army has mainly been directed towards lighter equipment, 
training and exercises, and operating expenses rather than procurement 
programs. The more forward-leaning Russian foreign policy posture 
is expected to upgrade the role of the army also in a national context. 
The proposed increased army presence in the two northern counties is, 
however, mainly a reallocation (omdisponering) of existing forces, not an 
increase in the total volume of army forces.33 
Interoperability with NATO: The Role 
of Exercises
Close allies talk to and inform one another and work together, and 
are preferred partners. Participating in procurement programs, such as 
the Joint Strike Fighter program, connects Norway to NATO’s most 
powerful member, both politically and militarily. Participating in the 
F-35 procurement program and the earlier F-16 program confirms—at 
least in Norway—the close and essential relationship with the United 
30  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011.
31  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011.
32  This prediction is based on Fagmilitært råd (FMR), whose proposals are expected to be an 
essential input into the next defence plan. 
33  The Armed Forces, Et Forsvar i Endring, 2015, p. 38ff.
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States. Norwegian policy avers that it cannot take American interest for 
granted, and thus needs to work to keep the United States interested 
in the defence of Norway, also through force contributions—a policy 
that has not always been problem free.34 According to the Norwegian 
Government, a strong transatlantic relationship is ‘important not only 
for Norwegian security, but for the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic 
area and for global stability’.35 In order to have this kind of partnership, 
forces need to be interoperable. Hence, Norwegian procurement policies 
and exercises are closely linked together. 
Norway puts heavy emphasis on NATO joint exercises, especially on 
Norwegian soil, claiming that they ensure that NATO structures and 
forces are familiar with the Norwegian context (e.g. climate and terrain), 
interoperable and that the alliance’s military capability is maintained 
and strengthened. Norway will be hosting a major NATO exercise in 
2018, which the Defence Minister sees as ‘Good [Gledelig] news for 
Norway and important for the Armed Forces’.36 Procurement policies 
are also important for Norway’s participation in NATO exercises beyond 
Norwegian territory. For instance, in summer 2014, Norway’s Aegis frigate 
participated in the world’s largest maritime exercise ‘Rim of the Pacific’, 
or RIMPAC, off Hawaii. Despite the existence of the exercise since the 
early 1970s, as Norway’s first time participating, it was considered to have 
considerable strategic significance for the Norwegian defence community. 
In June 2015, Norway participated in the annual, US-led Baltic 
Operations (BALTOPS) exercise, aimed at strengthening interoperability, 
capabilities and maintaining regional security. The exercise involved 
scores of ships and aircraft from 17 countries conducting naval drills in 
the Baltic Sea. Fourteen NATO allies were joined by NATO partners 
Finland, Georgia and Sweden, with 5,600 troops involved.37 In January 
that year, Norwegian forces were among the 25,000 allied forces 
exercising together in a high-visibility exercise on the Iberian Peninsula 
that focused on crisis management. Furthermore, the North Atlantic 
34  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011, p. 100.
35  Ine Eriksen Søreide, ‘Speech at RIMPAC 2014 Seminar in Oslo May 12 2014’, Minister 
of Defence, Ministry of Defence, 12 May 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/
Speech-at-RIMPAC-2014-Seminar-in-Oslo-May-12-2014/id759104/.
36  Ministry of Defence, ‘NATO Sier ‘Ja’ Til Stor-øvelse i Norge i 2018’ (NATO Says ‘Yes’ to Major 
Exercise in Norway), Press Briefing no. 9/2015, Norwegian Government, 4 Feb. 2015.
37  Participants include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, 




Council accepted Norway’s offer to host the high visibility exercise in 
2018, which, consistent with Norway’s long-term efforts, will focus on 
collective defence. In her speech ‘One for All, All for One’, which refers to 
the security guarantee in Article 5, Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide 
put a particular emphasis on the importance of collective self-defence 
for Norway and linked such exercises back to Norway’s core concept.38 
Exercises are a reinforcement of Norway’s alliance policy and close bilateral 
relationship with the United States. While welcoming the opportunity to 
raise the alliance’s awareness of the north, however, Minister Søreide made 
the caveat that it was important to note that the exercise will benefit all 
allied and partner nations.39 
The Norwegian Agenda in NATO
With regard to NATO, the Norwegian security and defence discourse is 
marked by a high degree of continuity. The defence of Norway is anchored 
in NATO’s Article 5 and the close bilateral relationship with the United 
States, as noted above. 
Norway has been an active member of NATO and has contributed to 
NATO activities and operations to maintain the mutual security guarantee 
and to ensure that the allies are likely to come to Norway’s assistance in 
the event of an armed attack. To that end, the United States has pre-
stocked military materials in Norway for quick access in times of crisis.40 
Furthermore, NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre is located on the west coast 
in Stavanger, and has survived the many cuts of NATO presence (bases, 
installations) during the 1990s and 2000s. If, however, Norway was to 
find itself in a situation where NATO for some reason will not or cannot 
engage militarily, capable, modern and flexible Norwegian armed forces 
are necessary. This argument was key when seeking domestic support from 
the general public and the military for the transformation of the armed 
forces from a static territorial defence into a more flexible tool, both.41
38  Ine Eriksen Søreide, ‘Speech by Ine Eriksen Søreide: “One for All, All for One”’, Minister 
of  Defence, Norwegian Government, 18 Mar. 2015, viewed Aug. 2016, www.regjeringen.no/en/
aktuelt/speech-by-ine-eriksen-soreide-one-for-all-all-for-one/id2401315/.
39  Søreide, ‘Speech by Ine Eriksen Søreide: “One for All, All for One”’, 2015.
40  Preparedness in the event of an attack on Norway or other allies is also a NATO concern. 
According to the 2015 Expert Commission’s report: ‘NATO is in the process of clarifying command 
and control relations between NATO and national command structures in the event of crisis and war’ 
(Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, pp. 40–41).
41  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011, p. 100.
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Being able to offer relevant and capable forces is also important to fulfil 
Norway’s role and commitments as a NATO member. In terms of military 
assets, for a small country, Norway pulls above its weight. Through its 
procurement policy and deployments to international operations, Norway 
has also sought influence, status and recognition in NATO and other 
important fora, and vis-à-vis central allies, a strategy that has been referred 
to as a ‘troops-for-influence’ policy42 and a ‘forces-for-status’ policy.43 
All of these practices may accord Norway a special status with the United 
States, which potentially enhances Norway’s status inside NATO as well 
as its security, as Nina Græger points out.44 In addition to contributing 
beyond the expectations of a state of its size, this also enables Norway to 
follow the moves of its neighbour closely, in the interest of both domestic 
and international security. This puts into question the extent to which 
this relatively high defence spending also enables a more independent 
direction in its foreign policy, and in the region, as we shall see below. 
Regarding NATO policies, the primary input from Norway in the most 
recent strategic concept process was the ‘Core Area Initiative’, a ‘non-paper’ 
issued in 2008. The need to establish a better balance between NATO’s 
engagement at home and abroad was a—if not the—major concern in 
Norway’s views on and input into the strategic concept revision process 
during 2008–10.45 Norway was not alone in expressing concerns about 
powerful neighbours and putting forward a call for the need to review 
NATO’s strategy in light of the new developments, which were supported 
by the Eastern European members. The main message of the Norwegian 
initiative was that NATO should focus on and direct its training and 
exercises more towards its core tasks (e.g. Article 5) and the challenges in 
its neighbourhood to balance the out-of-area operations that had become 
NATO’s main priority since the mid-1990s.46 Regarding national defence 
responses, the concerns about Russian foreign policy were reflected in the 
concept of ‘threshold (or literally “doorstep”) defence’.47
42  Nina Græger, ‘Norway and the EU Security and Defence Dimension: A “Troops-for-Influence” 
Strategy’, in Nina Græger, H Larsen & H Ojanen, The EDSP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations 
on a Theme, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Helsinki & Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen 
instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik, 2002, pp. 33–89.
43  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011, pp. 91–92.
44  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011, p. 100.
45  Jakub Godzimirski, Nina Græger & Kristin M Haugevik, Towards a NATO à la Carte? Assessing 
the Alliance’s Adaptation to New Tasks and Changing Relationships, NUPI Report, 2010.
46  Græger, ‘Home and Away?’, 2011, p. 15.
47  Ministry of Defence, ‘White Paper No. 1’; Ministry of Defence, ‘A Defence for Our Time’, 2012.
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NATO’s response to the Ukraine crisis evolving in 2014 demonstrates 
that the majority of NATO countries now support a rebalancing 
between deterrence and international operations. NATO’s Readiness 
Action Plan – which is ‘the biggest reinforcement of NATO’s collective 
defence since the end of the Cold War’, according to NATO secretary 
general Jens Stoltenberg—was unveiled at the 2014 NATO summit 
in Wales.48 The plan is composed of two pillars: immediate ‘assurance 
measures’ and longer-term ‘adaptation measures’. Assurance measures 
focus on increased activity for assurance and deterrence and involve 
immediate reinforcements of alliance presence in the eastern part of the 
alliance to increase readiness in the area. Adaptation measures, which 
are still under implementation, involve longer-term changes to the 
alliance’s force posture and its capabilities to respond more quickly to 
emergencies.49 As  part of the assurance measures, Norway (along with 
Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom) assumed responsibility for air-
policing duties as of 1 May  2015. Norway is also part of the UK-led 
Framework Nation Concept (FNC) initiative—a Joint Expeditionary 
Force (JEF) that also includes the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. The JEF is set to deploy rapidly into theatre, particularly 
in the Baltic region, to conduct the full spectrum of operations, and to 
increase alliance readiness and ability to project maritime and amphibious 
power in the North and Baltic Seas.50 Regarding its timeline, the United 
Kingdom intends to integrate JEF partners’ contributions fully into the 
UK’s existing high-readiness capabilities before 2018.51 In the Norwegian 
view, the JEF and other initiatives within the Readiness Action Plan, 
as well as later decisions and follow-up measures at the Warsaw NATO 
Summit in July 2016, build on the same ideas that were forwarded in 
the 2008 Core Area Initiative, namely that the alliance should put its 
emphasis on its periphery over out-of-area operations. 
The Alliance’s strategic shift of focus to the Baltic Sea region and eastern 
NATO members, which occurred from northern fall 2014 to northern 
spring 2015, has been described by various scholars as a ‘new normal’ 
48  NATO, ‘NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Factsheet’, Dec. 2014, p. 1.
49  NATO, ‘NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Factsheet’, May 2015, p.1.
50  Xavier Pintat, ‘NATO’s Readiness Action Plan: Assurance and Deterrence for the Post-2014 
Security Environment’, Sub-committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, 21 Aug. 2015, pp. 7–8.
51  Pintat, ‘NATO’s Readiness Action Plan’, 2015.
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for cooperative security.52 Despite their non-NATO status, both Sweden 
and Finland have stepped up cooperation with alliance members, 
on multilateral and bilateral levels, intensifying debates about full 
membership.53 Impetus for this shift and the development of the ‘new 
normal’ contextualisation came in the form of repeated Russian military 
activity in the Baltic Sea region, where Russian air activity—including 
heavy strategic bombers—tripled during 2013–14.54 The activity also 
includes incursions into Nordic and Baltic air space and the newsworthy, 
intensive submarine incident in Sweden in October 2014.55 Finnish 
and Swedish NATO membership debates also intensified when Russia 
conducted a big military exercise where the scenario allegedly was a rapid 
intervention in the islands of Åland (Finland), Gotland (Sweden), 
Bornholm (Denmark) and northern Norway.56 
Norway, Russia and the ‘Dual Policy’ 
Tradition
As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, Norway–NATO relations 
and Norway–High North issues are somewhat inseparable. Due to 
geography, Norway–High North issues naturally involve Norway’s 
bilateral relations with Russia. In addition, as Nina Græger argues: 
‘A complicating element is that this relation is not only defined by bilateral 
relations but also mirrors the temperature in the relationship between 
Russia and the West.’57 Tuomas Forsberg and Græme Herd (2015) suggest 
52  Anna Wieslander, ‘A New Normal for NATO and Baltic Sea Security’, UI Brief, no. 2, 2015; 
Søreide, ‘Speech by Ine Eriksen Søreide: “One for All, All for One”’, 2015.
53  See for instance Erik Brattberg & Henrik Breitenbauch, ‘Time for Sweden to Join NATO’, 
The American Interest, 25 Jun. 2015. For discussion on Swedish and Finnish policy towards and 
engagement in NATO, see Hannah Ojanen, ‘Finland’s Relation with NATO in the Shadow of Russia’, 
Cicero Foundation Commentary no. 14/03, Sep. 2014.
54  The Armed Forces, Et Forsvar i Endring, 2015, p. 15.
55  Aylin Matlé & Alessandro Scheffler Corvaja, ‘From Wales to Warsaw: A New Normal for 
NATO?’, Fact and Findings: Prospects for German Foreign Policy, no. 187, Oct. 2015; as also picked 
up in Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 5. In the Nordic context, military cooperation 
is generally organised under NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation). 
56  George Lucas, ‘The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report’, Center for European Policy 
Analysis, Washington DC, Jun. 2015, viewed Aug. 2016, www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/
medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(1).compressed.pdf.
57  Nina Græger, ‘Norges Sikkerhetspolitiske Instrumenter – Utfordringer og Muligheter’ (Norway’s 
Security Policy Instruments – Challenges and Possibilities’, in Pernille Rieker & Walter Carlsnaes 
(eds), Nye Utfordringer for Europeisk Sikkerhetspolitikk. Aktører, Instrumenter og Operasjoner, Oslo: 
University Printing, 2009, p. 151.
GLOBAL ALLIES
106
that the increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy, since 2014 in 
particular, marks a new low in NATO–Russia relations.58 In his preface 
to the annual report on NATO activity in 2015, Stoltenberg emphasised 
restoring predictability to the alliance’s relationship with Russia: ‘There is 
no contradiction between increasing the strength of NATO and engaging 
Russia. Indeed, it is only by being strong that we can develop a cooperative 
and constructive relationship.’59 Stoltenberg also stressed this strategy in 
his inaugural speech in 2014, pointing to his experience with managing 
bilateral relations with Russia during his 10 years as Norwegian prime 
minister.60
Although Russia is perceived by Norway to be an important and 
demanding neighbour, Norway remains committed to engaging Russia 
through its so-called ‘dual policy’ tradition, which focuses on mutual 
cooperative interests. For instance, the tradition, which was especially 
evident from the mid-1970s, instigated closer Norway–USSR cooperation 
on fisheries management during the Cold War, where the precautionary 
approach was key.61 As pointed out by the Norwegian Expert Commission 
on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: 
There is no contradiction between a distinct policy of firm line-drawing 
toward Russia and active collaboration. Norway has a long tradition of 
using this dual policy. As long as Russia’s orientation is considered to be 
interest-based, co-operation will be possible when deemed useful to both 
parties. Therefore, in difficult periods our policy towards Russia must be 
based on strategic patience.62
Defence Minister Søreide confirmed Norway’s post–Crimea 
implementation of the dual policy in a March 2015 speech stating that, 
although Norway suspended bilateral military cooperation with Russia 
in light of the unilateral annexation of Crimea, it continued day-to-day 
practical collaboration in coast and border guard activities and search 
and rescue operations, and cooperation regarding the Incidents at Sea 
58  Tuomas Forsberg & Græme Herd, ‘Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities 
to Closed Doors’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 2015, p. 41.
59  NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, 28 Jan. 2016, pp. 7, 10, www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_127331.htm.
60  NATO, ‘NATO: A Unique Alliance with a Clear Course’, 28 Oct. 2014, www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/opinions_114179.htm?selectedLocale=en.
61  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, pp. 71–72; Geir Hønneland, Making Fishery 
Agreements Work: Post-Agreement Bargaining in The Barents Sea, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 2013.
62  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015.
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Agreement. An open line between the respective countries’ national 
Joint Headquarters and the Northern Fleet is also maintained to avoid 
misunderstandings or miscalculations.63 Reassuring Russia through 
transparency and open lines has been a main strategy for Norway 
throughout the Cold War and during later incidents, such as the Russian 
invasion of Georgia in 2008. 
A particularly important civilian arena is the Barents Secretariat, which 
involves all the countries in the Northern Hemisphere.64 In the bilateral 
relationship, cooperation in civilian policy areas—such as fisheries, 
minority issues (especially regarding the indigenous Sami people), 
as  well as people-to-people exchanges facilitated by the 2012 visa-free 
crossings agreement65—have allowed for ongoing communication and 
collaboration. However, bilateral cooperation in the management of the 
stream of refugees coming into Norway over the Russian–Norwegian 
border in the north (at Storskog) has been a mixed experience.66
Norway’s Stakes in the High North
As a country with more than 80 per cent of its sea territory and 40 per cent 
of its land territory located north of the Arctic Circle, the High North 
is an area of deep interest for Norway. Under the 1920 Svalbard Treaty 
(Spitsbergen Treaty), Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago is 
formally recognised and supported by the 40 High Contracting countries. 
The High North is also an area of change occurring on environmental, 
economic and geopolitical levels. Constant physical fluctuations in the 
region require close monitoring, the identification and separation of 
short- and long-term policy approaches and preparedness for potential 
63  Søreide, ‘Speech by Ine Eriksen Søreide: “One for All, All for One”’, 2015. 
64  The International Barents Secretariat facilitates multilaterally coordinated activities between the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council. BEAC members include 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Russia and the European Commission. The Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat focuses on developing Norwegian–Russian relations through funding for bilateral 
collaborative projects on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
65  Heather Yundt & Catherine Benesch, ‘Visa-free Agreement Sign of Strong Border Relationship’, 
Barents Observer, 29 May 2012, barentsobserver.com/en/borders/visa-free-agreement-sign-strong-
border-relationship.
66  Alissa De Carbonnel, ‘A (Very) Cold War on the Russia–Norway Border’, Foreign Policy, 20 Nov. 
2015, foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/a-very-cold-war-on-the-russia-norway-border-syrian-refugees-
bicycles/; Verdens Gang, ‘Russland stanser asyl-returer over Storskog’ (Russia Stops Asylum Returns 




crisis situations.67 According to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Børge 
Brende, the High North constitutes Norway’s most important strategic 
area of responsibility, where Norway promotes a cooperative framework 
to responding to the changes taking place.68 Internationally, Norway has 
been recognised as an international relations entrepreneur in the Arctic.69 
This means that Norway has sought to distinguish itself through a role 
as a ‘convenor’ in Arctic affairs—bringing together different kinds of 
actors and interests—and also as a ‘bridge builder’, especially in assisting 
other countries in their relationship to and understanding of Russian 
northern policy.70
The extent of Norway’s interest in the maritime domain is vast and covers 
several fields, including fishing, transport, official supply services, deep 
sea services, drilling seismic oil and gas. Nearly 90 per cent of Norway’s 
export revenues come from sea-based economic activity and resources. 
As a country that lives off of the sea, Norway’s maritime approach is 
pragmatic: to keep the sea lanes open and to defend the country’s rights. 
This is because its livelihood is dependent on the ocean and its resources. 
The report from the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and 
Defence Policy reiterates the statement from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affair’s white paper on the main guidelines in Norwegian foreign policy, 
emphasising the role of the international community and international 
law for Norway’s safety:
A robust international framework is important for Norway. Especially 
for small countries, it is essential that the great powers recognise the 
importance of common rules of the game and do not threaten the system’s 
existence. In the same way, it is important to maintain international 
rule of law, institutions, regulations and norms that regulate behaviour 
and contribute to conflict resolution. The UN should continue to play 
a central role in this system. As a major maritime state, Norway draws 
heavily on the global regulations at sea including the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982, UNCLOS, as constitution of the seas.71
67  Katarzyna Zysk & David W Titley, ‘Signal, Noise and Swans in Today’s Arctic’, The SAIS Review 
of International Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, 2015, p. 177.
68  Børge Brende, ‘The Arctic: Important for Norway, Important for the World’, Harvard 
International Review, vol. 36, no. 3, 16 Apr. 2015, hir.harvard.edu/the-arctic-important-for-norway-
important-for-the-world/.
69  Geir Hønneland & Lars Rowe, Nordområdene – hva nå? (The High North – What Now?), 
Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2010.
70  Elana Wilson Rowe, ‘Arctic Hierarchies? Norway, Status and the High North’, Polar Record, 
vol. 50, no. 1, 2014, pp. 72–79. doi.org/10.1017/S003224741200054X.
71  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 14.
109
7 . THE CHALLENGES AND DYNAMICS OF ALLIANCE POLICIES
Engaging the United States in the High North is an area of interest for 
the Norwegian Government. Cultivating American interest in the region 
has coincided with efforts to strengthen northern European defence 
cooperation, as broader and closer cooperation is believed to enhance 
security of the region on various levels.72
High North, Low Tension?
Whereas the end of the Cold War implied that ‘for most other states 
than Russia the region has remained either marginal or peripheral’, 
the importance of the High North was revitalised in Norway with the 
Norwegian High North strategy from 2005 onwards.73 The significant 
Russian military build-up on the Kola Peninsula from the mid-2000s also 
raised concerns about security among Norwegian politicians, diplomats 
and militaries. In particular, the Russian reopening of old military bases, 
the increased level of military exercises and, not least, the increase in 
overflights of Russian bombers and strategic bombers off the coast of 
Norway sparked a new round of ‘New Cold War’ rhetoric and media 
headlines. 
Certainly, a more aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Eastern 
Europe and Ukraine in 2014 in particular has also put the High North, 
where Russia has ‘geo-political and military-strategic interests’, back at the 
top of the Norwegian security and defence policy agenda.74 For instance, 
the main focus of the expert commission was the security challenges 
that Russia represents in the region, which they describe as ‘an arena 
for geopolitical struggle’.75 The forward-leaning Russian foreign policy 
has also gained a lot of attention in Nordic academic environments.76 
Even after the Ukraine crisis, however, Russia has not been considered 
as a direct threat to Norway, at least not at present.77 As formulated by 
the head of Norwegian military intelligence, ‘Russia has not suddenly 
72  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 42.
73  Græger, Norsk Forsvarspolitikk, 2016, pp. 231–32.
74  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 15.
75  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 14.
76  See, for example, Forsberg & Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 2015; Jo Georg Gade & Paal Sigurd 
Hilde, ‘Nordområdenes sikkerhetspolitiske betydning for NATO’ (The High North’s Security 
Policy Importance for NATO), in Tormod Heier & Anders Olav Kjølberg (eds), Norge og Russland. 
Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene (Norway and Russia. Security Policy Challenges in the 
High North), Universitetsforlaget, 2015, pp. 96–109.
77  Ministry of Defence, Unified Effort, 2015, p. 15.
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become a military threat—not in the short term. But, in the long term 
the picture is more uncertain’.78 Hence the focus on strengthening the 
military presence in northern Norway in subsequent defence plans and 
reports.79 Rather than seeing any impending security threats in the region, 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low 
tension’, emphasises the safety aspect of Arctic activity.
All of the peacetime, cooperative military bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements in the Arctic are between the nation states in the region. 
For instance, the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed by the five Arctic 
coastal states, established a common framework for maritime sovereignty 
in the Arctic Ocean. All signatories have agreed that claims and disputes 
are to be negotiated between the Arctic coastal states to prevent the 
escalation of political disagreements into security issues. Norway and 
Russia, who have had overlapping claims in the Barents Sea for decades, 
finally managed to conclude negotiations and sign an agreement in 2010. 
The role of NATO in the region has been brought up from time to time. 
NATO is not, however, likely to increase its activity in the Arctic in 
peacetime and instead encourages the continuation of the cooperation 
between all of the Arctic states. The defence establishments of the Arctic 
states promote peacetime confidence-building measures.80 There are 
regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the region that 
include Russia and the individual NATO members among the Arctic 
states. There are annual informal meetings between military leaders from 
all of the Arctic states where ‘soft security’ measures and military support 
to civilian agencies responsible for safety-related matters are discussed. 
These matters have become increasingly important with growing levels of 
human activity in the Arctic Ocean. This emphasis on safety capabilities 
corresponds with recent efforts under the auspices of the Arctic Council 
that resulted in a new search and rescue agreement (2011) and an oil-spill 
preparedness and response agreement (2013). 
The requirement for monitoring and safety arrangements depends on 
the volume and scope of future civilian activities. The Arctic may be 
a  promising area for commercial opportunities. There is a potential 
78  Forsvarets Forum, ‘Nabovarsel’ (Neighbour Warning), 25 Feb. 2015, p. 27.
79  For example, The Strategic Military Review (Fagmilitært råd, FMR), which is the armed forces’ 
own recommendation to the politicians on how the organisation should evolve in the coming years 
(The Armed Forces, Et Forsvar i Endring, 2015).
80  This refers to the respective national governments’ as well as alliance memberships.
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for shorter transcontinental maritime transit though the Northern Sea 
Route, increasing the profit and value of extraction of onshore and 
offshore petroleum and mineral resources. Analysts, however, have 
recently addressed several factors dampening the most optimistic future 
predictions. Operations in the Arctic environment can be complex, 
difficult (extremely low temperatures and icing contribute to this) and 
costly. Profitability of commercial ventures in the Arctic may also be 
influenced by the dynamics in the market itself and evolving concepts for 
production and distribution. 
The Arctic—where Norway has invested significant political and economic 
capital—can be seen as a unique arena for the country as a place where 
Norway meets and interacts with many non-Arctic states. Meeting both 
Arctic and non-Arctic partners in the High North has been a priority for 
Norway. For instance, the rapidly growing economies of Asia have expressed 
a particular interest in the Arctic, which has coincided with Norway’s 
recognition of Asia as an increasingly important arena for Norwegian 
foreign policy.81 Similar to its other Nordic regional partners, Norway has 
been forthcoming and welcoming of Asian states’ Arctic interests, as it 
encourages broad dialogue on issues affecting the Arctic and competence 
sharing. Norway welcomes the diverse opinions, complementary expertise 
and outside-of-the-Arctic thinking that non-Arctic states can provide. 
Norway has developed especially close bilateral ties on Arctic issues with 
Singapore, South Korea and Japan. South Korea has prioritised Norway 
as a cooperation partner in Arctic and regular bilateral interactions 
between Norway and Singapore and Norway and South Korea have also 
strengthened collaborative commitments and interest in the region.82 
Norway proclaimed its support of the Asian states’ inclusion in the Arctic 
Council in early 2013 and continued to play a role in the states’ ultimate 
acceptance and inclusion in the council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna, 
Sweden, in May 2013. This receptive attitude towards the Asian states 
can be in part explained by a Norwegian interest in revitalising the Arctic 
Council.83 Given its geographic placement and record in the High North, 
81  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Largest Ship of the Norwegian Navy’, 2015.
82  Børge Brende, ‘Cooperation between Norway and the Republic of Korea in a Changing Arctic 
Landscape’, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2015.
83  Per Erik Solli, Elana Wilson Rowe & Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, ‘Coming into the Cold: 




Norway can play a significant role as a gatekeeper and facilitator of non-
Arctic states’ interests in the region, which can in turn have positive 
offshoots in other bilateral, regional and international settings.84 
Conclusion
Norway is a country where security and defence are core policy areas 
and political concerns. It has a well-funded national defence, relatively 
speaking, but one that is also committed to resolving disputes peacefully, 
and places great importance on security cooperation and its alliances. 
Since the first line of defence will often be abroad for small countries 
like Norway, it recognises the importance of maintaining an international 
order based on international law and the United Nations. Norway’s 
contributions to NATO operations and important coalitions of the willing, 
and close bilateral relationship with the United States are also key in this 
respect. Here, Norway’s procurement policy and willingness to contribute 
to peace operations as well as military enforcement operations around 
the world has placed it among the preferred allies in the past few years. 
This is a policy that has not only been conducted for the sake of status and 
recognition in NATO, but also to signal that Norway is no longer only 
an importer of security (having anchored its security in NATO’s Article 5 
since 1949). Given the country’s positioning and that its maintenance of 
international law and order, support of the UN, and enforcement and 
exercises of sovereignty are major areas of national defence focus, Norway 
is increasingly also an exporter of security. 
The challenges and dynamics inherent in Norway’s alliances have led to 
policy approaches and acquisitions that further commitments beyond 
Norwegian borders. Norway’s participation over the years in expensive 
procurement programs and ambition not only to participate in but also 
to host international—and especially NATO—exercises is a testament 
to the importance of its outward-looking and alliance-anchored security 
and defence policy. It is also a reflection of raised domestic and allied 
security concerns related to a more aggressive Russian foreign policy, as 
well as ‘new threats’ from terrorism, cyber attacks and ‘hybrid warfare’. 
For a small country located on the outskirts of Europe, the importance 
of international law and order cannot be overemphasised. This does not, 
84  Solli, Rowe & Yennie Lindgren, ‘Coming into the Cold’, 2013.
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however, stand in contrast to having a flexible and modern defence, but 
rather coincides with it. The general concern expressed by several defence 
ministers over the past decade is the dilemma of facing a situation where 
a given conflict is too small for NATO, yet too large for Norway to 
handle alone, or at a point in time where NATO is engaged elsewhere. 
Consequently, and in response to recent aggressive Russian foreign policy 
and military build-up, Norway is reallocating and strengthening its 
military presence in the northern part of the country.
In the High North, Norway is recognised for its entrepreneurial and 
inclusive approach towards the states and entities involved, as well as its 
dedication to the maintenance of a safe and predictable Arctic environment 
and the resolution of disputes in a peaceful, law-abiding manner. Norway’s 
pragmatic dual-policy tradition toward its Russian neighbour has allowed 
for steady communication and collaboration both in times of war and 
peace and at various levels of society. Although the long-term outcome 
of Russia’s increasingly strong defence posture is uncertain, at present 
Russia is not considered to be a direct threat for Norway. With NATO 
activity in the Arctic unlikely to increase, the continuation of cooperation 
between the Arctic states through confidence-building measures remains 
a top foreign policy priority for Norway as it navigates the challenges and 
dynamics of its modern alliance structures and policies. 
NATO, and thus Norway, faces an increasingly complex security 
environment defined by indiscriminate international terrorism, an 
unprecedented refugee crisis and a more assertive and unpredictable 
Russian military posture. With the alliance’s primary focus on its core 
tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, 
Norway’s reputation as a defence spender and its extended role as an 
exporter of security is likely to remain a source of assurance both on 




An Ally at the Crossroads: 
Thailand in the US Alliance System
Kitti Prasirtsuk
In the second decade of the 21st century, the United States is increasingly 
finding itself in a difficult situation on several fronts. The economic 
turbulence ushered in by the Subprime Crisis of 2008 led to long-term 
adverse effects on the US economy. This economic crisis has signified the 
relative decline of Western supremacy, as the economic difficulties have 
been lengthy and particularly spread to the Eurozone, the recovery of which 
is even more delayed than that of the United States. In terms of security, 
the War on Terror turned out to be a formidable threat, as demonstrated 
in the form of extremist terrorism wrought under the banner of Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which is now involving more people and 
is spreading beyond the Middle East. Europe’s immigrant crisis is also 
giving the West a headache. The rise of China insists that the United States 
has to recalibrate its strategy in managing allies and partner countries in 
East Asia. The ‘pivot’, or rebalancing, towards Asia, as framed under the 
US administration of Barack Obama since 2011, is a case in point. 
While tensions originating from the Cold War remain a rationale to keep 
US alliances intact in North-East Asia, this is less the case in South-East 
Asia, particularly in Thailand and the Philippines, both of which are 
traditional US allies. While American troops have remained in both Japan 
and Korea, they withdrew from the Philippines in 1992. The withdrawal 
from Thailand happened in 1976 following the end of the Vietnam War. 
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Even in South-East Asia, there seems to be different approaches between 
the two traditional allies. The South China Sea disputes represent clear 
and present danger for the Philippines, which, until the election of 
President Rodrigo Duterte, helped cement its alliance with the United 
States. Thailand, meanwhile, is an uneasy ally for the United States owing 
to the fact that both countries share fewer common threats and that 
Thailand also has close ties with China. 
Accordingly, this chapter argues that Thailand represents the most obvious 
case of an ally at the crossroads in Asia. This can be seen as Thailand 
tends to pursue a hedging strategy towards several major powers rather 
than sticking to any single great power. Having no territorial dispute 
with China, bilateral ties are strengthening between Thailand and China. 
Thailand thus epitomises a test case for the United States regarding the 
extent to which it can succeed in managing its alliances in the 21st century.
This chapter first examines how the US–Thailand alliance evolved, 
focusing  on the post–Cold War era. It then explores the changing 
international environment and the current perspectives of the alliance. 
It does so by exploring the opportunities and costs of the alliance today, 
which are punctuated by the outstanding factors of the rise of China and 
the current Thai political crisis that has continued since 2005. The chapter 
contends that, while management of the US–Thailand alliance is at 
a difficult point in its development, it is not impossible, given the two 
countries share some interests on regional stability and non-traditional 
security, which is underpinned by interoperability and the existence of 
a traditional/institutionalised relationship between the two nations.
Origin of the US–Thailand Alliance
Thailand (then known as Siam) became America’s first diplomatic partner 
in Asia when the two states signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 
1833. Though focusing on commercial relations, not security, the treaty 
well served the purposes of both countries. While Siam could diversify 
its relations with Western powers as a strategy to avoid colonisation by 
117
8 . AN ALLY AT THE CROSSROADS
European powers, the United States obtained access to mainland South-
East Asia that was equal to that of the European nations then operating 
in the region.1
The circumstances of the current US–Thailand alliance can be traced back 
to the end of World War II, when Washington came to defend Thailand 
from its status as a defeated country. As Britain launched numerous 
demands on Thailand, which initially sided with Japan during the war, 
the United States argued that Thailand was not a unitary state during 
wartime, as several internal Free Thai Movements supported the allied 
powers against the Japanese. This created the pretext for trust between 
the two nations. But it wasn’t until the intensification of the Cold War 
that the alliance was formalised, first by the 1954 Manila Pact, which 
formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and, second, 
through a communiqué signed by Thailand’s Foreign Minister Thanat 
Khorman and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1962. The purpose 
of the Thanat–Rusk communiqué was to seek Thailand’s cooperation to 
prevent the spread of communism in Laos, but it is always cited as the 
basis for alliance, which culminated in nine joint military bases. 
Various assistance and infrastructure-building schemes, supported by both 
the United States and the World Bank, were arranged as a result of the 
alliance. Most prominent among these were military facilities including 
the US-built airfields at U-Tapao, a deep-water port at Suttahip and the 
Mittraparb Highway to the hinterland north-eastern provinces. Investment 
from the private sector also thrived. Importantly, the two countries 
signed the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations in 1966, which 
gave Americans privileges in doing business in the kingdom, where the 
prevailing conditions for foreign investment were restrictive. Specifically, 
the treaty allows American citizens  and businesses  incorporated  in the 
United States, or in Thailand, to maintain a majority shareholding or to 
wholly own companies in Thailand, and thereby engage in business on the 
same basis as would a Thai national.2
1  Catharin Dalpino, ‘The United States–Thailand Alliance: Issues for a New Dialogue’, NBR 
Special Report, no. 33, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Oct. 2011, p. 4.
2  American companies are also exempt from most of the restrictions on foreign investment 
imposed by the Foreign Business Act of 1999.
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The alliance weakened when the United States withdrew from the 
Vietnam War in 1973 and eventually vacated the joint bases in Thailand 
in 1976. In fact, from 1973–76, Thailand briefly enjoyed a more liberal 
political atmosphere whereby anti-base protests periodically occurred. 
Thai leaders, meanwhile, came to view American military presence as an 
increasing liability. At any rate, Washington was not willing to maintain 
American troops on mainland South-East Asia. With the communist 
takeover of the Indochina states, Thailand was left in the cold. When the 
threat from Vietnam was looming large after its invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Cambodia in late 1978, Bangkok had to seek help from 
Beijing instead (further discussed below). Later, Thailand came to limit 
US military access to facilities following the 1975 Mayaguez Incident, 
when the United States decided to take action unilaterally. The incident 
started with the seizing of the American container ship Mayaguez by the 
Khmer Rouge. The United States reacted by sending military operations 
from the U-Tapao air base in Thailand without consulting Bangkok.3
Thai Perceptions of the United States
Thailand tends to view its alliance with the United States as a broad-
based relationship, rather than one of security alone, which seems to be 
in contrast to America’s view of the relationship.4 Therefore, it is crucial 
to consider overall bilateral ties when analysing the alliance relationship. 
It is important to note that I refer to Thai perceptions at both the level 
of elites and the general public. 
Though the general public is not well informed about the relationship 
with the United States, the media tends to reflect general feelings toward 
the United States. While Thai people will refer to the United States as 
America maha-mit (great friend America), the term is often used negatively 
and it tends to be followed by ‘why does a great friend treat us like this?’. 
These views stem from a variety of American actions, ranging from 
economic disputes and pressures, and the US characterisation of Thailand 
as a country with poor standards in the areas of human rights, human 
trafficking, intellectual property and money laundering. In particular, the 
two countries’ relations have been subject since the 1980s to difficulties 
3  Lewis Stern, ‘Diverging Roads: 21st Century US–Thai Defense Relations’, Strategic Forum, 
no. 241, Jun. 2009, p. 1.
4  Dalpino, ‘The United States–Thailand Alliance: Issues for a New Dialogue’, 2011, p. 7. 
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arising from US economic pressure. Thais perceive that the United States 
has failed to appreciate the historical depth of the bilateral relationship 
and thus all too often fails to act in honour of the friendship rather than 
economic calculations and shifting policy interests.
These negative perceptions can be traced back to America’s withdrawal 
in the 1970s. While the region was still facing threats of communism, 
the United States supported authoritarian regimes in Thailand. This left 
America open to criticism of its inconsistencies over democracy and human 
rights. Indeed, the left-leaning ideology of many Thai intellectuals led to 
their criticism of the United States in general and American capitalism 
more specifically. Importantly, under the influence of these outspoken 
opinion leaders in Thai society, it is relatively common for Thais to be 
critical of the United States. For example, a joint US–Thailand seminar 
that included senior politicians, bureaucrats, and leading academics in 
2002 concluded that, in Thailand, there is ‘deep mistrust of America’.5
Yet, most people who criticise the United States would prefer either 
visiting  or sending their children to study there more than most other 
countries. Compared to most South-East Asians, the majority of Thais are 
relatively more receptive to American culture, ranging from Hollywood 
movies, American music, IT  gadgets, fashion, and American lifestyle 
and consumption in general. In other words, feelings toward the United 
States are mixed: while there are commonly negative views about the US 
Government and corporations, most Thais are positive about American 
culture. 
The Post–Cold War Events
After the end of the Cold War, several events strained the US–Thailand 
alliance during the 1990s. The first was Thailand’s rejection of an 
American proposal to pre-position military equipment in Thailand’s 
territorial waters in 1994. The second was the failure of an FA-18 jet 
fighter sale, when Bangkok decided to trim its military budget largely due 
to financial difficulties after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The third was 
when the United States was found responsible for a chemical spill at Hua 
5  John Brandon & Nancy Chen (eds), ‘United States–Thailand Relations in the 21st Century’, 
Bilateral Conference Summary, The Asia Foundation, 11–13 Mar. 2002, p. 3.
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Hin airport in 1999.6 In the same year, Thais were disappointed when 
US opposition was perceived as pivotal in Thailand’s failed bid for the 
World Trade Organization presidency.
Likewise, three major events toward and during the late 1990s further 
qualified Thai attitudes toward the United States. First, the United 
States offered Thailand little support in response to the impact of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. Antagonism increased further as Western 
companies bought up Thai companies at fire sale prices. In contrast, 
regional powers like Japan and China engaged and cooperated with crisis-
hit countries. For instance, Japan offered Thailand soft loans under the 
Miyazawa Initiative and China held back from devaluing its currency. 
This made it easier for other Asian countries to recover, particularly as 
export prices were increasing. In this regard, ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus 
China, Japan and Korea) represented a significant regional cooperation 
scheme, fostering closer ties among regional powers and South-East Asian 
states, including Thailand.
Second, Thais were reluctant to support the unilateralism of the George 
W  Bush administration, which produced policies such as America’s 
failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the war on terror and the invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Thai attitudes were further hardened by 
America’s apparent lack of interest in the region, which was indicated 
by the consecutive absences of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from 
the  annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings during the mid-
2000s. Both events tarnished the US image for the Thais and other 
South-East Asians. This was very much in contrast with the image of 
China, which is seen as generously giving unconditional assistance to 
ASEAN countries. Following Bush’s visit to Thailand in 2003 for the 
APEC Summit, however, the US–Thailand alliance was resurrected after 
Washington designated Thailand as a non-NATO ally. Despite Thai 
society’s misgivings about the US-led war in Iraq in pursuit of its oil 
interests, the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra sent troops to support 
the US enterprise in Iraq. The aim was to predispose Washington to begin 
free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand. 
Third, Washington’s suspension of assistance and criticism of Thailand 
following the military coup in 2006 further alienated many Thais. Elites 
who supported the coup charged Washington with failing to understand 
6  Stern, ‘Diverging Roads’, 2009, pp. 3–4.
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the context of the kingdom. Some went further and argued that Thai 
coups solved political deadlocks. Such arguments were made less vocally, 
however, after the coup further worsened the existing political crisis in 
the kingdom. Very few Thais understand Section 508 of the US Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, which prohibits providing funds to 
a foreign government deposed by decree or military coup. Overall, as 
Thailand’s divisions deepened, feelings toward the United States became 
increasingly mixed. For instance, the anti-Thaksin groups (the yellow 
shirts) were happy that Thaksin at some point was barred from entering 
the United States, a position that outraged the Thaksin supporters (the red 
shirts). Any US statements regarding protests or violence in the nation 
were received differently by these two groups. Protest groups would be 
heartened by the airing of US concerns about human rights violations, 
believing that Washington’s protests helped deter the government from 
ordering military crackdowns. The opposition, meanwhile, would not be 
happy with US criticism. In short, US action or inaction regarding the 
Thai political crisis was viewed negatively by one or other of the two sides 
of the Thai crisis.
The election of the Obama administration briefly restored America’s 
image through its reengagement policy. Thais value high-level visits and 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s participation in the 2009 ARF summit 
in Thailand helped to improve the relationship. America’s diplomatic 
efforts were warmly welcomed by several South-East Asian nations, 
against a backdrop of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China 
Sea and the Mekong River. The territorial disputes over the Spratly and 
Paracel Islands made Vietnam and the Philippines particularly nervous, 
while concerns have been raised over China’s construction of dams on the 
Mekong, since they affect countries downstream, like Laos, Cambodia, 
Vietnam and Thailand. It should come as no surprise then, that American 
initiatives such as the Lower Mekong – Mississippi Cooperation have 
been welcomed as an alternative to engaging with China. Accordingly, 
the American reengagement efforts, coupled with public diplomacy and 
strong American soft power, have gained much acceptance from South-
East Asia. Overall, the Obama administration strengthened America’s 
image in Thailand.
Following the 2014 coup, however, the United States showed even more 
hostile attitudes toward the military government. Washington responded 
to the coup with a series of criticisms and sanctions, including the threat 
to move Cobra Gold—the largest regional joint military exercise—
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to  Darwin.7 Wary that such moves would only push Thailand further 
into Beijing’s orbit, Washington sent its first high-level visit of Deputy 
Secretary of State Daniel Russell to the kingdom in early 2015. Yet the 
visit failed to improve relations after he made critical comments about 
the military junta during his speech at Chulalongkorn University. What 
further aggrieved the bilateral relationship was the 2015 Trafficking 
in Persons (TIP) Report, which saw Thailand drop down to ‘Tier 3’ 
category, falling even below Myanmar and Malaysia, both of which are 
allegedly involved in the ongoing Rohingya migrant problem either as 
a sending or receiving country.8 Recently, US Ambassador Glyn Davies 
also made a strong comment in front of the media and directly to the 
Thai Foreign Minister over human rights violations, inviting the wrath 
of coup supporters. In this light, there seems to be the perception among 
the military and the Bangkok establishment that the United States is not 
supportive of Thailand’s domestic politics.
With the new presidency of Donald Trump, the US–Thailand relations 
seems to be more nuanced. On the one hand, the Trump administration 
emphasises ‘America First’, showing the sign of less engagement to Asia 
and resulting in the end of the Obama’s pivot strategy. Most ally countries 
in Asia are nervous if the alliances would be qualified. Trump’s overall 
policy so far seems to be detrimental to American soft power and could 
downgrade the US image. On the other hand, Trump is less interested in 
democracy compared to his democrat predecessor.  This can extend more 
space for the military government in Thailand, as the Trump government 
is not likely to pressure Thailand much to return to democracy. Evidently, 
following North Korea’s frequent missile tests during the 2017 spring, 
Trump came to value the traditional allies in South-East Asia more by 
making personal phone calls to Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha of 
Thailand, as well as the leaders of the Philippines and Singapore. President 
Trump also invited Prime Minister Prayut to visit him in Washington, 
DC.  Overall, the US–Thailand relations can fluctuate, depending on 
political regimes and leadership changes.
7  Though Cobra Gold remained in Thailand, the exercises were downsized to about 10,000 
personnel in 2015 and 8,500 in 2016 respectively. See Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘US, Thailand 
Launch 2016 Cobra Gold Military Exercises Amid Democracy Concerns’, The Diplomat, 9 Feb. 
2016, viewed Jul. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/02/us-thailand-launch-2016-cobra-gold-military-
exercises-amid-democracy-concerns/.
8  The 2016 TIP Report recently ungraded Thailand to Tier 2. See ‘Thailand Gets Upgraded 
in US TIP Report’, Bangkok Report, 1 Jul. 2016, viewed Jul. 2016, www.bangkokpost.com/news/
security/1024141/thailand-gets-upgraded-in-us-tip-report.
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Thailand’s Changing Security Environment
With a new security environment in the post–Cold War era, threats to 
Thailand’s security primarily come from the border areas in the forms 
of drug and human trafficking.9 In the 1990s, the Thai Government 
announced that the drug trafficking industry was a major threat 
to national security. Meanwhile, skirmishes over territorial disputes with 
Laos erupted briefly in 1987, and more recently with Cambodia. Border 
tensions with Myanmar used to be frequent, particularly between the 
Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) and minority rebel groups along 
the border. Accordingly, Thailand embraced a comprehensive security 
approach, comprising of both traditional and non-traditional security.
An insurgency in Thailand’s Muslim-majority south has continued since 
2004. While Manila allowed thousands of American troops to deploy 
to help curb terrorism, based on the US–Philippines Visiting Forces 
Agreement that came into force in 1999, a similar move is unthinkable in 
Thailand, which would treat it as an infringement of sovereignty. 
Since 2005, Thailand has been trapped in a prolonged political crisis. 
Leading to hundreds of causalities, the political crisis has been dogged 
by coups d’état, violent riots and military crackdowns. The controversy 
around former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra continues.10 Thailand’s 
preoccupation with its protracted domestic conflicts inadvertently affects 
international relations, including the US alliance.
Another key security problem that arose toward the end of the last decade 
is a border dispute with Cambodia over Prea Vihear Temple. The United 
States was less likely to play a role in this dispute due to its cultivation of 
ties with countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia, including military 
aid. In fact, Thailand aired concerns over US–Cambodia joint exercises, 
arguing that it was undercutting the US–Thailand alliance.11 Thailand 
perceives limited benefit from its US alliance on issues such as territorial 
disputes with neighbouring countries.
9  Panitan Watanayagorn, ‘Thailand: The Elite’s Shifting Conceptions of Security’, in Muthiah 
Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 438.
10  See Kitti Prasirtsuk, ‘Thailand in 2015: Bill, Blast, and Beyond’, Asian Survey, vol. 56, no. 1 
(Jan./Feb. 2016), pp. 168–73. doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.1.168.
11  Dalpino, ‘The United States–Thailand Alliance: Issues for a New Dialogue’, 2011, pp. 10–11.
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Given the changing threat environment, Thai perceptions of the US 
alliance are not favourable. At a closed-door brainstorming session on 
Thailand’s strategies toward the United States and China in five years 
(2012–17), three dozen representatives from concerned agencies (e.g. the 
ministries of foreign affairs, defence, and commerce), the private sector 
and academia agreed unanimously that Thailand must look beyond the 
US alliance and strengthen engagement with China, even as they lamented 
the decreasing utility of their strategic ties with the United States, which 
fitted more with the Cold War, but not the contemporary milieu.12
In sum, threats to Thailand’s security can be understood as either domestic, 
non-traditional, or traditional border disputes with neighbouring 
countries, all of which are less likely to see direct US involvement. More 
specifically, the United States does not have a major role in Thai security 
thinking. Bangkok also believes that Thai security is of increasingly 
marginal interest to the United States and that the alliance is less important 
compared to America’s relationship with its other traditional allies in 
the Asia-Pacific—Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines. 
Considering that the United States is increasingly cultivating security 
ties with Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam, commentators worry that 
Thailand is being relegated to the group of second-tier allies.13 As regional 
developments define new interests for South-East Asian countries, 
Thailand will increasingly divert its security identity away from the United 
States. 
The Rise of China
The rise of China attracts much attention in the 21st century. Though 
the fast-growing China was initially viewed as China Threat in the 1990s, 
since the 2000s, most countries have come to appreciate China as an 
opportunity, particularly on economic grounds. China’s strategic interests 
have seen it cultivate bilateral relationships with many countries, and 
Thailand is no exception. 
Since 2009, China has become Thailand’s largest export market, surpassing 
the United States. By 2012, China replaced Japan as Thailand’s top trade 
partner. In 2015, Thailand traded with China as much as 2.2 trillion baht 
12  Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Thailand Looks Beyond the US Alliance’, The Nation, 2 Apr. 2012.
13  Conversation with Thai and Japanese professors, Bangkok, Feb. 2012. 
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(US$65 billion), which comprises 15 per cent of Thailand’s total trade, 
compared to the 1.3 trillion baht (US$39 billion), or 9.1 per cent of 
Thailand’s total trade, that it traded with the United States.14 Though 
Japan has remained Thailand’s top investor, Chinese investments are 
steadily increasing. Importantly, Chinese from mainland China represent 
the number one source of tourists in the kingdom, as many as 7.9 million 
(26.5 per cent of total tourists) in 2015.15
For Thailand, in fact, the turn to China is not a recent phenomenon. 
Since the late 1970s, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and American 
troops left mainland South-East Asia, it was essential for Thailand to 
seek help from China. As the frontline state, Thailand was concerned at 
incursions by Vietnamese forces, particularly when they crossed the Thai 
border to hunt down the Khmer Rouge. Beijing responded by sending 
support to the anti-Vietnam Khmer Rouge as well as cutting assistance to 
the underground Thai Communist Party. And, as China waged a border 
war with Vietnam in early 1979, the Vietnamese military shifted to the 
north. This changed the shape of regional defence realities and formed the 
basis for the Sino–Thai alliance. A wide range of arms sales at ‘friendship 
prices’ was offered to Thailand, including armoured vehicles, artillery and 
missiles.16 This pattern of the Sino–Thai alliance continued despite the 
two coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014. When the United States placed 
sanctions on Thailand after the 2006 coup, especially in terms of security 
cooperation, China offered Thailand good deals on arms purchases and 
other forms of assistance and cooperation. Notably, the Chinese provided 
US$49 million in military assistance, almost double the size of the 
US$24 million in US military assistance that was legally suspended in 
accordance with Section 208 mentioned above.17
The Thai political crisis and the two coups should not be exaggerated 
as the major reason for Thailand to lean toward China. The trend has 
been that way regardless of who is in government in Bangkok, whether 
elected or non-elected. Economic interests with China represent 
a strong incentive for any Thai Government to strengthen the relations 
14  Ministry of Commerce, Trade Information, www.moc.go.th/index.php/moc-english.html# 
(accessed July 2016).
15  Department of Tourism, ‘Million of Tourists’, viewed Jul. 2016, www.tourism.go.th/view/2/
Million%20of%20Tourists/EN-US. 
16  Walter Lohman, ‘Reinvigorating the US–Thailand Alliance’, Backgrounders, no. 2609 (26 Sep. 
2011), p. 8. See also Stern, ‘Diverging Roads’, 2009, p. 2.
17  Stern, ‘Diverging Roads’, 2009, p. 3.
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with China.  The  Thaksin government (2000–05) and the Yingluck 
government (2011–14) opposed the Thai military and sought to cultivate 
ties with China, ranging from free trade agreements, the lease of pandas, 
arms purchases and frequent high-level visits. The 2014 coup and the 
subsequent US antagonism only accelerated Thailand’s gravitation 
towards China. 
More recently, China continues to tempt ASEAN and other Asian nations 
with even bolder initiatives. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative are two examples, aimed at 
building and upgrading infrastructure to increase connectivity in Asia. 
Recent train deals with Laos, Thailand and Indonesia represent efforts 
in this regard, which will contribute to the goal of ASEAN connectivity 
that was initially proposed and advocated by Bangkok. Beijing also 
recently proposed the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Initiative to 
further cooperation among Mekong River riparian countries. The aim 
has not only been to ameliorate tensions and concerns over China’s dam 
construction, which significantly affects the downstream countries, but 
also to counterbalance the Lower Mekong – Mississippi Cooperation, 
as proposed by the United States. In  addition, China and ASEAN are 
negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
a pan-regional trade arrangement that also involves Japan, Korea, India, 
Australia and New Zealand. In short, compared to the United States, 
China’s engagement appears to have more relevance to the interests 
of South-East Asia and Thailand.
In 2012, Thailand and China elevated their relations to a comprehensive 
strategic partnership. Since then, both sides have been steadily following 
the plan through various schemes of cooperation and exchanges, including 
frequent high-level visits, exchange of personnel in commander and staff 
colleges, joint seminars and so on. Importantly, both countries have 
expanded the Strike military exercises to cover army and also, recently, 
air force. 
Thailand, therefore, arguably has the closest relationship with China, 
compared to other South-East Asian nations. Short of a territorial dispute 
with China, the relationship has been cordial. For instance, Thailand is 
the first country in South-East Asia to host leased pandas from China 
since 2003. In the so-called ‘Panda Diplomacy’, China leases pandas to 
only a limited number of countries to signify the importance of relations. 
Furthermore, in April 2012, Thailand’s Defence Minister led a military 
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mission, including chiefs of army, navy and air force, to China and paid 
a courtesy call to the then Vice President Xi Jinping. Such visits are rare 
and, in the current military government, Prime Minister Prayut has visited 
China several times, while Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan has met 
with high-level defence counterparts on many occasions.
Risk Factors in Gravitating Towards China
While there is good news about Sino–Thai relations, there are also several 
risks, and key infrastructure projects are a case in point. Thailand’s 
railway project with China has become problematic. Initially, the Thai 
Government was optimistic about upgrading its outdated train system 
by developing medium- and high-speed railway lines with China. 
As  negotiations dragged on, Thailand increasingly found that China 
was a demanding partner, particularly compared with other offers from 
Japan. For instance, China would charge higher interest rates on its 
loans—at  almost 4 per cent, compared to 0.5–1.5 per cent for Japan. 
On operational management, China’s offers were also demanding and 
imposed stringent rules relating to technological transfer, which again 
contrasted with those of the Japanese. Considering Thai leaders’ general 
positive sentiments toward China, the inability for the railway project to 
move forward was disappointing. 
Second, similar to other South-East Asian states like Myanmar and Laos, 
Thailand is increasingly exposed to economic threats from China. For 
instance, Chinese capitalists are purchasing large plots of land through 
their connections with Thai nominees. Real estate projects are constructed 
to cater for Chinese customers, and revenue from Chinese tourism flows 
to Chinese nationals via their travel agencies, restaurants and tour guides. 
While Chinese students are heavily represented at Thai universities, many 
never return to China after graduation. Overall, China represents both 
opportunities and threats for Thailand. 
Third, the South China Sea disputes between China and some ASEAN 
members—the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia—constitutes a risk 
factor for Thailand–China relations. Though Bangkok may be able to 
play a coordinator role, as it did constructively during its assignment 
as China–ASEAN country coordinator during 2012–15, the situation 
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is escalating. Sporadic tensions in US–China and Japan–China relations 
also raise concerns for ASEAN countries, including Thailand. Both issues 
signify that it is not plausible to lean toward China too much.
Whither the US–Thailand Alliance?
With negative attitudes towards the United States prevalent in Thailand, it 
is difficult to develop a common thread of strategic thinking between the 
two countries. In principle, Thailand maintains the alliance relationship 
with the United States, as exemplified by the number of annual military 
cooperation initiatives in which it is involved, including Cobra Gold and 
more than 50 other bilateral and multilateral exercises. Operationally, the 
Thai military command structure, weapons and overall interoperability 
remains highly compatible with US forces. 
In practice, however, Thailand, cautiously responding to America’s pivot, 
sees the United States as a difficult ally to work with. Several events point 
to that direction. The Yingluck government significantly delayed approval 
of the usage of the U-Tapao air base for the SEAC4RS (Southeast Asia 
Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study) in 2012. There 
was a concern that the project might raise some suspicion from China 
about US spying activities using the Thai air base. Likewise, the current 
military government under Prayut Chan-o-cha rejected a US aircraft 
basing request in 2015.18 This was in stark contrast to earlier Thai responses 
to US calls to use the base for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HADR) in the case of the 2004 tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, as 
well as the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Thailand still cooperates with the 
United States, but tends to steer military exercises and cooperation more 
towards HADR, so as not to make China unhappy. In short, Thailand 
responded to the American pivot with considerable reluctance.19
To the disappointment of the United States, such reluctance was felt 
despite the fact that Bangkok and Washington have just signed the Joint 
Vision Statement for the Thai–US Defense Alliance in 2012. Emphasising 
the 21st-century security partnership, the joint statement aims to 
18  Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Thailand Mulls New US Aircraft Basing Request’, The Diplomat, 
28 May 2015, viewed Jul. 2016, thediplomat.com/2015/05/thailand-mulls-new-us-aircraft-basing-
request/.
19  See Kitti Prasirtsuk & William Tow, ‘A Reluctant Ally? Thailand in the U.S. Rebalancing Strategy’, 
in William Tow & Douglas Stuart (eds), The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia, Routledge, 2015.
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reinvigorate the alliance and update the half-century-long Thanat–Rusk 
communiqué, which has always been cited as the cornerstone of the US–
Thailand alliance. Specifically, the new statement calls for a partnership 
for regional security in South-East Asia, stability in the Asia-Pacific region 
and beyond, bilateral and multilateral interoperability and readiness, 
as well as relationship-building, coordination and collaboration at all 
levels. As it turned out, the 2012 joint statement falls short of the aim of 
cementing alliance relations. 
Obviously, the status of the US alliance is not a current priority in Thai 
strategic thinking. In recent defence white papers, there is no clear 
mention of the US alliance and more emphasis is placed on ASEAN-led 
mechanisms and multiple partners.20 The US arms previously acquired 
by the Thai military are ageing, a great many are nearing retirement, and 
there have been few recent purchases. Understandably, Thailand prefers 
less costly arms that come with technological transfer, and is trying to 
diversify its sources of purchase by approaching China, Ukraine, Sweden, 
Korea, Spain, Israel and Russia. The purchase of the Swedish Gripen, 
rather than the American F-series jet fighters, is indicative of this. 
Though the developments discussed above may seem pessimistic, there 
are several promising factors for the future of the US–Thailand alliance. 
First, Thailand continues to have deep and long cooperation with the 
United States, particularly in terms of interoperability. China is no match 
in this regard. Regular military exercises and various forms of military 
cooperation have ultimately quietly and firmly institutionalised the US–
Thailand alliance. Military-to-military relations remain robust with more 
than 50 joint US–Thailand exercises annually. Between 2001 and 2009, 
the total number of military exercises increased from 44 to 59, seven of 
which are multilateral.21 Cobra Gold is not the only large-scale military 
exercise, but also Cope Tiger, the Red Flag (previously Cope Thunder), 
and CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training). While 
originally focusing on the navy, these bilateral exercises have expanded to 
cover the army and air force. The Americans also benefit from conducting 
20  Thai Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper 2013, p. 8.
21  John Baseel, ‘The Military Relationship between Thailand and the United States in the Post 
September 11th Era’, MA Thesis, Chiang Mai University, 2009, p. 52.
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exercises in different terrain. In recent years, the exercises increasingly 
focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, civil affairs, peacekeeping 
and, importantly, humanitarian assistance.22
US–Thai military relations can be attributed to the role of the Joint 
US Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), which has 
been active in various schemes of military cooperation, particularly 
military exercises, humanitarian and counter-drug missions. In fact, 
JUSMAGTHAI organises one of the largest International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) programs for Thailand and a number 
of cadets will be sent to study in the United States each year. Likewise, 
American military officers are sent to Thailand’s Command and General 
Staff Academy. The socialisation is helpful in pursuing more cooperation. 
Apart from the military-to-military relations, Thailand and the United 
States engage in bilateral strategic dialogue. 
Second, Thailand is a workable partner. Thanks to the interoperability 
accumulated through years of military exercises, training and equipment 
purchase, a number of new cooperation initiatives are proceeding. 
In response to the increasing terrorism threats following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States in 2001, Thailand has been host to a new 
multilateral naval exercise called SEACAT (South-East Asia Cooperation 
Against Terrorism) since 2002. This exercise aims to police South-East 
Asia’s sea lanes for maritime terrorism and piracy. Importantly, Thailand’s 
cooperation with the United States in arresting Hambali, a key Al-Qaeda 
member, in 2003 highlights the ability of the two countries to work 
effectively on non-traditional security issues.
Moreover, Thailand and the United States reached an agreement in late 
2002 to create a war reserve stockpile,23 the first US stockpile outside 
of NATO territories and South Korea.24 This demonstrates a part of the 
cooperation under the non-NATO alliance.
Third, the areas of shared interests between the United States and 
Thailand remain considerable, specifically on regional stability and non-
traditional security. The United States remains the most important actor 
22  Baseel, ‘The Military Relationship between Thailand and the United States in the Post September 
11th Era’, 2009, p. 53.
23  Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Equipment and Munitions from 
United States War Reserve Stocks to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, Treaties and 
International Act Series 02-1126.
24  Stern, ‘Diverging Roads’, 2009, p. 2.
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in maintaining regional stability. Thailand relies on stable regional order 
to develop its country. So do other regional countries. Any cooperation 
toward that goal would be welcome. Admittedly, however, it may be 
harder to mutually agree on the appropriate kind of cooperation, and its 
extent, that would lead to regional stability. 
In this regard, cooperation is increasingly focused more on non-traditional 
security, including drugs, terrorism and insurgency, all of which are 
important threats to Thailand. Here, information and intelligence sharing 
is crucial. In 2012, following a US travel warning, several bombs exploded 
in Thailand. Since then, the US army has been assisting Thailand in 
developing bomb-disposal skills.25
Meanwhile, Thailand has played a role in peacekeeping operations and 
HADR, both of which will raise the country’s international profile. This is 
particularly true after its successful involvement in the peace processes in 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste. The frequent occurrence of disasters in the 
region also motivated Thailand to play a more active role in this area. 
As the United States continues to be a key player in such activities, there 
is room for joint operation, particularly on HADR.
Finally, Thailand traditionally tends to diversify ties with major powers. 
Accordingly, sour relations with the United States can be only temporary 
during this military government. Once Thailand returns to electoral 
democracy, scheduled for 2018, bilateral relations should improve.
Conclusion
In Thai strategic thinking, the status of the US alliance is not at its peak. 
Owing to this is the changing security environment and shifting economic 
equation following the rise of China. There are several downsides in 
the US–Thailand alliance, stemming from America’s security identity, 
Thailand’s increasing shared economic and political interests with China 
and domestic politics. The general trend is that Thailand’s relations 
with China are on the rise, while those with the United States are 
in relative decline. 
25  Conversation with US army officer, Bangkok, Feb. 2011.
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Yet, the relationship with China does not have only upsides, but also 
downsides, including economic threats from Chinese capitalists as well 
as China’s assertiveness, especially with regard to the South China Sea. 
Thailand’s high expectation of China’s generosity could be disappointed. 
Thailand cannot rely too heavily on China, but has to resort to the familiar 
strategy of hedging and diversifying ties with major powers. 
Meanwhile, there are quite a few upsides in the US–Thailand alliance. 
Military-to-military interactions with the United States remain 
intact, thanks to a half-century of institutionalised relationships and 
interoperability. Thailand also has converging interests with the United 
States on regional stability and non-traditional security. HADR emerged 
as a promising field for cooperation between the two nations. 
At any rate, the United States must accept the changing realities and 
concentrate on what the two countries can do, rather than aiming 
unrealistically towards common strategic thinking and action. Thailand 
is not likely to maximise the utility of its US alliance, but rather prefers 
to maximise its room for manoeuvring between major powers. Hedging 
and limited alignments remains the viable choice for small ally countries 
like Thailand.26 As Thailand tends to view relations with major powers in 
various lights, the United States should not concentrate on the security 
realm but rather seek to engage with its ally in a multidimensional manner. 
Given the region’s security, economic and political environment, alliance 
management has become more difficult but still manageable.
26  See John Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975, 
Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010.
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1  See, for example, a perceptive analysis by F Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr 
Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 3, 2002, pp. 377–96.
Poland as an Ally
Witold Rodkiewicz
By 2016, Poland had been a member of the North Atlantic Alliance for 
over 15 years. This is a sufficiently long period for a country to establish 
a track record as an ally. Even a cursory look at Poland’s record reveals 
a number of distinctive features that characterise Polish attitudes towards, 
and behaviour within, the alliance. These distinctive features have been 
shaped by three factors: geopolitical location, historical memories and 
national political traditions.
The first factor is obvious: Poland is a borderline state. In the east it 
borders three states—Belarus, Ukraine and Russia—which are not 
members of the alliance, and whose trajectory of development since 1991 
has increasingly diverged from the path chosen by Poland and other post-
Communist nations in Central Europe. Institutionally and symbolically, 
this borderline became even sharper following Poland’s entry into the 
European Union in 2004. Moreover, one of those states, Russia, is not only 
a nuclear great power but also a successor state and the legal continuator 
of the Soviet Union, the great power that, not so long ago, played the role 
of a regional hegemon. While in the early 1990s it was open to question 
how the ruling elite in Moscow would interpret its ‘successor’ role, by the 
time of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the ‘revisionist’ elements in foreign 
policy thinking of the Russian elite were becoming increasingly evident.1
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The second factor is that of historical memory, which contains several 
layers. The most recent is the experience of living in a state with limited 
sovereignty. For the politically active generation that was shaped by the 
Solidarity period, this involves a memory of the threats of Soviet military 
intervention that were used as a tool of political pressure by both Moscow 
and the Communist leadership in Warsaw. A deeper layer consists of 
memory of the neighbouring power’s use of military aggression to bring 
about a swift destruction of the reconstituted Polish state in 1939. This 
is also associated with the experience of being ‘abandoned’ by the Allies. 
A still deeper layer is that of the experience of more than a century-long 
period of living under foreign rule, after the final partition of the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century.
The third factor is the deep attachment to the right of self-determination 
both on an individual as well as a collective level as symbolised by 
the principle of the political culture of the First Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth: quod omnis tangit, ab omnibus approbari debet (what 
concerns all, should be approved by all). The political establishment of 
post-Communist Poland internalised the so-called ‘Giedroyc doctrine’,2 
which claimed that preservation of independence by the new post-Soviet 
states that lie between Poland and the Russian Federation is a fundamental 
Polish long-term interest.
‘Existential’ Alliance
Those factors produced a set of attitudes that influenced the way Poland 
functioned as an ally. They included first of all the assumption that Polish 
membership of the alliance is not a luxury or a matter of choice but an 
‘existential’ necessity. It is an axiom for the Polish political establishment as 
well as for public opinion that, given Poland’s geopolitical location and her 
historical experience, external security guarantees are an absolute must. These 
convictions are reflected in high levels of public support for membership of 
the alliance from the time when Poland was entering the alliance up to 
the present moment. Moreover, the feeling of relative vulnerability and the 
historical experience of an ‘ineffective alliance’ produced a conviction that 
an alliance cannot be limited to mere ‘paper’ guarantees. Guarantees have 
to be backed by real military capabilities and the political will to use those 
2  Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000) was the chief editor of an influential emigré monthly, Kultura, 
which was published between 1945 and 2006, first in Rome and later in Paris.
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capabilities cannot be taken for granted but needs to be cultivated. Hence, 
Poland’s interest not only in membership but in keeping the alliance in 
good shape—both organisationally and politically. 
A ‘Serious’ Ally
Poland treats its membership of the alliance seriously. This is reflected in 
the  fact that Polish defence expenditure, in terms of GDP percentage, 
never  fell below the European average and, since 2009, it has stayed 
consistently above it. Although it is true that Poland has not been 
fulfilling the official NATO requirement to maintain defence spending at 
2 per cent of GDP, it has never fallen much below that threshold (only in 
the crisis year of 2008 did it drop to 1.6 per cent). This is particularly 
striking when one takes into account that, in per capita terms, Poland is 
one of the poorest members of the alliance and, what is politically more 
relevant, the poorest among the Central European countries that form 
a natural reference point against which Polish society measures its standard 
of living. Moreover, in real terms Poland has consistently increased its 
defence expenditures—again with the exception of the crisis year of 2008 
and of 2013—since it joined the alliance. This spike in defence spending 
has been especially pronounced in recent years: in 2014 it rose by 11.5 
per cent and, in 2015, by an estimated 21.7 per cent. In this respect Poland 
has become a clear leader in the alliance, overtaken only by Lithuania and 
(in 2015) Luxembourg.3
The other demonstration of Poland’s commitment to the alliance was 
its significant and consistent contribution to the military operations 
conducted either by the alliance or—as in the case of Iraq—by the United 
States and some of its allies. In Afghanistan, the Polish contingent that 
was present from 2002 until 2014 reached, at the maximum point of 
engagement—the so-called 8th Rotation from the end of October 2010 
– 2,600 military personnel. Overall, over 28,000 Polish military personnel 
participated in the Afghan mission, suffering 45 casualties.4 Polish forces 
3  See Tables 2, 3 and 4, in NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. 
Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (1990–2013), 10 Mar. 2011 (www.nato.int/cps/pl/natohq/
news_107359.htm); and Table 3, NATO, Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008–2015), 
28 Jan. 2016, viewed Aug. 2016, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_127537.htm. 
4  Official information of the Polish Ministry of Defense, ‘Podsumowanie Polskiego Udzialu 




also participated in the stabilisation mission in Iraq where, between 
2003 and 2008, a Polish contingent served as the core of a Multinational 
Division, responsible for one of the four security sectors in Iraq. In the 
first years of deployment the size of the contingent hovered around 2,500. 
Overall over 15,000 Polish military participated in the Iraqi operations, 
suffering 22 casualties.5
Poland also has participated in alliance missions in the Balkans, contributing 
a battalion-size unit to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 
Kosovo. An important detail that should be emphasised is that Polish 
contingents operated both in Iraq and in Afghanistan with relatively few 
restrictions (so-called ‘national caveats’), which did not preclude their 
participation in combat operations.
Proving Commitment
Significant Polish participation in two major, costly and high-risk 
operations (Iraq and Afghanistan) throws an important light on Poland’s 
approach to its alliances. Polish public opinion was opposed to Poland’s 
participation in both operations—in particular in Iraq. This was due to the 
widespread perception that in both cases no direct Polish national security 
interest was involved. Poland had no major interest in the Middle East 
and did not see the Saddam Hussein regime as a particular security threat. 
Similarly, in the case of Afghanistan, the reaction of the Polish public was 
shaped by the fact that Poland has never been a target of terrorist attacks 
and radical Islam was not seen as an immediate threat to Polish security. 
On the contrary, the heavy involvement of the United States (in Iraq) and 
of NATO (in Afghanistan) in out-of-area operations was seen as running 
directly against Polish security interests, since it was diverting US/NATO 
resources and attention from preparations for the Article 5 contingencies 
on the Eastern flank of the alliance.
Nevertheless, the decisions to participate in those operations were meant 
to demonstrate Poland’s commitment to its allies and to the alliance. 
This  was bound up with expectations—that some would describe as 
5  P Hudyma, ‘Udział Wojsk Polskich w Misjach Zagranicznych o Charakterze Pokojowym 
i Stabilizacyjnym, w Latach 1953–2008’, PhD Thesis, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, 2011, 
p. 98.
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naïve—that in this way Poland was creating political and moral ‘IOU-
notes’ that  could be ‘cashed in’ when Poland is faced with an actual 
military threat. 
America’s ‘Trojan Horse’
Poland’s decision to send military forces to Iraq highlights another 
important strand in the Polish approach to the alliance. NATO is 
perceived first of all as an institutional framework that provides Poland 
with a security guarantee from the United States. This ‘America-centric’ 
approach has a persuasive pragmatic rationale that is connected with the 
point already mentioned above—the ‘existential’ nature of the alliance 
for Poland. Since the alliance is seen as an instrument for providing 
real military assistance in case of aggression, the gradual and consistent 
demilitarisation of Western Europe that could be observed after the end 
of the Cold War, meant that the United States has been the only player 
that realistically could be expected to have sufficient forces at its disposal 
to offer significant assistance that would be effective in military terms. 
Moreover, the United States was credited with greater willingness to use 
military force than West European nations, and therefore less likely to 
hesitate when faced with the perspective of deployment that could involve 
real combat and carry the risk of an escalation into a large-scale conflict.
Therefore, Poland has always been eager to develop bilateral defence ties 
with Washington, beyond and outside the multilateral NATO framework. 
This is also why Warsaw decided to back Washington over the Iraq issue, 
even though this decision put it on a collision course with Germany 
and France, the two most influential EU states, and even though Poland 
was then in the process of negotiating its membership of the European 
Union.6 Similarly Poland, after some hesitation and hard bargaining, 
signed and ratified in August 2008 a bilateral agreement with the United 
States allowing for the stationing of elements of the American anti-ballistic 
missile system in Poland.7 It is important to note that the bargaining 
was about the degree to which the project was to be accompanied by 
6  On the motives behind the decision, see, M Wągrowska, ‘Udział Polski w Interwencji Zbrojnej 
i Misji Stabilizacyjnej w Iraku’, Raporty i Analizy, no. 12, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, 
2004, pp. 6–11.
7  M Wągrowska, ‘Tarcza Antyrakietowa z Polskiej Perspektywy’, in Amerykańska tarcza antyrakietowa 
w Europie, koniczność, warunki, akceptacja, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008, pp. 39–47.
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development of other military ties. In effect, Poland was trying to utilise 
the missile defence project for developing a broader bilateral security 
relationship with the United States. The Polish aim was to get ‘American 
boots’ on the ground—a significant and permanent US military presence 
to guarantee that any military attack on Poland would inevitably mean 
a direct attack on the American armed forces. 
A Recalcitrant Ally
The Polish–American bargaining that preceded the August 2008 
agreement on the location of elements of the anti-missile shield in Poland 
demonstrated another distinctive feature of Polish alliance behaviour. 
Poland, due to its size, population and history, aspires to be a ‘middling 
power’ that is capable of articulating and defending its national interests 
within the alliance. It seeks to express its own vision for the alliance and 
expects to have its voice heard and taken into account, especially on 
those aspects of alliance policy that are directly relevant to the alliance’s 
Eastern flank. 
A few cases can be cited where Warsaw demonstrated that it was not 
about to accept the prevailing winds from Washington but would behave 
according to its own analysis of the strategic situation. The first such 
example was the Polish decision not to follow the tendency in the alliance, 
that was prevalent until the Russian military aggression against Ukraine 
in 2014, to restructure the military for expeditionary, out-of-area tasks, 
de-emphasising—and in some cases completely getting rid of—assets and 
capabilities necessary for conventional territorial defence. Poland tried to 
keep the balance, retaining a significant land warfare component armed 
with heavy equipment. Moreover, during the discussions preceding the 
adoption of the New Strategic Concept at the 2010 Lisbon summit, 
Poland—together with Norway—argued for retention of the Article 5 
tasks (i.e. collective defence of member states’ territories) being given 
sufficient weight and priority.8 
Warsaw has consistently raised, almost from the beginning of its 
membership of the alliance, the issue of the lack of significant military 
presence and infrastructure on the territory of new members, as well as 
8  See, for example, B Górka-Winter & M Madej (eds), NATO Member States and the New Strategic 
Concept: An Overview, Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010, pp. 79–82.
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a lack of contingency plans for their defence in case of military aggression. 
This was apparently met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm in both Berlin 
and Washington. In view of their assessment of Russian intentions and 
capabilities, such plans were redundant, while they might hamper the 
pursuit of cooperation with Russia by contradicting the official NATO 
line that it did not perceive Russia as a potential enemy. Nevertheless, 
Poland’s persistence, facilitated by the Russian military operation against 
Georgia, in demanding contingency plans in case of an attack on Polish 
territory led to such plans being drawn up between 2008 and 2010.9 
Poland also was trying to persuade the alliance to hold military exercises 
on its territory that would not be limited to peacekeeping or crisis 
management operations but would prepare for Article 5 contingencies.
Conclusion
Poland’s exposed strategic location, combined with its historical memories, 
has shaped its distinctive approach to the NATO alliance. The alliance is 
seen as an indispensable means of providing a military guarantee shielding 
the country from military pressure or even military aggression from the 
Russian Federation. Therefore, Poland attaches particular importance to 
the cultivation of transatlantic military links, both within the framework 
of NATO as well as bilaterally. Its primary interest was in the collective 
defence function of the alliance as opposed to crisis management and 
out-of-area operations. Nevertheless, it actively participated in out-of-
area stabilisation operations conducted by its allies, deploying significant 
forces for extended periods of time, in order to prove its value as an ally 
and to accumulate a stock of good will and trust in allied capitals—first 
of all in Washington—that could be ‘called in’ in an hour of need. While 
demonstrating its alliance loyalty, Poland has at the same time revealed 
itself to be capable of hard bargaining, asserting its own interests within 
the alliance and of articulating a distinctive position on alliance policy 
based on its own, independent analysis of the strategic situation.10
9  B Klich, ‘NATO po Afganistanie’, in Piętnaście lat Polski w NATO, Warszawa, 2014, p. 121.
10  See, for example, R Kupiecki, ‘The Security Dilemma Facing Central and Eastern Europe, 
NATO, the United States, and Transatlantic Security Relations’, in R Kupiecki & A Michta (eds), 
Transatlantic Relations in a Changing European Security Environment, Warsaw: Center for Strategic 
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